



## PREFACE

In response to demands which have reached Government from several sources, Government have now prepared a review which brings together a number of facts, whether derived from official documents or otherwise, bearing on the responsibility of Mr. Gandhi and the Congress High Command for the disturbances which followed the sanctioning of a mass movement by the A. I. C. C. on August 8th, 1942. Almost all the facts presented in this review are, or should be, already within the knowledge of the public. The review does not purport to disclose all the information in the possession of the Government. In addition to the facts here stated, there is a large volume of evidence which it is undesirable to publish at present.

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# CONGRESS RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE DISTURBANCES, 1942-43

## CHAPTER I

### THE "QUIT-INDIA" MOVEMENT : SETTING THE STAGE

In an article written on April 19th, 1942, which appeared in "Harijan" of April 26th, Mr. Gandhi first gave public expression to the theory which was to crystallize into his "Quit-India" move. In this article, after deploring the introduction of foreign soldiers into India to aid in India's defence, Mr. Gandhi asserted that if the British were to leave India to her fate, as they had had to leave Singapore, non-violent India would lose nothing and Japan would probably leave India alone. "Whatever the consequences, therefore, to India," he continued, "her real safety and Britain's too lie in orderly and timely British withdrawal from India".

It will be suggested that during the period between Mr. Gandhi's first advocacy of British withdrawal from India and the meeting of the All-India Congress Committee in Bombay on August 7th, the Congress High Command and in the later stages the Congress organisation as a whole were deliberately setting the stage for a mass movement designed to free India finally from British rule. The type of movement that they envisaged and the plans they made for it will be examined later. An essential preliminary to any such examination, however, is a clear understanding of the real motives underlying the move ; and though no detailed record of the many discussions which took place at Sevagram and elsewhere during this period is available, Mr. Gandhi's writings in "Harijan", and the record of the discussions in the Working Committee during its meeting at Allahabad at the end of April are sufficient to provide an ample insight into the true motives of Mr. Gandhi and the Congress in demanding the immediate withdrawal of the British power from India. The period falls naturally into two halves, in the first of which, lasting up to the passing of the Working Committee's resolution of July 14th, Mr. Gandhi held the stage alone and the essential structure of his proposals for the withdrawal of the British was developed. In the second half, extending to the Bombay meeting of the A. I. C. C., the emphasis lay on the struggle to be launched by Congress should the British not withdraw voluntarily, and the centre of interest shifted from Sevagram to other parts of the country, where Congress leaders placed before the people their varied interpretations of the resolution of July 14th.

In the article on Foreign Soldiers in India already alluded to, Mr. Gandhi expressed the opinion that should the British withdraw from India, Japan would leave her alone and that the withdrawal was therefore necessary for India's safety. This theme of India's safety from Japan dominates all Mr. Gandhi's earlier writings on the subject. It finds expression in "Harijan" of May 3rd, when, in denying that by asking the British rulers to withdraw he was inviting Japan to

attack India, Mr. Gandhi stated : " I feel convinced that the British presence is the incentive for the Japanese attack." It is even more precisely expressed in " Harijan " of the following week, in which Mr. Gandhi says : " The presence of the British in India is an invitation to Japan to invade India. Their withdrawal removes the bait." It was not till May 24th, nearly a month after the debut of ' Quit India,' that Mr. Gandhi first admitted the possibility of Japan still invading India despite the withdrawal of the British. His advice to the people was then characteristically that they should offer stubborn non-violent non-co-operation to the Japanese, which he suggested would be infinitely more effective in the absence of the British.

Although his earlier proposals for British withdrawal all emphasised the importance of this withdrawal being a voluntary act willingly performed, Mr. Gandhi had already by May 10th decided that he must devote the whole of his energy to this ' supreme act ' ; and it is clear that very shortly afterwards, he began to think in terms of a struggle to achieve his object. The following paragraph appears in " Harijan " of May 31st, in an article entitled ' Friendly Advice ', in which Mr. Gandhi says that he is taking every care humanly possible ' to prepare the ground ' :

" Of course the people must not on any account lean on the Japanese to get rid of the British Power. That were a remedy worse than the disease. But as I have already said, in this struggle every risk has to be run in order to cure ourselves of the biggest disease—a disease which has sapped our manhood and almost made us feel as if we must for ever be slaves. It is an insufferable thing. The cost of the cure, I know, will be heavy. No price is too heavy to pay for the deliverance."

In its earlier stages, Mr. Gandhi's ' Quit India ' move was meant and was widely interpreted as a proposal for the physical withdrawal from India of the British, and of all British and Allied troops. As late as June 14th, he makes, for the purpose of his scheme, the assumption " that the Commander-in-Chief of the united American and British Armies has decided that India is no good as a base, and that they should withdraw to some other base and concentrate the allied forces there." Added strength is given to the belief that this is a correct interpretation of Mr. Gandhi's original intentions by the prominence, to which attention has already been drawn, of the theme that the British withdrawal would remove any Japanese motive for invading India ; for with the British and Allied armies still in India, how is the bait removed ? At the same time, he made it clear that on the British departure the Indian Army would be disbanded. Opposition to Mr. Gandhi's move, which besides developing strongly in Britain and America as was to be expected, had also been expressed in portions of the Press in India on which he and the Congress had become accustomed to rely for support, centred chiefly round this proposal for the withdrawal of the Allied

armies in the face of what appeared imminent Japanese aggression. Realists were unable to see how India's defence and the cause of the Allies would thus be strengthened and indeed Mr. Gandhi's defence of this position by the assertion that, in the absence of the violent resistance of the British, Indian non-violent resistance would be able to attain the maximum effectiveness did appear somewhat inadequate in the face of his well-known admission that only a very doubtful proportion of the Indian people was sufficiently imbued with the doctrine of non-violence to be capable of offering successful non-violent resistance. Bowing to the gathering force of this opposition, and also, as we shall seek to show later, with a possible view to reconciling disagreement among members of the Working Committee, Mr. Gandhi discovered the 'gap' in his original proposals. In "Harijan" of June 14th, he paved the way,—by the slightly cryptic assertion that, if he had his way, the Indian National Government when formed would tolerate the presence of the United Nations on Indian soil under certain well-defined conditions but would permit no further assistance,—for the more definite statement made to an American journalist in the following week's "Harijan," when in reply to a question whether he envisaged Free India's allowing Allied troops to operate from India, he said: "I do. It will be only then that you will see real co-operation". He continued that he did not contemplate the complete shifting of Allied troops from India and that, provided India became entirely free, he could not insist on their withdrawal.

Before any attempt is made to assess the motives actuating Mr. Gandhi in his 'Quit-India' move, reference must be made to the important evidence as to the working of his mind and the reactions of the members of the Working Committee furnished by the record (Appendix I) of the latter's Allahabad meeting, which was recovered in a subsequent police search of the All-India Congress Committee's office. Mr. Gandhi was not present at this meeting, but he sent for the consideration of the Working Committee a draft resolution which was the direct precursor of the resolution of July 14th. "Japan's quarrel," he states in the draft, "is not with India. She is warring against the British Empire.... If India were freed her first step would probably be to negotiate with Japan." Britain, Congress was of opinion, was incapable of defending India, whereas if the British withdrew India would be able to defend herself against the Japanese or any other aggressor. The draft goes on to assure the Japanese Government that India bears no enmity against Japan and desires only freedom from alien domination, which she will attain and retain through her non-violent strength. The hope is expressed that Japan will not have any designs on India; but should she attack India, all Indians who look to the Congress for guidance would be expected to offer non-violent non-co-operation to the Japanese.

The draft revealed a marked division of opinion in the Working Committee, and the remarks of Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru and Mr. C. Rajagopalachari, its two principal opponents, are of sufficient interest to merit quotation at length :

"Withdrawal of troops and the whole apparatus of civil administration," said Nehru, "will create a vacuum which cannot be filled up immediately. If we said to Japan that her fight was with British Imperialism and not us she would say 'we are glad the British army is withdrawn ; we recognise your independence. But we want certain facilities now. We shall defend you against aggression. We want aerodromes, freedom to pass our troops through your country. This is necessary in self-defence.' They might seize strategic points and proceed to Iraq, etc. The masses won't be touched if only the strategic points are captured. If Bapu's (Mr. Gandhi) approach is accepted, we become passive partners of the Axis powers.... The whole background of the draft is one which will inevitably make the world think that we are lining up passively with the Axis powers. The British are asked to withdraw. After the withdrawal we are to negotiate with Japan and possibly come to some terms with her. These terms may include a large measure of civil control by us, a certain measure of military control by them, passage of armies through India, etc..... Whether you will like it or not, the exigencies of the war situation will compel them to make India a battleground. In sheer self-defence they cannot afford to keep out. They will walk through the country. You can't stop it by non-violent, non-co-operation.....the whole thought and background of the draft is one of favouring Japan. It may not be conscious. Three factors influence our decisions in the present emergency (i) Indian Freedom (ii) sympathy for certain larger causes (iii) probable outcome of the war—who is going to win. It is Gandhiji's feeling that Japan and Germany will win. This feeling unconsciously governs his decision."

To this penetrating analysis of Mr. Gandhi's draft, Mr. Rajagopalachari added :

"I do not agree that if Britain goes away India will have some scope for organising itself even if Japan should make some headway. Japan will fill the vacuum created by the British withdrawal. Our reaction to the evils of Britain should not make us lose our sense of perspective. It is no use getting upset on small matters. Do not run into the arms of Japan, which is what the resolution comes to."

For those of the Working Committee who supported the draft, let Achyut Patwardhan speak :

"If we do not take decisions, Jawaharlalji's attitude will lead to abject and unconditional co-operation with British

machinery which must collapse....Our co-operation with Britain is an invitation to Japan....The war is an imperialist war. Our policy can be that we take no sides. The world is in the grip of a fear complex. I would consider the position if the Allies could defeat the Axis, but I see clearly that Britain is going towards the deep."

And finally, Mr. Rajendra Prasad :

"We cannot produce the proper atmosphere unless we adopt Bapu's draft"

—a draft, to repeat, of which the whole thought and background is one of favouring Japan, a resolution which amounts to running into the arms of Japan.

## CHAPTER II:

### WARDHA TO BOMBAY—THE MOTIVES AND AIMS OF THE RESOLUTIONS

By the time the Working Committee met at Wardha in July, Mr. Gandhi's proposals were complete in their essentials. These were not later changed, and the succeeding period was concerned rather with how the essentials were to be brought about and how the dish was to be served up in such a way as least to antagonize world opinion.

On July 14th, the Working Committee passed a resolution which differed in only one *fundamental* respect from Mr. Gandhi's Allahabad draft—in that the Congress agreed to the stationing of Allied troops in India to ward off Japanese attack. It is difficult to find an adequate explanation, in the events of the period between the Working Committee's Allahabad meeting in April and their Wardha meeting in July, of this reversal of their former decision. In particular, the external threat to India was virtually unabated and the psychological background of the resolution remained the same. It is hard to resist the conclusion therefore that the decisive factor by which those realists who had formerly opposed the resolution were swayed was Mr. Gandhi's decision to permit the retention of the Allied troops in India—a decision which may well have been due to his eyes having been opened by an American journalist to what America would think of the original plan. A further legitimate inference is surely that the necessity of carrying his former opponents in the Working Committee with him was a reason, if not *the* reason, for Mr. Gandhi's striking change of front on this fundamental issue; such an explanation is at least as plausible as that a man of Mr. Gandhi's mental calibre should be guilty, in placing a carefully pondered scheme before the world, of such a glaring oversight as his later explanation required one to believe. But this theory goes far to resolve a further difficulty: it was always hard to believe that Mr. Gandhi, a well-known opponent of any form of military regime, should fail to see the obvious danger that, with the British civil



Government removed, the troops who remained and who would require to safeguard their communications and supplies would immediately establish some form of military rule over at least the major part of the country ; this danger was forcibly expressed to him by many, including Mr. C. Rajagopalaehari, and the following extract is from a letter written by the latter to Mr. Gandhi and subsequently made public (Appendix II) :

“ Your proposal that while the civil power may be withdrawn the British and Allied forces may continue in India in anticipation of a treaty with a problematical provisional Indian Government will only lead to the exercise of all governmental functions by the military forces. This will happen if only for their own safety and effective functioning. They are further likely to be urged towards this step by local chieftains and suffering people. This would be the reinstallation of the British Government in a worse form ”.

No satisfactory solution of this difficulty was ever made public by Mr. Gandhi ; but it is impossible to suppose that he had achieved no solution and it must be inferred that the solution was one which he preferred should remain a secret. Now while the details of Mr. Gandhi's personal solution of this problem must remain a matter for speculation, an explanation which fulfils the logical requirements of the above situation immediately comes to mind ; it is that, as we have shown above to be probable, Mr. Gandhi's admission of this amendment to his scheme was intended primarily as a bid for American support and perhaps secondarily as a sop to his opponents on the Working Committee, but that he envisaged, or planned to create, circumstances in which this permission would be meaningless, that is to say, circumstances in which the troops would either be forced to withdraw, or would if they remained be rendered ineffective. The nature of Mr. Gandhi's plans will be discussed later ; meanwhile, some slight added plausibility is given to this view by the following reply of Mr. Gandhi's to one of his early questioners as to the nature of his proposed movement :

“ It will be a move which will be felt by the whole world. It *may* not interfere with the movement of British troops, but it is sure to engage British attention ”.

But the chief attraction of this explanation is that it provides a background of logical thought for Mr. Gandhi's most illogical writings on this subject and also supplies continuity of motive ; for without some such explanation, we are faced with the paradox of Mr. Gandhi, having proposed a scheme one of the principal objects of which was to avoid India's becoming a theatre of war, and suddenly introducing a new feature the result of which was apparently likely to be the direct negation of that object.

From the foregoing somewhat lengthy survey two basic motives emerge as the foundation of Mr. Gandhi's proposals :—the first is a desire to free India finally from British domination ; the second is a desire to avoid at all costs India's becoming a theatre of active warfare, a battlefield between Britain and Japan.

Few will deny the existence of the first of these motives. Complete freedom for India is the openly expressed goal of Congress. Controversy enters only over the time factor. Why, many have asked, when freedom had been promised to India after the war, should the Congress engage upon a venture the extreme riskiness of which had been pointed out on many occasions by Mr. Gandhi himself? There were it may be suggested, two main reasons. The first was a growing sense of frustration in Congress itself. This is well illustrated by the following extract from an article by Mr. Gandhi entitled ' To Resist Slave Drivers ' which appeared in " Harijan " of June 7th :

" I waited and waited until the country should develop the non-violent strength necessary to throw off the foreign yoke. But my attitude has now undergone a change. I feel that I cannot afford to wait. If I continue to wait, I might have to wait till doomsday. For the preparation that I have prayed and worked for may never come, and in the meantime I may be enveloped and overwhelmed by the flames that threaten all of us. That is why I have decided that even at certain risks which are obviously involved I must ask the people to resist the slavery."

The Congress campaign of selected satyagraha having failed to achieve any practical object and having long ceased to attract any attention, had finally been called off ; and partly on account of this and partly owing to the general lack of political interest which marked the period before the Cripps mission, Congress influence with the masses was at a low ebb. The arrival of Sir Stafford Cripps and the negotiations which appeared to come so near to success roused political feelings to a fever pitch. The very suddenness with which final failure came, and the recriminations which succeeded it, opened the door to the inculcation of a deep and widespread bitterness against Britain and against the Government in this country. The Congress High Command was at this time a house divided, serious disagreements which had shown themselves during the Cripps negotiations continuing over the question of non-violence with particular reference to the defence of India against Japan. A powerful and unifying cause was thus necessary then, both to save the Congress from internal disruption and to rescue their hold over the masses. What better cry than the removal of the British, especially when common cause could be made in spreading bitterness against Britain and exploiting the agitation in some parts

of the country against the discomforts inevitably attendant on war? The second reason connects with the second main motive postulated above. The threat of Japanese invasion seemed imminent. If an armed clash in the East was to be avoided, action must be immediate, as soon as the necessary preparations could be made.

The second motive was never explicitly admitted by Mr. Gandhi or the Congress, but it is implicit in all the former's earlier writings on the 'Quit India' theme and is even more clearly shown in the draft resolution sent by him to Allahabad. Mr. Gandhi, and not only he but also apparently Achyut Patwardhan and the members of the 'non-violent' clique in the Working Committee, were convinced that the Axis must win the war and that Britain would prove incapable of defending India against Japan.

That this attitude persisted long after the Allahabad Working Committee meeting is shown by the following remark made by Mr. Gandhi in "Harijan" of July 19th, in reply to a question whether it would not be wiser to postpone his movement until Britain had settled with the Germans and the Japanese:

"No, because I know you will not settle with Germans without us".

A passage in Mr. Gandhi's letter to the Viceroy of August 14th is significant in this connection:

"I have taken Jawahar Lal Nehru as my measuring rod. His personal contacts make him feel much more *the misery of the impending ruin of China and Russia* than I can".

They foresaw a British rearguard action across India and the devastation that this must entail; and it is no coincidence that, at the same time as Mr. Gandhi was developing his 'Quit India' theme in "Harijan", he was also inveighing against any form of 'scorched earth' policy. (Mr. Gandhi's solicitude for the property, largely industrial property be it noted, which it might have been necessary to deny to the enemy contrasts strangely with his readiness to sacrifice countless numbers of Indians in non-violent resistance to the Japanese. The property must be saved; it is perhaps legitimate to ask—For whom?) It seems possible that at first Mr. Gandhi genuinely hoped that, with the removal of the British from India, Japanese incentive to attack would be removed; and that he hoped to be able to treat with Japan after the British withdrawal is clearly shown in his Allahabad draft resolution. Subsequently proposals for non-violent non-co-operation with Japan, should she attack India after the British withdrawal, were developed. We have however his own admission that he could not guarantee that non-violent action would keep the Japanese at bay; he refers indeed to any such hope as an 'unwarranted supposition'. Since, therefore, Mr. Gandhi had no illusions as to the likelihood of effective non-violent resistance to the Japanese, we can only infer that in the admittedly possible event of Japanese aggression on India after the departure of the

British, he was prepared to concede to their demands. Such an inference accords with what we have shown to be his frame of mind at the time and it is strengthened by the following extract from an appeal addressed by him to the Japanese which appeared in "Harijan" of July 26th :—

"And we are in the unique position of having to resist an imperialism that we detest no less than yours (the Japanese) and Nazism".

That Mr. Gandhi would have preferred to see India entirely free from any form of domination, whether British or Japanese, cannot be doubted ; and it seems clear that only in the grip of some dominant emotion would he have contemplated such a capitulation ; this emotion was, it seems clear, his desire to preserve India from the horrors of war.

The principal difficulty in the way of accepting any such interpretations of Mr. Gandhi's motives during this period is the apparent contradiction in his consenting to the retention of Allied troops on Indian soil. It has already been shown that the reasons advanced by Mr. Gandhi for this admission, which bid fair to disrupt his whole scheme, are not such as can reasonably be accepted. And this entire difficulty disappears with the explanation previously given of the motives underlying his consent to the retention of the Allied troops.

Efforts have been made above to demonstrate that the dominant motives underlying Mr. Gandhi's 'Quit India' move, dominating to some extent even his intense desire to see India freed from foreign rule, was his wish to avoid India's being turned into a battlefield between Britain and Japan. It remains to examine the ostensible motives with which Mr. Gandhi and the Working Committee presented their move and to assess the genuineness of these motives in the light of the foregoing material.

Three main *ostensible* aims are common to both the Wardha resolution of July 14th [Appendix III (1)] and the Bombay resolution of August 8th [Appendix III (2)]. These are :—

(1) To remove foreign domination over India.

(2) To check the growing ill-will against Britain, with its danger of passive acceptance by the masses of aggression against India ; to build up a spirit of resistance to aggression among Indians ; and by granting India's millions immediate freedom to release that energy and enthusiasm which alone can enable India to play an effective part in her own defence and in the war as a whole.

(3) To achieve communal unity, by the removal of the foreign power with its policy of divide and rule, which will be followed by the formation of a Provisional Government representative of all sections of the Indian people.

Three further aims appeared for the first time in the Bombay resolution.

(4) To bring all subject and oppressed humanity to the side of the United Nations, thus giving these nations the moral and spiritual leadership of the world.

(5) To assist Asiatic nations under foreign domination to regain their freedom and to ensure that they are not again placed under the rule of any colonial power.

(6) To bring about a world federation, which would ensure the disbanding of national armies, navies and air forces, and the pooling of the world's resources for the common good of all.

The genuineness of the first of these aims is undeniable. The freedom of India, in whatever terms it may have been expressed, has long been the main goal of Congress and it has been shown above how this aim coincides with one of the main motives underlying the 'Quit India' move.

The second ostensible aim consists of two supplementary halves—to check India's growing ill-will against Britain and to enable India to play a more effective part in the war. It has been suggested that far from seeking to allay the bitterness left by the failure of the Cripps Mission, it was the aim of the Congress to seize upon the opportunity thus offered to regain her lost hold over the masses. Added reason to believe that this interpretation is correct is given by the fact, as will be seen later when the type of movement for which the Congress was preparing comes to be examined, that racial antagonism was deliberately aroused by the Congress leaders who, during the period between the Wardha and Bombay resolutions, toured the countryside preparing the masses for the coming rebellion. The further claim that the move was designed to enable India to play a more effective part in her own defence is belied by Mr. Gandhi's own writings. As already shown, Mr. Gandhi had little belief in the effectiveness of non-violence as a means of resisting Japanese invasion; he referred to such a belief, in fact, as an "unwarranted supposition" and it was on these grounds that he purported to consent to the retention of foreign troops in India for her defence. Grounds have, however, already been given for doubting whether this was the real reason. It is also amply clear from Mr. Gandhi's own writings that the presence of allied troops in India vitiated to his mind such effectiveness as non-violent resistance by Indians to the Japanese could be supposed to have. Thus, in his draft Allahabad resolution he says:—

"In such places where British and Japanese forces are fighting our non-cooperation (with the Japanese) will be fruitless and unnecessary."

This theme is repeated in the "Harijan" as the following extracts will show :—

"I make bold to say that, if the British withdraw and people here follow my advice, then non-cooperation will be infinitely more effective than it can be today; when it cannot be appreciated for the violent British action going on side by side."

"It must be admitted, therefore, that there will be little scope for non-violent resistance of aggression, with the Allied troops operating in India, as there is practically none now."

To summarise briefly, Mr. Gandhi did not believe that non-violence alone was capable of defending India against Japan. Nor had he any faith in the ability of the Allies to do so; "Britain", he stated in his draft Allahabad resolution, "is incapable of defending India." His 'Quit India' move was intended to result in the withdrawal of the British Government to be succeeded by a problematical provisional government or, as Mr. Gandhi admitted to be possible, by anarchy; the Indian army was to be disbanded; and Allied troops were to be allowed to operate only under the terms imposed by this provisional government, assisted by India's non-violent non-cooperation to Japan, for which, as Mr. Gandhi had already admitted, there could be little scope with Allied troops operating in India. Finally, even if, in the face of the above arguments, it could be supposed that Mr. Gandhi and the Congress proposed to pin their faith on the ability of Allied troops to defend India, it should be noted that the former himself admitted that the ability of Allied troops to operate effectively would depend upon the formation of a suitable provisional government. Now since this government was to be representative of all sections of Indian opinion, it is clear that neither Mr. Gandhi nor the Congress could legitimately commit it in advance to any particular course of action; they could not, that is to say, undertake that it would support the Allies in defending India against Japan. They could not in fact make any promise on behalf of this provisional government unless they intended that it should be dominated by Congress; and the whole trend of Congress policy coupled with the extravagant promises made in the Bombay A. I. C. C. resolution on behalf of this provisional government, leave little doubt that this *was* their intention,—a view held, significantly, by the Muslim League and Muslims in general. You have then a situation in which the Allied troops would be dependent for support on a Government dominated by a clique which it has already been shown to be thoroughly defeatist in outlook, and whose leader had already expressed the intention of negotiating with Japan.

It is not the intention here to examine the third aim, the establishment of communal unity followed by the formation of a provisional government, at all closely. It has been suggested in the

preceding paragraph that the Congress intended this government to be under their domination and a note has been made of the strength added to this view by the unity of Muslim opinion that the Congress move was aimed at establishing Congress-Hindu domination over India. It will suffice here to show, from Mr. Gandhi's own writings, the doubts that he entertained as to the feasibility of establishing any such government.

"Under my proposal, they have to leave India in God's hands—but in modern parlance to anarchy, and that anarchy may lead to internecine warfare for a time or to unrestrained dacoities".

"I have not asked the British to hand over India to the Congress or to the Hindus. Let them entrust India to God or in modern parlance to anarchy. Then all the parties will fight one another like dogs, or will, when real responsibility faces them, come to a reasonable agreement. I shall expect non-violence to arise out of that chaos."

That Mr. Gandhi's doubts on this subject were fully shared by Mr. C. Rajagopalachari is shown in the letter addressed by him to Mr. Gandhi, a copy of which is attached as Appendix II.

No detailed examination is necessary of the last three ostensible aims outlined at the top of page 10. It will be observed that they all have this point in common—they have no application to India and are concerned solely with the effect on the world of India's proposed move. It is surely significant that these three aims should have made their first appearance in the Bombay resolution, after a period when the Congress had been subjected to strenuous criticism both in Britain and America for what was almost universally held to be a betrayal of the Allied cause. That the additions were the result of this criticism may be taken for granted. Whether the authors of the resolution genuinely believed that the Congress demand would, if accepted, help rather than hinder the cause of the United Nations and intended that it should have that effect, depends on the answer to two questions. In the first place, could any body of men who honestly desired that result have deliberately called the country, if their way of achieving it was not accepted, to take part in a mass movement the declared object of which was to have precisely the opposite effect by paralysing the whole administration and the whole war effort? In the second place, bearing in mind that less than a year previously it had been proclaimed under Mr. Gandhi's orders to be a "sin" to help the war with men or money, can it be denied that these men saw their opportunity in Britain's danger and believed that the psychological moment for the enforcement of their political demands must be seized while the fate of the United Nations hung in the balance and before the tide of war turned—if it was ever going to turn—in their favour? The answer to these two questions is left to the reader.

## CHAPTER III

## THE CONTEMPLATED CHARACTER OF THE MOVEMENT

So far an attempt has been made to show the true motives underlying Mr. Gandhi's 'Quit India' move and to establish the hollowness of the grounds advanced for this move in the Congress resolutions of July 14th and August 8th. We shall now proceed to examine the nature of the steps which Mr. Gandhi proposed to take, should the British not accede to his request for their voluntary withdrawal.

As early as May 10th, Mr. Gandhi had determined that the withdrawal of the British from India was a "supreme act", to the realisation of which he must devote his whole energy. It very shortly became clear that he was already thinking in terms of a final struggle against the British, should they refuse to withdraw and in "Harijan" of May 31st he referred to it as a struggle in which every risk must be run in order that India should be cured of the disease of British domination, and of the spirit of hatred and slavery which it had engendered. Of this, he said :—

"It is an insufferable thing. The cost of the cure I know will be heavy. No price is too heavy to pay for the deliverance."

From this point onwards Mr. Gandhi's conception of the struggle developed rapidly. His writings on the subject are too lengthy to quote in full, but the following excerpts from "Harijan" illustrate the direction in which his mind was moving :—

"It will be a move which will be felt by the whole world. It *may* not interfere with the movement of British troops, but it is sure to engage British attention."

"My proposal for the withdrawal of the British power involves two actions. One is to deal with the present emergency, and the other to secure freedom from British supremacy. The second admits of delay. There is a lot of confusion about its implications. I am trying to the best of my ability to deal with the questions as they arise from time to time."

"The first admits of no delay and demands specific action irrespective of the proposal for British withdrawal. This is in connection with (1) the behaviour of troops, (2) the impending salt famine, (3) control of food-grains, (4) evacuation for the sake of the military, (5) discrimination between Europeans and Anglo-Indians and Anglo-Burmans on the one hand and Indians on the other hand."

"It is worth fighting for, it is worth staking all that the nation has."

"They (Indians) will fight, not to seize power but to end the foreign domination, cost what it may."



" But you may know that it will be a mass movement of a strictly non-violent character and then you can fill in the details. It will include all that a mass movement can include.....I do not want rioting as a direct result.....If in spite of all precautions rioting does take place, it cannot be helped.....I am not going to court imprisonment. The struggle does not involve courting imprisonment. It is too soft a thing.....My intention is to make the thing as short and swift as possible."

" Ours is an unarmed revolt against British Rule."

" Therefore I shall take every precaution I can to handle the movement gently, but I would not hesitate to go to the extremest limit, if I find that no impression is produced on the British Government or the Allied Power.....

It will be your biggest movement ?—

Yes, my biggest movement."

" I have no false notions of prestige, no personal considerations would make me take a step that I know is sure to plunge the country into a conflagration."

" Is the possibility of strike precluded ? "

" No ", said Gandhiji " strikes can be and have been non-violent. If railways are worked only to strengthen the British hold on India, they need not be assisted."

That the movement was to be the final effort of the Congress party, in which it must win freedom or be wiped out, was made clear by Mr. Gandhi in his speech at the Bombay meeting, after the A. I. C. C. had passed the ' Quit India ' resolution.

" Every one of you should, " he said, " from this moment onwards, consider yourself a free man or woman and act as if you are free and are no longer under the heel of this imperialism.....You may take it from me that I am not going to strike a bargain with the Viceroy for ministries and the like. I am not going to be satisfied with anything short of complete freedom.....*We shall do or die.* We shall either free India or die in the attempt."

In conclusion there are the famous words uttered by Mr. Gandhi at a press conference in Wardha, after the Working Committee had passed the resolution of July 14th, which show clearly how even at that early stage he was fully determined on a final struggle :—

" There is no room left in the proposal for withdrawal or negotiation. There is no question of one more chance. After all it is an *open rebellion.*"

There also lies the answer to those who have since accused Government of precipitating the crisis by the arrest of Mr. Gandhi and the Congress leaders, and have suggested that the period of

grace referred to by Mr. Gandhi in his Bombay speech should have been utilised for negotiation ; " there is no room left for withdrawal or negotiation ", Mr. Gandhi had said a month earlier. Moreover the Wardha resolution merely threatened a mass movement if the demands of Congress were not accepted. The Bombay resolution went further. It no longer *threatened* a movement with the delay that that might entail. It *sanctioned* the movement ; and if any further delay was intended, are there not at least good grounds for believing in the light of all that had been said, that it was to be used not for the purpose of negotiation but for putting the finishing touches to a plan to which its authors were already committed but which might not yet be completely ready to put into execution ?

The general character of the movement contemplated by Mr. Gandhi emerges clearly from the foregoing extracts. It was to be a struggle, a fight to the finish, in which foreign domination must be ended, cost what it may ; it was to be an unarmed revolt, short and swift, sure to plunge the country into a conflagration—a grimly accurate forecast!—in which Mr. Gandhi was prepared to risk the occurrence of riots, in which he was prepared to go to the extremest limit, including, if necessary, the calling of a general strike ; the struggle was to include everything that a " non-violent " mass movement could do, including strikes and the stoppage of railways, and possibly interference with British troop movements ; and full use was to be made of existing grievances against the British ; former Congress methods such as courting imprisonment were to be eschewed as too soft for the present occasion : finally every man and woman was to consider himself free and act for himself. These last words, or at least their sense, find a place in the resolution itself ; and any body of men that makes such an appeal to its followers can hardly disclaim responsibility for anything that may follow.

A question of sufficient importance to demand separate consideration is whether a movement of the kind that Mr. Gandhi is shown to have been contemplating, could, by its nature, be non-violent, and further whether Mr. Gandhi intended that it should be so or hoped that it would remain so.

It is significant that the entire phraseology of Mr. Gandhi's writings in connection with the movement is of a type associated in the ordinary man's mind with violence. Thus the struggle is referred to as a revolt and a rebellion in which the people must stake their all and be ready to do or die. The ordinary man to whom these writings were addressed was surely not to be blamed if he understood them as exhorting him to take up whatever arms lay handy and fight his British rulers. Supporters of non-violence will reply indignantly by pointing out that the word non-violence appears frequently in Mr. Gandhi's writings on the subject. It is necessary, therefore, to examine exactly what Mr. Gandhi meant in his use of this word in this context and how far he believed that the

“conflagration”, once under way, would remain non-violent. It has already been shown that Mr. Gandhi had little faith in the effectiveness of non-violence to resist Japanese aggression, while Maulana Abul Kalam Azad and Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru made no secret of their opinion that only armed resistance could defend India against Japan. Mr. Gandhi, however, had openly expressed the view that the British and Japanese imperialisms were equally to be detested. Why then should it be supposed that he would consider non-violence any more effective against the British than against the Japanese? Again, he had, as shown above, no illusions as to the very doubtful proportion of Indians who were full believers in his theory of non-violence; yet he proposed embarking on a movement in which he expressed the hope that all classes and communities would join and in which he directed every man and woman to consider themselves free and to think and act for themselves. Contrast this with his previous movement, the “satyagraha campaign” of 1940-41, in which, in order to maintain the desired standard of non-violence, he had been forced to limit participation to specially selected *satyagrahis*, who were even then only allowed to commit a special formal offence; remember too that he had before him the example of his previous movements, each professedly non-violent, yet each giving rise to the most hideous violence. The certainty that his movement could not remain non-violent is plain enough and, if further indication were wanted, it is supplied in the extracts from Mr. Gandhi’s own writings quoted in the preceding paragraphs, which make it clear that even if violence and rioting occurred during the movement this would not deter him, that he was prepared to go to the extremest limit.

It is perhaps worth examining one of Mr. Gandhi’s own many definitions of non-violence, and endeavouring to relate it to this particular case:—

“If a man fights with his sword single-handed against a horde of dacoits armed to the teeth, I should say he is fighting non-violently. Haven’t I said to our women that, if in defence of their honour they used their nails and teeth and even a dagger, I should regard their conduct as non-violent. She does not know the distinction between Himsa and Ahimsa. She acts spontaneously. Supposing a mouse fighting a cat tried to resist the cat with his sharp teeth, would you call that mouse violent. In the same way, for the Poles to stand bravely against the German hordes vastly superior in numbers, military equipment and strength, was almost non-violence.”

In other words, in any fight, the weaker of the two combatants may employ as violent measures as he likes or is able, and may still be considered to be fighting non-violently; or to put it in another way, violence when employed against superior odds automatically becomes non-violence. Surely, a very convenient theory for the rebels in “an unarmed revolt”.

Having endeavoured to show the type of struggle envisaged by Mr. Gandhi, it is time to turn to his colleagues in the Congress High Command and observe how they interpreted his views to their Congress followers and to the masses. During the period between the Working Committee's resolution of July 14th and the Bombay meeting of the A. I. C. C., almost all the Members of the Working Committee and many other important Congress leaders were engaged in endeavouring to explain and interpret Mr. Gandhi's proposed move to the public and to indicate in broad terms the nature of the struggle upon which, if the A. I. C. C. ratified the Working Committee's resolution, the Congress would embark if the British refused to withdraw. Thus Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru in the United Provinces, Babu Rajendra Prasad in Bihar, Mr. Shankerrao Deo and Mr. Vallabhbhai Patel in Bombay and many others addressed public meetings and Press conferences, urging the masses, in speeches many of which were openly seditious, to be prepared for the fight to the finish against the British which the Congress would shortly launch.

Before endeavouring to give examples from these speeches, attention may be drawn to two points which stand out in all this activity: the first is the insistence with which almost all speakers urged that every man should be prepared and willing to act on his own initiative; the second is the extraordinary attention paid by the speakers to the student community. Thus Congress speakers in Bihar, and the Central and United Provinces, made a point of canvassing the support of the student community, while Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru is known to have taken steps to enlist the support of students from the Benares Hindu University, a fact of particular significance in view of the prominence later assumed by this University in the serious disturbances which occurred in the east of the United Provinces. In Bombay, Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel and Mr. Shankerrao Deo publicly exhorted students to take an active part in the movement and to assume the leadership of Congress should Mr. Gandhi and the other leaders be arrested.

Space does not permit of a full or even a representative reproduction of the many speeches made by Congress leaders during this period and the following selection aims at displaying only the broadest trends:—

Typical of the speeches of Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru at this time were his words to a mass meeting of peasants in Allahabad on July 27th, when he warned them that there would be a mass movement in the country within a very short time and said that it was the duty of every *kisan* to understand the movement properly and to respond to the call. In other speeches he made it clear that there was no question of Congressmen deliberately choosing to go to jail; that

the Congress might perish in the terrible ordeal which was ahead of it ; but that a free India would emerge out of its ashes.

“ India is now determined to take a dip in this world-wide storm. In a few weeks we will have a mass movement. This will be our final struggle and we must be prepared to face the worst ”.

Finally at the Bombay A. I. C. C. meeting, Pandit Nehru said that the Congress had now burnt its boats and was to embark on a desperate campaign.

The following is an extract from the speech made by Babu Rajendra Prasad at a meeting of the Working Committee of the Bihar Congress held on July 21st and 22nd :—

“ One thing required special attention that no act should be done which would weaken the moral strength of the people. According to Gandhiji's view the movement would kindle a fire all over the country and would only be extinguished after either obtaining the independence of the country or wiping out Congress organisation altogether ”.

Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, who paid particular attention to students, addressing a student meeting in Ahmedabad is reported to have asked them to pick any item from the struggles that had been fought so far, since 1919, and also to tell every Britisher to quit India immediately ; Congress would not come any more to tell them what to do and what not to do, and they must take the initiative and do what seemed proper under the circumstances ; they should consider themselves free men and disobey all Government's orders ; they would have to pass on this message from house to house, as most newspapers would be suppressed ; it would be necessary for them to become living newspapers ; if they failed in their duty, it would bring nothing but disgrace on them.

Mr. Shanker Rao Deo, speaking at a public meeting held by the Bombay Congress on August 4th, said that in the coming struggle they would have to request workers in factories in which war material was being produced, and railway workers and others, to stop work until the British left India. The following is an extract from another speech in Bombay by Mr. Shanker Rao Deo.

“ Some students ask us whether they have to leave schools and colleges during the struggle. My answer is that they will have to do it, if ordered by Gandhiji. Students have always wanted revolution. Here is their opportunity. Revolution is coming to them, they should embrace it now without losing the opportunity ”.

Finally, in yet another speech, he said that the movement would be like a mutiny based on non-violence and would resemble the fight of 1857.

The above examples, which could be greatly multiplied, serve to give considerable further insight into the type of movement which the Congress intended to launch. It must be remembered that the members of the Working Committee, and through them the other first rank Congress leaders, were in the closest contact with Mr. Gandhi during this period and the working of their minds, exhibited in their speeches, must be regarded as in some sort a projection of Mr. Gandhi's own thoughts. Reference has already been made to the emphasis laid on the importance of each individual acting for himself ; and the type of action which he was urged to take confirms and strengthens the previous impression of a fundamentally violent movement of an "all-in" nature. Thus in addition to the more orthodox *hartals*, and no-rent and no-tax campaigns, defiance of all forms of Government authority was enjoined upon the people ; they were urged to endeavour to undermine the loyalty of the police and the military, and of Government servants as a whole ; prisoners were recommended to foment disorder inside the jails ; and the stoppage of work in mills and factories, including war factories, was recommended, as also strikes on the railways. Finally, there is the significant reiteration of the theme that students are to play an all-important role and are to take over the leadership of the Congress, should the established Congress leaders be arrested. No one knowing the inflammable nature of their audience, and the intolerance that youth has always displayed of the Gandhian creed of non-violence, could possibly address such appeals to students as those quoted above by Mr. Shanker Rao Deo and Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, without realising the violence which must inevitably result.

Enough has now been said to show the general nature of the movement contemplated by Mr. Gandhi and projected by his lieutenants on to the public screen. To what extent were more detailed instructions regarding the conduct of the movement in existence before the All-India Congress Committee meeting in Bombay and did they conform to the general outline of the movement which we have pictured above ?

The first example will again be chosen from "Harijan" ; in the issue of August 9th there appeared an article entitled "Ways of non-violent co-operation". Though not phrased in terms of definite instructions for the coming campaign, it is quite clear that the article was meant to be read in that context. It describes detailed methods of paralysing Government, and of conducting strikes. A feature of the examples quoted is the racial theme underlying the struggle in each case. In the two subsequent issues of "Harijan", edited by Mr. Gandhi's mouthpiece, K. G. Mashruwalla, detailed instructions for conducting various phases of the movement were given, to which a further reference is made later on.

Before the Bombay All-India Congress Committee meeting, instructions were circulated by the Congress organisations in Madras,

the United Provinces, Bihar and doubtless in other Provinces also. Space forbids their reproduction at length and the present purpose, which is to demonstrate the continuity of development from the general programme outlined by Mr. Gandhi to detailed instructions issued by local Congress organisations will be served by the examination of a single set of such instructions ; for this purpose may be chosen those issued in Madras. A series of instructions definitely outlining the programme of mass disobedience was produced by the Andhra and Tamil Nad Congress Committees, with, it must be presumed, the approval of Dr. Pattabhi Sitaramayya. The full instructions are reproduced as Appendix IV ; it will suffice here to mention that although the removal of rails was in these instructions specifically forbidden, this ban was significantly raised by a written amendment immediately the arrests of the leaders took place.

It is of the greatest interest to observe the logical development of Mr. Gandhi's general ideas, through the more specific suggestions made by Congress leaders, into the final detailed instructions such as the Andhra circular quoted above. Thus Mr. Gandhi's expressed preparedness, if necessary, to interfere with the working of the railways and the movement of troops develops finally into detailed proposals for the pulling of alarm chains, ticketless travel and the uprooting of the permanent way, for the cutting of telegraph and telephone wires, and for the picketting of troops. A similar process of development can be traced in the case of most of the other items in the programme.

The closest reflection, however, of Mr. Gandhi's ideas in any set of instructions is exhibited by what has come to be known as the "All-India Congress Committee 12-point programme". The correspondence between the various items of this programme and ideas already expressed by Mr. Gandhi is so close that it has been thought best to illustrate it in tabular form. The resulting table is reproduced as Appendix V.

Before proceeding to examine the actual form taken by the disturbances and the extent of Congress implication in them, it will be as well to summarise briefly the conclusions which we have so far reached.

After tracing briefly the development of Mr. Gandhi's "Quit-India" move, and after examining the reactions of the Congress Working Committee at Allahabad to Mr. Gandhi's draft resolution, it was suggested that the two principal motives by which he was actuated were firstly the desire to obtain freedom *now* for India and secondly the desire to avoid at all costs, even if necessary by capitulation to the Japanese, India's being made a battlefield between Britain and Japan. The next step was to point out that Mr. Gandhi had himself clearly admitted the ineffectiveness of non-violence to resist a Japanese invasion and that this was the reason advanced

by him for the alteration of his original scheme to allow of the retention of Allied troops to defend India ; that this willingness on his part to allow Allied troops to remain was only on the surface ; and that he had no intention of allowing them to operate effectively in resisting Japan. A comparison of the ostensible motives displayed in the two Congress resolutions of July 14th and August 8th with the basic motives underlying the move revealed that of the three main ostensible aims, only the first, the desire to free India from British rule, was genuine ; and that the remaining two, the contention that India would thus be enabled to play a more effective part in her own defence and that communal unity would be achieved, were wholly specious. An examination followed of the period between the Wardha and Bombay resolutions, with a view to ascertaining what type of struggle Gandhi was himself contemplating, should the British refuse to withdraw, and how Gandhi's views were interpreted to the masses by the Congress leaders.

A composite picture of the projected movement, as it emerges from Gandhi's writings or statements (Appendix V) and from the speeches of Congress leaders, developed in detail in the two sets of Congress instructions referred to, has clearly three main features. By its nature, the movement cannot be non-violent, nor did Mr. Gandhi expect it to be so ; his doubts on this subject were clearly voiced and, as clearly, his resolution to proceed with the movement despite any violence which might occur. Secondly, every man was exhorted to think and act for himself and to be his own leader. Finally students were urged to play a prominent part and to assume the leadership of the Congress should the recognised Congress leaders be arrested. On a more detailed view, the movement was to include all possible forms of mass demonstration and was to be marked by a defiance of Government authority ; individual items were to include interference with communications including the stopping and sabotaging of railways, interference with troop movements, the cutting of telegraph and telephone wires, incitement to strikes and the fomentation of no-tax and no-rent campaigns, and efforts to suborn the police, the military, and Government servants as a whole from their allegiance.

At Bombay on August 8th, the All-India Congress Committee ratified by an overwhelming majority a resolution sanctioning the starting of a mass struggle on the widest possible scale.

## CHAPTER IV

### THE NATURE OF THE DISTURBANCES

On the morning of August 9th Mr. Gandhi and other Congress leaders were arrested in Bombay and simultaneously throughout the country a round-up of important Congressmen took place. The total number of arrests probably did not exceed a few hundreds.



In view of the efforts since made to attribute the disturbances to what is invariably called "Government repression", it is important to note that this was probably the only occasion throughout the rebellion on which Government took the first step. Practically everything that followed was the result, and not the cause, of action taken by the other side. First reactions to the arrests were surprisingly mild. On August 9th there were disturbances in Bombay, Ahmedabad and Poona, but the rest of the country remained quiet. On August 10th disturbances occurred also in Delhi and a few towns in the United Provinces; but still no serious repercussions were reported from elsewhere. It was from August 11th that the situation began to deteriorate rapidly. From then onwards, apart from the *hartals*, protest meetings and similar demonstrations that were to be expected, concerted outbreaks of mob violence, arson, murder and sabotage took place; and in almost all cases these were directed either against communications of all kinds (including railways, posts and telegraphs) or against the Police. Moreover, these outbreaks started almost simultaneously in widely separated areas in the Provinces of Madras, Bombay and Bihar and also in the Central and United Provinces. Finally, the damage done was so extensive as to make it incredible that it could have been perpetrated on the spur of the moment without special implements and previous preparation; and in many instances the manner in which it was done displayed a great deal of technical knowledge. Block instruments and control rooms in railway stations were singled out for destruction; and the same technical skill appeared over and over again both in the selection of objects for attack—on the railways, in P. & T. offices and lines, and on electric power lines and installations—and also in the manner in which the damage was carried out. On the other hand—and this is a significant fact—industrial plant and machinery, even where it was fully employed on Government work, escaped any serious injury.

The position was at one time extremely serious in the whole of Bihar, except its most southern districts, and in the eastern part of the United Provinces. In these areas, the trouble soon spread from the big towns to the outlying areas; thousands of rioters gave themselves up to an orgy of destruction of communications and certain classes of Government property; whole districts, with their small defending forces of Government officials and police, were isolated for days on end; a very large part of the E. I. and practically the whole of the B. & N. W. Railway systems were put out of action. For a considerable period, Bengal was almost completely cut off from Northern India, while communications with Madras were also interrupted by the damage done to the railways in the Guntur District and around Bezwada. It was, indeed, significant that the areas in which the disturbances took the most serious form were

also the areas of greatest strategic importance. Not only did they contain the centre of India's coal supplies, stoppage of which would have paralysed all transport, trade and industry, but also they lay immediately behind those parts of India which were most obviously exposed to enemy attack. They could not have been better selected if the object was to dislocate the communications of the defending forces on the east coast of India. On the other hand, Assam, Orissa, the Punjab and the North-West Frontier Province remained free from serious trouble throughout the first week after the arrests, and there was comparatively little disorder in Sind.

In all the affected Provinces, students, invariably Hindu students, were in the forefront of the initial disorders. Everywhere the Congress creed of non-violence was ignored and mobs were recklessly incited to extremes of fury. It was from these mobs that the provocation came and most certainly not from the Government forces. They had to open fire, no doubt, but in many cases they did so in sheer self-defence. Apart from attacks on communications and various forms of transport such as trams, buses and motor vehicles, the violence of the mob was directed against certain classes of Government buildings, but many buildings escaped of the kind that one might have expected to be the target of indiscriminate popular anger. Municipal, and even private, property also suffered; and there was some looting. Speaking generally, however, what might be called the ordinary manifestations of mob violence were, by comparison and to begin with, unremarkable—there were no communal clashes—and the whole picture was much more one of calculated venom directed against selected objectives than of indignant people hitting out indiscriminately at the nearest object in blind resentment at the arrest of their leaders. Cases were, indeed, reported of mobs operating against railway lines over 40 miles from their homes; and, after all, these very same leaders, except Mr. Gandhi himself, had been arrested less than two years previously and there had been scarcely a ripple on the smooth waters of India's peace.

In the large towns where disorders first broke out, the situation was quickly brought under control, though not without the use of force in the face of violent activities by crowds of great numerical superiority. Subsequently, the disorders spread out from urban areas into the countryside, where, as already noticed, the marked similarity between incidents reported from widely separated places was a feature that attracted immediate attention. Muslims took practically no part in the disturbances; and labour, although in some cases unable to resist the temptation to suspend work and in other cases succumbing to open political pressure to do so, behaved, as a whole, with commendable restraint. There was no general

strike and work was soon resumed in mills and factories, with the one important exception of the Ahmedabad mills. These were subjected to special political pressure, backed by ample funds.

During the first two weeks following the arrests the disturbances continued with varying intensity mainly in the Central Provinces, Bihar and the United Provinces. By the third week, indications of a growing disapproval of mob violence among the general public began to appear and by the fourth week firm action had largely succeeded in suppressing mass lawlessness, except in Assam, where disorders began to appear similar in nature to those which had occurred earlier elsewhere. Indiscipline in jails was a part of the Congress programme and jail mutinies duly occurred in two Provinces. By the sixth week normal conditions had been restored throughout most of the country except in the eastern Provinces. With the close of the first phase of violent mass disorders three new tendencies became apparent. In the first place, signs appeared of an orthodox "non-violent" civil disobedience movement. Secondly, there was a development of serious crime as a direct result of the failure of rebellious groups to subvert constituted authority. The third and the most important development was the drift towards terrorism, which experienced observers had from the beginning anticipated, as soon as the realisation of the failure of the initial attempt at open rebellion became general. Cases of arson, sabotage and of murderous assault on public servants continued. Bombs made their appearance in Bombay, the Central Provinces and the United Provinces. These were at first crude and ineffective but technical improvement was rapid and by the twelfth week of the movement bombs and other explosive mechanisms, some of a highly dangerous type, were in use on a fairly extensive scale, particularly in the Bombay Province.

The attempts to develop a "non-violent" civil disobedience movement proved abortive and in spite of the temporary stimulus afforded by Mr. Gandhi's birthday there was no public enthusiasm or support for such a programme. At the end of November instructions for a no-tax, no-rent and no-grain campaign were issued from Bombay in the name of the All-India Congress Committee (Appendix VI). These instructions outlined a programme designed to paralyse Government by cutting off its sources of revenue, undermining confidence in the currency, creating apprehensions of food and cloth famines, and developing parallel Government in the form of independent village communities. By this time, however, the public were becoming more and more disgusted with Congress and its programmes, except in a few isolated areas, and the new campaign failed from the start to gather any momentum. The Congress organisation, by now entirely underground, had been further weakened by continued and successful police pressure. From the beginning of the struggle the Congress Socialist Party, a group

within the main party and an integral part of the Congress, had played an important part, with Bombay as its main centre. The escape from Hazaribagh Jail in early November of Jai Prakash Narain, the General Secretary of the Congress Socialist Party—the same man whose detected attempt to smuggle letters from Deoli in 1941 had caused such a sensation and who in those letters had poured scorn on the “farce of satyagraha” and had called for the organisation of a secret wing which would not pay even lip service to the creed of non-violence—further increased the influence of this left-wing section of Congress. With the arrest from time to time of certain of the other leaders, Jai Prakash Narain came to play an increasingly important part in the direction of a movement, which was by now indistinguishable from an underground revolutionary movement with all the trappings of terrorism, political dacoity, sabotage, unscrupulous opportunism and complete disregard of the safety and welfare of the general public.

Of the steady decline of the movement none was more aware than the underground leaders themselves. Programme followed programme and repeated attempts at re-organisation were made, in the hope of imparting new life to a dying cause. In early December a review and programme entitled “The Freedom Struggle Front” (Appendix VII) made its appearance. This was followed in January, 1943, by a new programme to commence from “Independence Day”, January 26th (Appendix VIII). A significant feature of this programme was the stress placed on “guerilla bands.” Finally at the end of January, 1943, a circular entitled “To all Fighters for Freedom” (Appendix IX) was issued by Jai Prakash Narain. This revealing document admits the failure of the “Open Rebellion envisaged by our incomparable leader Mahatma Gandhi” and ascribes this failure to two reasons : (1) “There was no efficient organisation” and (2) “After the first phase of the rising was over there was no further programme placed before the people”. It admits that “there was some violence indeed under extreme provocation, but it was remarkably little as compared with the magnitude of the rising and the staggering manifestation of individual and collective non-violence”. But what this staggering display really meant is further explained :

“I would first remind you of the difference between Gandhi Ji's views on non-violence and those of the Working Committee and the A. I. C. C. Gandhi Ji is in no event prepared to depart from non-violence. With him it is a question of faith and life-principle. Not so with the Congress”; and again, “I should add that I have no hesitation in admitting that non-violence of the brave, if practised on a sufficiently large scale, would make violence unnecessary, but where such non-violence is absent, I should not allow cowardice, clothed in Shastric subtleties, to block the development of this revolution and lead

to its failure". The circular concludes with instructions for the preparation of a new and "last phase of the revolution" but makes it clear that "preparation does not mean that fighting entirely ceases for the moment. No, "Skirmishes", "frontier activities", "minor clashes", "sniping", "patroling"—all this must go on. These are in themselves a preparation for the offensive".

The violent and widespread nature of the disturbances which followed the arrests of August 9th, 1942, soon led to endeavours in certain quarters to suggest that this was no Congress movement but a spontaneous outburst on the part of the public at large precipitated by the action of Government against the popular leaders. The evidence of events themselves against this theory has already been sketched. A further point is that it presupposes that the whole population, or at least a very large majority, rose as one man all over the country in united and blind resentment, which does not correspond with the facts. The Muslim community, the Scheduled Castes as a whole and a very large proportion of organised labour stood entirely aloof, and large areas of the country were quite free from any form of disturbances. Although the news of the Bombay arrests was flashed all over India and simultaneous arrests were being made all over the country, on August 9th there were disturbances only in the Bombay area and the rest of the country remained quiet. Again, during the first week after the arrests those Provinces most remote from Bombay remained either entirely undisturbed or only slightly affected. (It is true there were some early student demonstrations in Bengal but these soon subsided and a considerable interval elapsed before more serious disorder and sabotage developed in that Province at a later date.) It is difficult to reconcile the theory of a spontaneous countrywide mass uprising with this gradual spread of disturbances. It is also difficult to reconcile this theory with the undoubted emergence after a comparatively short period in some of the areas worst affected of a desire on the part of the law-abiding population to co-operate with the authorities in preventing further disorders and damage to public property.

Since the theory of a spontaneous rising does not fit in with the actual post-arrest events, who was responsible? Mr. Gandhi, unquestionably the leader of Congress notwithstanding the fact that he held no official position in the organisation, had been vigorously propagating his "Quit-India" move for weeks; the Congress Working Committee had formally endorsed this policy; the Congress Party was indubitably the largest and best organised political organisation in the country; all the arrested leaders belonged to Congress; it is hardly likely, in view of these facts, that any other political party would have been capable or desirous of organising these disorders. It is not enough, however,

to say that the Congress Party was the party most concerned and most likely to have caused the disturbances ; it is necessary to show how this was done.

There can be no doubt that the initial and concerted action of the Government of India and Provincial Governments struck the Congress organisation a very severe blow ; but it did not entirely put it out of action. On August 7th most of the important Congress leaders and a large number of leaders of Provincial and lesser importance were present in Bombay for the meeting of the All-India Congress Committee. Not all these leaders and minor leaders were arrested. After the arrests, instructions were at once prepared at Bombay and distributed all over India by post and messenger with remarkable efficiency. There were two sets of instructions. One consisted of the "12-point programme" to which reference has already been made and a copy of which is reproduced at Appendix V. Manuscript copies of these instructions, together with a copy of a message (Appendix X) left by Mr. Gandhi at the time of his arrest, on the notepaper of the Bombay Congress office, were seized in a distant Province on August 11th. In another Province copies of the same instructions were recovered on August 12th from a Congress ex-Minister. The second set of "Instructions from the All-India Congress Committee" was divided into two parts, the first addressed to "Provincial Congress Committees and others" and the second to students. This second set of instructions is reproduced in Appendix XI. Un-arrested Provincial delegates to the All-India Congress Committee meeting set out for their Provinces, many of them carrying these instructions with them. Some of them were arrested *en route*, or when they arrived at their destinations ; but many others disappeared underground. Why did they do so ? Some of these have since been arrested ; others are known to be still underground organising the movement. Almost at once, floods of illegal pamphlets appeared in many parts of the country. These inflammatory pamphlets did a great deal of harm in the initial stages of the movement and played an important part in fomenting the trouble in rural areas, which followed the first outbursts in towns. Most of the early leaflets were issued in Mr. Gandhi's name. Many of the earlier productions were based on the Bombay instructions and there was thus a marked similarity at first among leaflets appearing in different parts of the country. There is overwhelming evidence that the instructions issued from Bombay played an important part in stirring up trouble. For example, secret instructions sent from Bombay to the Secretary of the Kerala Provincial Congress Committee on August 12th included the following :

"Burn important offices, buildings, post offices, Government buildings etc., railways, pull down, issue notices, derail by putting stones, remove all roadside posts, remove lights

from the road sides. Close all shops, offices, etc., cut off communications. These are some of the things, going on daily here. Terrible work we are able to do here”.

They were translated into the local vernaculars and lost nothing in the translation. There can be little doubt that they provided the necessary stimulus to the preparation of more enterprising programmes by local Congress fire-brands. After the first outbreaks in the towns had been brought under control students and underground Congress workers spread out into the rural areas carrying with them the Bombay instructions, which at once began to produce their effect. Confirmation of this well-known fact is provided in the “All-India Congress Committee Instructions, No. 11”, dated November 27th, 1942 (Appendix VI), which mention—

“(a) Those active Congress workers who have spread the fire of revolt in the countryside and have still remained free,

“(b) Those students who have left their colleges and schools and who have taken up the leadership of rural revolt”.

This explanation, that the widespread disturbances were precipitated in accordance with a deliberately preconceived plan by the arrival of Congress workers and instructions from Bombay, fits in with the undisputed facts. The theory of a spontaneous mass movement does not. But this by no means completes the evidence against the Congress Party. It is a curious coincidence, if coincidence it is, that in the four Provinces most affected by the disorders, namely, Bombay, the Central Provinces, Bihar and the United Provinces, the strongest Congress organisations existed and from 1937-1939 Congress Ministries with large majorities had been in office. The exception to this rule is even more significant. In Madras which also has a strong Congress organisation and where a Congress Ministry enjoyed a handsome majority, such disturbances as did occur were confined to comparatively small areas. But in this very Province the former Prime Minister and other important Provincial Congress leaders were strongly opposed to the “Quit-India” policy. In other Provinces, where non-Congress or Coalition Ministries have been formed and Congress has not enjoyed absolute power, the disturbances have been on a moderate scale (except in the Congress stronghold of Midnapore) as compared with the four Provinces named above. It has been argued that the undesirable prominence given, in many cases deliberately, by a section of the Press, to news items of incidents, disorders and outrages, was responsible for the country-wide similarity of means and methods. It is undisputable that much harm was done in this way, until the offenders were curbed by executive action; but a study of the recital of events and developments given above at once shows that the offending newspapers could not have alone been responsible for this similarity. The comparative immunity enjoyed by large



areas of the country where some, at least, of the offending newspapers were circulating, the sporadic nature of the disorders even in some of the badly affected Provinces and the late onset of disorders in certain Provinces served by the offending section of the Press, can, none of them, be reconciled with this theory. Furthermore, the Congress can hardly disclaim entire responsibility even for the mischief caused by the section of the Press in question, since it is a well-known fact that they have always counted upon this section of the Press as one of its most effective vehicles for propaganda; and in the United Provinces, at least it is known that previous arrangements had been made to use certain newspapers for publicity purposes and for the conveyance of party directions. It can fairly be claimed therefore that the only explanation that fits all the known and established facts is that the Congress produced and, to the best of its ability, directed the widespread disorders, amounting in some areas to nothing short of open rebellion, which followed the arrests on August 9th. If further confirmation is required it may be found in Bombay Congress Bulletin No. 132, dated 9th January 1943, in which a most revealing survey is made of the first five months of "Our Revolution" (Appendix XII).

## CHAPTER V

### THE PART PLAYED BY KNOWN CONGRESSMEN

The preparations for a mass movement made by Mr. Gandhi and the other leaders of the Congress party have been described. The outline of a mass movement, of which the chief characteristic during its opening phase was its unbridled violence, has been given. The argument that the movement was a 'spontaneous outburst' has been countered. The next question to be answered is the extent to which known members of the Congress party have been personally responsible for the disorders which have occurred.

On general grounds, it would be only natural to expect that the persons who before the arrests had been leaders of the local Congress committees in their legal activities should after the arrests continue to be leaders of the illegal activities. Consider the case of an ordinary Congress rural worker, who for years has been carrying out the party instructions—and the Congress party insists on implicit obedience, witness the expulsions of Subhas Bose, Mr. M. N. Roy and Mr. Rajagopalachari: in 1940-41, he will obediently have committed "Selected satyagraha" and have undergone a short term of imprisonment; during the hot summer months of 1942 he will have read week by week the exciting message of the Mahatma in "Harijan" and he will have keyed himself up to the coming struggle, the "rebellion"; in the opening days of August, he will have followed closely the proceedings of his masters in Bombay. Their arrests are for him a declaration of war by the Government.



Will he then retire from the field of battle? Known in his village as the representative of the Congress party, will he remain silent and inactive? The natural presumption is that the disorders that occurred after the arrests of the Congress leaders were organized by the people who for years had taken their orders from those arrested leaders. And there is abundant evidence to support this presumption. The instances now to be given are only a minute part of the evidence that could be produced—and that again is only a fraction of what is known, but which, because the movement is still alive, cannot safely be revealed.

The evidence falls, broadly speaking, into two classes—acts of violence committed by Congressmen, and incitements to violence written by Congressmen. The number of instances of *prominent* Congressmen taking open part in the disorders is naturally not large, as most of those who were known to be leaders of importance were arrested at the outset, and those who evaded arrest were at pains not to disclose their whereabouts. But though most of the Congressmen now to be mentioned are not persons known outside their Provinces, or even outside their districts, they are well-known in their own localities—and if the question whether Congressmen were responsible for the disturbances that followed the arrests of the Congress leaders were put to the ordinary public in those localities, they would have no doubt in answering it in the affirmative.

It is appropriate that the instances of Congress complicity should begin with one from Wardha, the headquarters of Mr. Gandhi. On August 11th the son of a prominent Congressman of Wardha, who had returned from attending the A. I. C. C. meeting at Bombay, read out in a public meeting the Congress programme which included school and railway strikes and the cutting of telegraph and telephone wires; the District Superintendent of Police succeeded in seizing the copy of the programme, but the police party was at once mobbed. On the same day a professor in the Commerce College at Wardha, who had resigned his post on the arrest of Mr. Gandhi, harangued a crowd, urging them to boycott the police and threatening traders that their shops would be looted if they sold any articles to the police; the deaths of two men at Wardha by police firing would be avenged, he said, and two men would be considered equivalent to two hundred constables. As a result of these speeches a post office and police station records were burnt and telegraph wires and poles were broken. On August 14th, Pandit R. S. Shukla, the former Congress Premier of the Central Provinces, told the police officer in whose custody he was that if they had been given ten days time instead of being arrested on their way back from Bombay, every police station in the district would have been burnt down. On August 15th the vice-president of the Mandla District Congress Committee asked a crowd of about 1,500

people to destroy Government records, railway lines and bridges. In the same district the previous day four members of the Congress party had instigated villagers to blow up a bridge ; when they failed in their attempt they looted some passing Government grain carts instead. Two prominent Congress workers (one being a woman) in Akola addressed lightning meetings of mill hands on August 13th and urged them to sabotage communications, march on banks, railways and post offices and burn them down. As a result of these speeches the mill hands succeeded in destroying some telephone poles and wires before they were dispersed by the police. On August 14th a crowd of two or three thousand set fire to all the public buildings of Ramtek including the tahsil, the civil court, the police station, the post office and the railway station ; a train in the station was set on fire and the treasury looted of about three lakhs of rupees ; many known Congressmen took part in this affair.

All these incidents occurred in the Province of the apostle of non-violence within a week of his arrest. But evidence of mass attacks led by members of the Congress can be given from most parts of the country.

In Bihar, Mr. Jaglal Chaudhury, who had been a Congress Minister from 1937 to 1939, and who was one of Mr. Gandhi's trusted men, personally instigated the burning of a police station in the Saran district and during the attack urged the crowd to tie up the Sub-Inspector in a sack and throw him into the river. This same Minister made plans to resist troops with spears, lighted torches and boiling oil. He has been tried and sentenced to ten years imprisonment, the sentence being reviewed and upheld by a Judge of the Patna High Court. Mr. Jagat Narain Lal, who had been a Parliamentary Secretary in the same Ministry (and who moved the resolution at the A. I. C. C. at Allahabad on May 2nd, 1942 in opposition to Mr. Rajagopalachari's " Pakistan " resolution) was personally responsible for instigating a mob that committed arson and looting in the Patna area on August 12th. When he was arrested a month later, he was found in possession of literature advocating sabotage. He has been sentenced to three years imprisonment on the first charge and two years imprisonment on the second. In the same Province, an Australian missionary who has spent 25 years doing educational, medical and evangelical work was the victim of a mob of Congress hooligans, who made a determined attempt on his life. When his bungalow was first mobbed, he tried to reason with the leaders, saying that if he had done them or the Congress any harm, he was willing to pay the penalty ; but they paid no attention and he was extremely fortunate to escape with his life.

An account of the movement in the backward hill district of Koraput in Orissa is interesting. The Congress had built up an organisation and acquired a hold over these backward tribes by making attractive promises that when *Swaraj* came there would be no

rents and taxes and no forest laws ; they also played on their superstition, and in some areas Mr. Gandhi was deified and temple ritual took place at the Congress office. On receiving instructions from the District Congress Committee, the subordinate workers rapidly passed the word round that the British Raj was no more and that police stations should be attacked. Violent disorders took place for a few days, but the local authorities got the situation in hand and, as the movement had been based entirely on false promises, its collapse was as rapid as its rise. There was no disturbance among the hill-tribes of a neighbouring sub-division simply because the Congress had not yet built up an organisation there. The most serious incident in this Province occurred at a place called Eram in Balasore district. A body of armed police who had gone to make some arrests there found themselves confronted by a mob of four or five thousand persons, who had been mobilised by the sounding of conch-shells from village to village as the police party approached. They disobeyed an order to disperse, and the police had to open fire, ultimately causing 25 or 26 deaths and about 50 injuries. A joint enquiry was made by the Revenue Commissioner and the Inspector-General of Police, who found that the extent of the firing was fully justified. Their report showed that the disturbance was in no sense spontaneous but was incited among ignorant villagers by the deliberate efforts of mischievous politicians playing on their economic difficulties. The moving spirit in this affair was a lieutenant of Sri Jagannath Das, a Congress M. L. A.

A typical instance of mass attacks on Government buildings led by Congressmen occurred at a tahsil in Ballia district in the east of the United Provinces (which was one of the main storm centres in the opening phase). At this tahsil, there was a well-constructed office with a strong record room and good quarters. A mob, led by a local Congressman, who installed himself as "Swaraj Tahsildar" for a short period, broke down the perimeter wall, destroyed every record in the office, broke into the treasury, and looted Rs. 15,000. At the headquarters of this district, a mob led by prominent local Congressmen sacked the residences of four Government officers and two non-official gentlemen who had given some support to Government ; one of the latter was a doctor the entire contents of whose dispensary was wantonly destroyed. In the neighbouring district of Azamgarh, the District Magistrate was besieged in an outlying police-station by a mob of about five thousand men and a pitched battle lasting two hours took place before the mob was driven off. Before the battle started, the leaders explained that as Swaraj had been attained they wanted to hoist the Congress flag on the police station. In the Pilibhit district in the United Provinces an excited crowd directed by three locally well-known Congressmen, including a secretary of the District Congress Committee, murdered a constable, for no other reason than that he was a constable. In the Bijnor district a mass attack on the police station was led by a

“four-anna” Congressman mounted on horseback. In another part of the same district, the secretary of the local Tahsil Congress Committee organised and led a mass attack on a railway station. In another attack on a railway station in Barabanki district the local Congress “dictator” and nine other members of the District Congress Committee were prominent among the attackers. In the Muttra district, thirteen men, all of whom were members of the Congress party, were concerned in the derailing of a goods train. In Allahabad city, the president of a Ward Congress Committee was involved in an attack on a police outpost, the looting of cash and the cutting of telephone wires on August 12th. In the same district, 17 persons, all of them four-anna members of Congress, were convicted of looting a post office and burning a dak bungalow.

In Madras, the campaign of sabotage of communications started with the violent attack on Tenali railway station in Guntur district on August 12th; the previous day two persons who had just returned from the A. I. C. C. meeting at Bombay had held a public meeting at Tenali, at which a most provocative description of the events at Bombay had been given.

C. Krishnan Nair, an important rural Congress worker of Delhi and a member of the Narela Gandhi Ashram, who went underground at the time of the August arrests, has been sentenced to two years imprisonment for setting fire to a railway station on November 12th.

A more recent case of particular interest comes from Midnapore district in Bengal. On November 19th, seven members of a Thana Congress Working Committee sent a resolution to the Thana Officer in the following terms :—

*“The Keshpur Thana Congress Committee started their movement in the Thana area according to the direction of the A.I.C.C. and their working plans. The residents of the villages of this police station are very much terror-stricken at the action taken to quell the movement . . . . . in order to remove the anxieties of the countrymen, and also for their safeguards, this Committee resolve that they should surrender themselves with their rifles, guns and cartridges snatched by the Congress mob. This Committee have joint liability for the snatching and concealment of the guns”.*

Here is an example of open admission of Congress responsibility.

So far, the instances given have been mainly of mass attacks. Congressmen have been equally responsible for individual acts of arson, sabotage and murder. In the United Provinces, the Secretary of the Naini Tal District Congress Committee confessed to damaging telegraph communications on several occasions and also to attempting to burn down a forest rest-house. In the West Godavari district of Madras, the police arrested on the night of Christmas Eve a number

of persons who were preparing to remove bolts from railway lines ; some big wrenches and drilling machines and two packets of gun-powder were recovered from them, and it appeared that they were going to try to blow up a railway bridge ; several of the arrested persons were known Congressmen. Among the members of a gang arrested at Nagpur (Central Provinces) in February, with whom were found five revolvers and a quantity of ammunition and explosives, was an ex-member of the Women's Mahila Ashram at Wardha. Another gang arrested at Wardha at the same time and found to be responsible for two cash robberies and five cases of sabotage included members of Vinoba Bhave's ashram near Wardha.

In Bombay on January 14th, 1943, the Police searched a flat and found a revolver, time-bombs, stocks of high explosives and all the paraphernalia needed for lethal bombs. One of the persons arrested on the spot was a well-known leader of the Maharashtra Provincial Congress Committee who was also President of the All-India Spinners Association. Again in the same Province there were systematic attacks by a gang of saboteurs on electric pylons and installations and robberies were committed by the gang to obtain arms. The head of this gang, who has since been killed in an encounter with the police, was a well-known Congressman who held office in that organisation as the Secretary of a local Congress Committee. In Broach district an armed gang of about 75 persons headed by two Congress leaders raided a Police Station and took away government arms and cash. The Office Orderly who was present and tried to escape was fired at and wounded. Another mob headed by the same Congress leaders raided a Police post in Wagra Taluka, killed the sentry, overpowered and beat the other policemen in the outpost and looted the lines.

Many of the mob cases arising out of the rebellion are still *sub-judice*, but in those that have been concluded particular weight must be attached to the observations of the learned Judges. One such case from Bihar and two from the Central Provinces may be considered. The case from Bihar concerns an attack on the police-station of Minapur in Muzzaffarpur district on August 16th by an armed mob of four or five thousand men. They looted and burnt the police-station, assaulted the officers and constables and burnt the Sub-Inspector alive. There is no doubt whatever that these acts were perpetrated in the name of the Congress. Leading members of the mob were shouting Congress slogans and carrying Congress flags. The main accused, who was responsible for holding the Inspector down in the fire (and who has been sentenced to death) was seen hoisting a Congress flag on the roof of the thana ; this was an exhibit in the case. At the conclusion of the judgment,

in discussing the interpretation of section 121 of the Indian Penal Code (waging war against the King-Emperor) the Judge observed:

“ It is a matter of common knowledge that the object of the recent disturbances and risings throughout the country was to paralyse the administration and to compel the Government to submit to the demands of the Indian National Congress ”.

Simultaneously the notorious cases of Ashti and Chimur had occurred in the Central Provinces. The following are extracts from the judgment in the Ashti case relevant to the question of the responsibility of the Congress for the murders :—

“ At about 11 A.M. a mob consisting of about 250 men came right up to the gate of the Station House shouting the usual Congress slogans. The Sub-Inspector and Head Constable met them at the gate, and the former tried to argue with them in vain. He was even prepared to shout with them the Congress slogans and to permit them to hoist the Congress flag on the Station House building, but the leaders of the mob wanted him to hand over the Station House records for destruction . . . . . When he declared that he would protect Government property with his life, the leaders ordered the mob to get to their work. . . . At this stage, finding the mob uncontrollable, two constables opened fire knocking down about half a dozen men out of whom five succumbed to their injuries. The firing had the desired result and the mob fled in disorder ”.

It is not necessary to pursue this story of barbarism to the end by describing the subsequent murder of the Sub-Inspector and four constables.

The disorders at Chimur resulted in the murders of a Sub-Divisional Magistrate and a Naib Tahsildar in a dak bungalow, and the murders of a Circle Inspector of Police and a constable shortly after. The following are extracts from the judgment of the High Court Judge in his review of the case relating to the first pair of murders :—

“ The main facts in the case are not disputed and have been set out at length in the judgment of the Special Judge. I will merely summarise them briefly : Chimur is a town of about 6,000 inhabitants, about 30 miles from Warora in the Chanda district with which it is connected by road. From the 11th August onwards there were Congress meetings there at which inflammatory speeches were made and the people were urged to rise against the Government and to obey only Congress orders. . . . . The moral responsibility for such an appalling crime, of a sort that has seldom disgraced this province, rests mainly upon the leaders, mostly not before me, who worked the mob up to the pitch of brutality and fury required to batter defenceless and innocent men to death. I have detected few

signs of any genuine remorse amongst the residents of Chimur, and the crime has hardly received the condemnation there or elsewhere that one might have expected ”.

In the second case the Circle Inspector at the head of a small body of police (including a Sub-Inspector) was pursued along a road by a frenzied mob. After the pursuit had gone on for some time, the Sub-Inspector surrendered. The words he used to denote his surrender (as a result of which his life was spared) are significant. To quote the description of the Special Judge :

“ At this stage the Sub-Inspector decided the position was hopeless and turning to the crowd he threw off his cap, and probably part of his uniform at the same time, and cried ‘ Mahatma Gandhi ki jai ’ ”.

The mob, not appeased by this recognition of their ultimate leader, went on to butcher the Circle Inspector. The earlier actions of the Sub-Inspector, described in another passage, also throw light on the question of Congress responsibility :—

“ It is apparent that the Sub-Inspector was not from the beginning inclined to use force and had been negotiating with the Congress leaders in the town. He had allowed a big procession to come in front of his station house on the 15th morning and done nothing about it ; he had made no attempt to arrest leaders, though his subordinate officers in his absence had made such attempts. By this attitude he had effectively vacated police authority and the town was under control of the Congress. They were perfectly satisfied with that state of affairs and the subsequent happenings on the 16th are the expression of the resentment of the Congress leaders ”.

Passing now from crimes of violence in which Congressmen took part to incitements to crime written and distributed in the name of the Congress, it will again be appropriate to start with an instance from the Central Provinces—a pamphlet entitled “ Six Commandments of Gandhi Baba ”. This and similar productions were without doubt accepted by the rank and file of local Congressmen as genuine accounts of Mr. Gandhi’s last message. The leaflet, the text of which is contained in Appendix XIII, is divided into two parts. The first part “ (Bapu’s message to the Nation at the time of going to jail) ” contains six commandments in the style that might be expected from Mr. Gandhi. “ Regard yourself as independent ”, “ We are free to do anything so long as we remain within the limits of non-violence ”, “ Do or Die ”, etc. But the second part describes how this message can be put into execution and this includes instructions to compel the closure of factories, mills, colleges, schools, and bazaars until independence is achieved ; to destroy the administration of Government ; to destroy tram, motor and railway services ; to destroy telephone and telegraph wires ; to advise the police not to obey Government orders ; and



to violate all prohibitory orders of Government. Similar doctrines were preached in issues of the "Harijan" published soon after the arrests. The editors of the various editions of "Harijan" would hardly have dared to depart radically from the ideas of Mr. Gandhi; yet, the cutting of telegraph wires, the uprooting of railway tracks, the destruction of bridges and burning of petrol tanks are described as permissible within the bounds of non-violence. (The text of this matter also is reproduced in Appendix XIV.)

An equally wide definition of "non-violence" is contained in an interesting letter recovered from Kesho Deo Malaviya, the Congress Socialist leader who acted as Provincial "dictator" in the United Provinces during the opening phase of the movement until he was arrested on September 29th. "We shall never" he wrote, "forsake our principle of non-violence. It is not violence to get the vital communications suspended or to prevent the functioning of railway stations, tahsils and police stations, or take possession of property found there. You have also to make every effort to prevent the running of railways. *As far as possible, you must ensure that no life is lost in this connection. Distribute handbills in villages announcing that no one should travel by train after October 15th or else his life will be in danger*". Other passages in this letter are also of interest. "Dear Comrades", he began, "our initial struggle has completed two months. *We can pride ourselves on the happenings of the past two months . . . . . Generally speaking, Congress workers have given a good account of themselves. They have fought bravely against the enemy and are still fighting heroically. I appeal to them to strain every nerve in keeping the Congress flag flying in their respective circles*". After Malaviya's arrest, he was succeeded by Acharya Jugal Kishore, who was a Parliamentary Secretary in the time of the Congress Ministry. The following are extracts from cyclostyled instructions sent by him "to the dictators of all the districts and towns and chief workers". "Dear Sir, *On receipt of instructions from the All-India Congress Committee and after consulting the chief workers of the Province who are still out of jail, I am forwarding to you the scheme which has been chalked out to push vigorously this great revolution for the independence of India by organizing ourselves*". Detailed instructions for the organisation of disorders then follow. The position is summarized in the following passage:—

"At this juncture two kinds of programmes are going on in the country: (i) within the scope of the non-violent principle to dislocate the means of communications and transport so as to smash Government machinery in such a way as to render it impossible for the improper use of them by these oppressors and to destroy all emblems of the Government, and, (ii) propaganda, demonstrations and other work such as non-payment of revenue and organization. The first part is to



be done by selected persons and the work they can do should be selected by them. This requires experienced hands and technicians and only such men should be selected for this work as can perform it secretly ”.

The part played in the organization of the movement by Jai Prakash Narayan since his escape from Hazaribagh jail has already been mentioned. A few passages from a recent appeal issued by him to the student world are of interest :—

“ The first phase of our revolution was a great success inasmuch as it succeeded in uprooting the British power from large tracts of the country. Its further development was checked not because the superior physical force of the enemy blocked its way, but because of our lack of adequate organization and complete conscious programme of revolution. This relates to the second point, namely that present task is clearly to prepare, organize and discipline our forces for the second and last major offensive. We have not much time before us and therefore we must not lose a moment. In every field of preparation we need your help. We have to work in the villages and industrial centres, on the railways and in the mines, in the army and the services ; we have to publish and distribute our literature, maintain our contacts and communications ; we have to raise and to train a militia and bands of technical workers for sabotage and similar activities ; and we have to continue our present clashes and skirmishes with the enemy. A network of organization, working under a co-ordinated and central command is being built up . . . . . I have faith that when the time for the next offensive comes, you will be at the front of the battle again as you were in August. But in order that the offensive might this time completely rout the enemy, it is essential that you take up seriously and immediately, the work of preparation and organization ”.

A specimen of mischief-making by students is given in a leaflet circulated by a students' organization in Gujarat, making arrangements for a no-revenue campaign. (It may be mentioned that these arrangements were wholly unsuccessful).

“ This time the no-tax movement differs from the old one in one important point. In the old campaign, after refusing to pay land-revenue, we allowed the Government to attach our property, cattle, etc. This meant that we accepted the legality of the Government at that time, and only non-cooperated with it for certain reasons. This time, we do not consider the present Government as the legal Government of the country and consequently we have raised the banner of open rebellion against it and are carrying on a guerilla warfare. This time, after refusing to give land-revenue, the peasants have to resist with their full strength the attachment of their property ”.

It is impossible to describe even a small proportion of the manifold leaflets which are being churned out by presses and duplicators in many parts of the country. (The number has greatly diminished owing to effective action by the police. In Madras, for example, two secret production centres in Tamilnad, one in Andhra and one in Malabar, have been located; known Congressmen were found to be in charge of all these centres.) A selection of harmful pamphlets put out in the earliest phase of the rebellion is reproduced in Appendix XV. A few recent instances may be given. An issue of the "Bombay Congress Bulletin" of November 23rd contained an elaborate programme of revolutionary activity which included two new items, urging the withdrawal of all post office savings bank accounts and attacks on docks where British troops were loading and unloading. Leaflets in circulation in Bengal have been notable for their racial animosity: one declared that India was "fighting against the brutal British power and not against Japan", and another advocated attacks on British troops and police and the boycotting of Europeans. Finally, Congress underground workers have made the most of the recent difficulties of the economic situation; a particularly mischievous leaflet emanating from Delhi contains the following passage:—

"Our city population should learn to come out of the streets every day indignant and raging at the British incompetence and bungling and deceit that has resulted in internal food scarcity and external defencelessness. Strikes for freedom and wage increase should become a permanent feature of our industrial life..... Food riots, strikes and agitation among the military and police, all on a mass scale, should culminate in the supreme moment when the usurpers, Linlithgow and Wavell, are prisoners and the Indian Republic is proclaimed".

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## CHAPTER VI

### CONCLUSION

At the risk of some repetition it is necessary to emphasize again the fact that Mr. Gandhi knew that any mass movement started in India would be a violent movement. He knew this from his bitter experience of the movements he had led ten and twenty years before. In spite of this knowledge, he was prepared to take the risk of outbreaks of rioting and disorder—a risk which in his writings he tried to minimize but in his mind he must have estimated correctly. Consider again this series of statements:—

(1) "Leave India to God. If that is too much, then leave her to anarchy". (Harijan, May 24th).

(2) "That anarchy may lead to internecine warfare for a time or to unrestrained dacoities". (Harijan, May 24th).

(3) "This ordered, disciplined anarchy should go, and if there is complete lawlessness in India as a result I would risk it". (Harijan, May 24th).

(4) "I waited and waited until the country should develop the non-violent strength necessary to throw off the foreign yoke. But my attitude has now undergone a change. I feel that I cannot afford to wait.....The people have not my Ahimsa, but mine should help them. I am sure there is ordered anarchy around and about us. I am sure that the anarchy that may result because of the British withdrawal or their refusal to listen to us and our decision to defy their authority will in no way be worse than the present anarchy. After all those who are unarmed cannot produce a frightful amount of violence or anarchy, and I have a faith that out of that anarchy may arise pure non-violence". (Harijan, June 7th).

(5) "I don't want rioting as a direct result. If in spite of all precautions rioting does take place, it cannot be helped". (Harijan, July 19th).

Once it is realised, as has been clearly demonstrated, that Mr. Gandhi, the fountain-head of non-violence, knew perfectly well that the Indian masses were incapable of non-violence, a new light is shed on the events of the six months which have elapsed since the August arrests. It follows that every reference to non-violence, in the forecasts of the forms the movement would take made by Mr. Gandhi and his Congress disciples and in the post-arrest programmes and instructions, is nothing more than a pious hope, or at best a mild warning, which was known to have no practical value. Since such references have been shown to be valueless, they may be ignored and the pre-arrest forecasts and post-arrest instructions may be examined shorn of their "non-violence" mask. Omitting these valueless references to non-violence, Mr. Gandhi wrote in "Harijan" of 19th July 1942, "It would be a mass movement..... It will include all that a mass movement can include"; and again in "Harijan" of 26th July 1942, "The programme covers every activity included in a mass movement.....I would not hesitate to go to the extremist limit, if I find that no impression is produced over the British Government or the Allied Powers.....(It will be) my biggest movement...(With the arrests of leaders) it should gain strength, if it has any vitality". The Working Committee of Congress in the resolution passed at Bombay on August 4th and endorsed by the All-India Congress Committee on August 8th stated: "The Committee resolves therefore to sanction for the vindication of India's inalienable right to freedom and independence, the starting of a mass struggle on the widest possible scale so that the country might utilise all the strength it has gathered during the last 22 years". Again, omitting the lip-service to "non-violence", the 12-point programme called for "non-cooperation on the widest

possible scale " in a " titanic clash between the people and the alien Government," a struggle in which " Victory or death " is to be the motto of every son and daughter of India, a struggle which would " include all activities that a mass struggle can include," a struggle in which " whatever helps in the attainment of that objective " (of ending foreign rule) " is permissible and legitimate ", and in which " people in the Provinces have to devise and adopt all ways of paralysing the administration ". As a description of what actually occurred these instructions present a very accurate picture bearing in mind the limitations imposed by the prompt and firm action taken by the Central and Provincial Governments and the lack of sympathy for the Congress programme in large sections of the population.

In the face of all this evidence—the evidence of the atmosphere produced by Mr. Gandhi's writings in the " Harijan ", the evidence of the speeches of the members of the Working Committee before and at Bombay, the evidence of the programmes involving violent action distributed at the time of the arrests, the evidence of the form of the uprising, the evidence of known Congressmen personally proved guilty of violent action, the evidence of the pamphlets broadcast in the name of the Congress—only one answer can be given to the question as to who must bear the responsibility for the mass uprisings and individual crimes which have disgraced and are still disgracing the fair name of India. That answer is—the Indian National Congress, under the leadership of Mr. Gandhi.

## APPENDIX I

*Record of the Allahabad Meeting of the Congress Working Committee*

Gandhiji was not present at this meeting (at Allahabad from April 27 to May 1) of the Working Committee. But he sent from Wardha a draft resolution for the consideration of the Committee. Miraben who brought the draft explained how Gandhiji's mind was working along the lines sketched in it. The Committee gave earnest and careful consideration to the draft (Appendix A).

The draft contained the following points :—(i) A demand to the British Government to clear out, (ii) India is a zone of war as a result of British imperialism, (iii) No foreign assistance needed for the freedom of this country, (iv) India has no quarrel with any country, (v) If Japan invaded India it shall meet with non-violent resistance, (vi) Form of non-co-operation laid down, (vii) Foreign soldiers a grave menace to Indian freedom.

Jawaharlalji : Gandhiji's draft is an approach which needs careful consideration. Independence means, among other things, the withdrawal of British troops. It is proper ; but has it any meaning, our demanding withdrawal ? Nor can they reasonably do it even if they recognize independence. Withdrawal of troops and the whole apparatus of civil administration will create a vacuum which cannot be filled up immediately.

If we said to Japan that her fight was with British imperialism and not us she would say, " We are glad the British army is withdrawn ; we recognize your independence. But we want certain facilities now. We shall defend you against aggression. We want aerodromes, freedom to pass our troops through your country. This is necessary in self-defence." They might seize strategic points and proceed to Iraq, etc. The masses won't be touched if only the strategic points are captured. Japan is an imperialist country. Conquest of India is in their plan. If Bapu's approach is accepted we become passive partners of the Axis Powers. This approach is contrary to the Congress policy for the last two years and a half. The Allied countries will have a feeling that we are their enemies.

Kripalaniji intervening said that the draft was a declaration of their stand. England and America might put what interpretation they liked but they (the Congress) had no designs against them.

Maulana Saheb : What is our position ? Shall we tell the British Government to go and allow the Japanese and Germans to come or do we want the British Government to stay and stem the new aggression ?

Pantji : I want the right of self-government and we shall exercise it as we like. If the British troops and the rest must withdraw let them do so by all means and we shall shift for ourselves.

Jawaharlalji : A draft like this weakens their (the British Government's) position. They will treat India as an enemy country and reduce it to dust and ashes. They will do here what they did in Rangoon.

Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel : The draft says to the British, " You have proved your utter incompetence. You cannot defend India. We cannot defend it either because you won't let us do. But if you withdraw there is a chance for us."

Asaf Ali : The draft asks us to accept non-violence for all time.

Achyut Patwardhan : It was put to Gandhiji. He said that the Congress can take the stand that under existing circumstances non-violence was the best policy.

Jawaharlal Nehru : The whole background of the draft is one which will inevitably make the world think that we are passively lining up with the Axis Powers. The British are asked to withdraw. After the withdrawal we are to negotiate with

Japan and possibly come to some terms with her. These terms may include a large measure of civil control by us, a certain measure of military control by them, passage of armies through India, etc.

Kripalaniji : Why should it mean passage of armies through India, etc. Just as we call upon the British and the Americans to withdraw their armies so also we ask others to keep out of our frontiers. If they do not, we fight.

Jawaharlal Nehru : Whether you will like it or not, the exigencies of the war situation will compel them to make India a battle ground. In sheer self-defence they cannot afford to keep out. They will walk through the country. You can't stop it by non-violent non-co-operation. Most of the population will not be affected by the march. Individuals may resist in a symbolic way. The Japanese armies will go to Iraq, Persia, etc., throttle China and make the Russian situation more difficult.

The British will refuse our demand for military reasons apart from others. They cannot allow India to be used by Japan against them. Our reaction in the event of refusal will be a passive theoretical lining up with the Axis Powers. Japan may have an excuse for attack. We get involved in a hopeless logical quandary. We get hostility from every other element outside the Axis Powers. Japan will occupy strategic points. We get no chance to offer mass civil disobedience. Our policy of sympathy with one group is completely changed.

So far as the main action is concerned there is no difficulty about Bapu's draft. But the whole thought and background of the draft is one of favouring Japan. It may not be conscious. Three factors influence our decisions in the present emergency: (i) Indian freedom, (ii) sympathy for certain larger causes, (iii) probable outcome of the war; who is going to win? It is Gandhiji's feeling that Japan and Germany will win. This feeling unconsciously governs his decision. The approach in the draft is different from mine.

Achyut Patwardhan : I agree with Jawaharlalji's background but there are certain difficulties. The British Government is behaving in a suicidal manner. If we do not take decisions, Jawaharlalji's attitude will lead to abject and unconditional co-operation with British machinery which must collapse. If the battle of India is to be fought by Wavell, we shall do ourselves discredit if we attach ourselves to him. We talk of allying ourselves with the Allied nations. I doubt if America is a progressive force. The existence of the American army in India is not a fact which improves our situation. I was opposed to the Poona offer but not to talks with Cripps. Jawaharlalji's statement after the negotiation broke down distressed me. The trend of thought it disclosed lands us in a position which obliges us to offer unconditional co-operation to Britain. Our co-operation with Britain is an invitation to Japan.

Rajendra Babu : We cannot produce the proper atmosphere unless we adopt Bapu's draft. The Government has closed the door on armed resistance. We have only unarmed resistance to offer. We have therefore to strengthen Bapu's hands.

Govind Ballabh Pant : There is no difference of opinion so far as non-violence is concerned. There may be two opinions as to its effectiveness. Non-violent non-co-operation is not meant to be a demonstration. It is designed to prevent invasion or resist occupation, what will be our attitude to armed resistance. Shall we assist it or at least do nothing to hamper it?

Jawaharlal Nehru : It (Babu Rajendra Prasad's amendment) retains the approach in Bapu's original draft. The approach is a variation from the attitude we have taken up about the Allies. At least I have committed myself to that sympathy 100 per cent. It would be dishonourable for me to resign from that position. There is no reason why that choice should arise. But it has arisen somewhat in this approach. The portion of the draft about resistance has some substance. The

portion about minorities, Princes are unrealistic. We go on thinking in terms of what was and not what is, and that is a dangerous thing in a rapidly changing situation. There is no difference among us about (i) our reactions to Government and (ii) our total inability to co-operate with the Government. Our programme of self-sufficiency and self-protection helps the Government but that cannot be helped. (iii) We do not embarrass the British war effort because that in itself would mean aid to the invader. We agree on these points but we have different ways of getting at them. It is true that since my approach is different my emphasis too would be different.

Pantji : One test to apply to the draft is whether it is consistent with our previous resolutions. The language about the condemnation of Cripps' proposal is highly exaggerated. If the proposals were so bad why did we spend so much time over them. My attitude to-day is : We must do our utmost to defend the country and swallow many things. If I can't co-operate with the British it is because it is not consistent with our dignity. But the approach in the draft makes every soldier I see my enemy.

Asaf Ali : The draft will not make any effective appeal to the Axis Powers. Telling the British to withdraw will do nobody any good.

Bhulabhai Desai : No resolution is called for. We passed at Wardha one which expressed our definite position. The resolution is made in an unreal way. It is inconsistent with our previous stand. We have said that if offered an opportunity we shall side with the Allies.

Rajaji : I do not think the changed draft is different from the original. We appeal to Britain and Japan. The appeal to Britain will fail but certain tangible results will follow. The entire policy of the Congress will be reinterpreted and the new interpretation will go terribly against us. Japan will say "excellent."

I do not agree that if Britain goes away India will have some scope for organizing itself even if Japan should make some headway. Japan will fill the vacuum created by the British withdrawal. Our reaction to evils of Britain should not make us lose our sense of perspective. It is no use getting upset on small matters. Do not run into the arms of Japan, which is what the resolution comes to.

Dr. Pattabhi : It is a comprehensive and appropriate draft. A time has come when we must realize ourselves. After the rejection of Cripps' proposals we must reconsider our attitude and restate our position. We have varied our position from time to time during the time the war has been on. Poona was a variation from the old position. Bombay was a variation from Poona. Bombay was followed by C.D. and C.D. by Cripps.

Sarojini Naidu : The changed draft is much better than the original. There is however a great deal of unnecessary matter in the resolution. The appeal is a rhetorical gesture. It is however good as an expression of our extreme disgust and dislike and hatred of the British Government. The appeal to Japan is a useless gesture. India is a part of the map they have drawn. I agree with the non-violent non-co-operation part of the resolution. It can be recast keeping the substance of the original. The draft is a narrowing of sympathies not consistent with the position we have taken up. I do not like foreign soldiers. The portion dealing with them is good.

Biswanath Das : I see two conflicting views in the Committee. This division of opinion is fatal at this juncture. I generally agree with the draft. The Cripps' proposals if accepted would have kept us in permanent bondage. The appeal to Britain to withdraw is very proper. We can tell them that neither will they defend us nor allow us to defend ourselves.

The protest against the introduction of American soldiers in the country is also proper. They have brought in troops from the Dominions and other foreign nations. This is highly objectionable and dangerous.

Bardoloi : One portion of the draft is operative and another ideological. If we lay emphasis on the operative portion the differences will be greatly minimized. For joint action I should be prepared to delete the portion which deals with the ideological background. We are already in the danger zone. This is no time for ideological discussion. Let us concentrate on the present action which cannot be anything other than non-violent non-co-operation.

Satyamurti : The changed draft is an improvement. I do not agree with the objection to the entry of foreign soldiers. India may defend herself even with the aid of foreign soldiers. I think we must make an approach to the Muslim League.

Achyut Patwardhan : I am in general agreement with the draft. The open door policy is at an end. The resolution emphasizes a factor which has been emphasized by every intelligent man, i.e., the war is lost unless the people are in it. The war is an imperialist war. Our policy can be that we take no sides. The world is in the grip of fear complex. I would consider the position if the Allies could defeat the Axis. But I see clearly that Britain is going towards the deep. We want to create neutrality. Do not look to Japan or Britain.

Jairamdasji : The criticism that the draft is pro-Japanese is wrong. Opposition to the Japanese invasion is there in the draft.

The mention of foreign armies in the draft is very appropriate. The Indian History bears ample testimony of the highly undesirable consequences which foreign armies have led to. The draft creates an atmosphere of neutrality. The attempt is worth making.

Sardar Sahib : I see that there are two distinct opinions in the Committee. We have ever since the outbreak of war tried to pull together. But it may not be possible on this occasion. Gandhiji has taken a definite stand. If his background is unsuitable to some members of the Committee there is the other background which is unsuitable to us. The first four or five paragraphs of the draft is a reply to the Cripps mission. Cripps is a clever fellow. He has gone about saying that his mission has not been a failure. The draft is a perfect reply to his propaganda.

I am not in favour of making any approach to Jinnah. We have made repeated attempts and courted many insults. The Congress to-day is reeling under two blows, one Cripps and the other Rajaji's resolutions which have done us enormous harm. I have placed myself in the hands of Gandhiji. I feel that he is instinctively right, the lead he gives in all critical situations. In Bombay, at the time of the A.-I. C. C. meeting there was a difference in approach but the door to negotiations was closed. In Bardoli it was made clear that the door was still open and our sympathies were with Allies. It is time the door is finally closed after the repeated insults heaped upon us. I agree with the draft before us. If there is any pro-Fascist hint in the draft let it be removed.

Acharya Narendra Dho : I do not agree with the view that the war is one and indivisible. The aims of Russia and China are not identical with those of Britain and America. If it is one we should join the war and side with Britain. Our position has not been that we want power because without it we cannot kindle the national spirit. Our position has been that if the war was a people's war and there was proof of it in action we are willing to throw in our weight on the side of democracies.

It is necessary to counteract the mischievous propaganda of Cripps. Cripps has been saying that internal differences have prevented a settlement. Rajaji has strengthened his hands. Japanese threat has also influenced our attitude to Britain. It has led us to even modify Poona. We have to make it clear that Japanese threat has not unnerved us. We can tell the British to go, leaving us to our fate. Whatever unreality there is in Indian politics is due to the British rule. Let it go and the unreality will disappear. I am not interested in defeating Hitlerite Germany. I am more interested in war aims and peace aims.



Maulana Sahib : The discussion has been useful. But it is not clear to me the differences that divide the two groups. Cripps was a great hope. He came here with the reputation of a radical. But he proved a great disappointment. He made things worse. Cripps in his statements after the failure of negotiations has emphasized two points : (i) His mission has proved the sincerity of the intentions of the British Government towards India, (ii) The anti-Japanese front is the outcome of this mission. All this is false propaganda. Great Britain has made it impossible for us to defend our country. But we have something to do about the Japanese aggression. It is my firm belief that nationalism is the only religion for a subject nation. If I feel that Japan was better than Britain and her invasion was for the good of India I would have said so in public. But it is not so. Gandhiji's prescription is the only alternative though I doubt its effectiveness.

Since the draft presented by Rajendra Babu was not acceptable to Jawaharlalji and a few other members of the Committee the President asked Jawaharlalji to prepare a draft of his own. Jawaharlalji presented the following draft in the next sitting of the Committee.

The draft sought to cover the points contained in Bapu's draft but the approach was different. The discussions showed that the division of opinion revealed in the earlier discussions persisted. Jawaharlalji modified his draft with a view to accommodating better the other group, but the difference in approach remained. The draft was not acceptable to the whole Committee. Thereupon the President put the two drafts to the vote. Those who voted for Gandhiji's draft as modified by Rajendra Babu were Sardar Vallabhbhai, Rajendra Babu, J. B. Kripalani, Shankar Rao Deo, Sarojini Naidu, Prafulla Chandra Ghosh. Those who voted for Jawaharlalji's draft were Jawaharlal Nehru, Govind Ballabh Pant, Bhulabhai Desai and Asaf Ali. Among the invitees Shri Jairamdas Daulatram, Acharya Narendra Deo, Achyut Patwardhan, Bardoloi and Biswanath Das voted for Rajendra Babu's draft and Shri Satyamurti and Mrs. R. S. Pandit voted for Jawaharlalji's draft.

Rajendra Babu's draft was passed by the Committee in the morning sitting on May 1. The subject was however re-opened by the President in the afternoon sitting. He pleaded with those who supported Rajendra Babu's draft to accept Jawaharlalji's draft and make it a unanimous resolution. It was the President's opinion that there was practically no difference between the two drafts though the protagonists of both the drafts held that a vital difference in approach persisted. Supporters of Rajendra Babu's draft yielded to the wish of the President and accepted Jawaharlalji's draft. The draft resolution for the A.-I. C. C. as was finally passed by the Committee is as follows (See Appendix B).

### *Appendix A,*

Draft No. 1, dated Allahabad, April 27, 1942, Working Committee

Whereas the British War Cabinet's proposals sponsored by Sir Stafford Cripps have shown up British imperialism in its nakedness as never before, the A.-I. C. C. has come to the following conclusions :—

The A.-I. C. C. is of opinion that Britain is incapable of defending India. It is natural that whatever she does is for her own defence. There is an eternal conflict between Indian and British interests. It follows that their notions of defence would also differ. The British Government has no trust in India's political parties. The Indian army has been maintained up till now mainly to hold India in subjugation. It has been completely segregated from the general population who can in no sense regard it as their own. This policy of mistrust still continues and is the reason why national defence is not entrusted to India's elected representatives.

Japan's quarrel is not with India. She is warring against the British Empire. India's participation in the war has not been with the consent of the representatives of the Indian people. It was purely a British act. If India were freed her first

step would probably be to negotiate with Japan. The Congress is of opinion that if the British withdrew from India, India would be able to defend herself in the event of Japanese or any aggressor attacking India.

The A.-I. C. C. is, therefore, of opinion that the British should withdraw from India. The plea that they should remain in India for protecting the Indian Princes is wholly untenable. It is additional proof of their determination to maintain their hold over India. The Princes need have no fear from unarmed India.

The question of majority and minority is a creation of the British Government and would disappear on their withdrawal.

For all these reasons the Committee appeals to Britain, for the sake of her own safety, for the sake of India's safety and for the cause of world peace to let go her hold on India even if she does not give up all Asiatic and African possessions.

This Committee desires to assure the Japanese Government and people that India bears no enmity either towards Japan or towards any other nation. India only desires freedom from all alien domination. But in this fight for freedom the Committee is of opinion that India while welcoming universal sympathy does not stand in need of foreign military aid. India will attain her freedom through her non-violent strength and will retain it likewise. Therefore the Committee hopes that Japan will not have any designs on India. But if Japan attacks India and Britain makes no response to its appeal the Committee would expect all those who look to Congress for guidance to offer complete non-violent non-co-operation to the Japanese forces and not render any assistance to them. It is no part of the duty of those who are attacked to render any assistance to the attacker. It is their duty to offer complete non-co-operation.

It is not difficult to understand the simple principle of non-violent non-co-operation :—

1. We may not bend the knee to the aggressor nor obey any of his orders.
2. We may not look to him for any favours nor fall to his bribes. But we may not bear him any malice nor wish him ill.
3. If he wishes to take possession of our fields we will refuse to give them up even if we have to die in the effort to resist him.
4. If he is attacked by disease or is dying of thirst and seeks our aid we may not refuse it.
5. In such places where the British and Japanese forces are fighting our non-co-operation will be fruitless and unnecessary. At present our non-co-operation with the British Government is limited. Were we to offer them complete non-co-operation when they are actually fighting, it would be tantamount to placing our country deliberately in Japanese hands. Therefore not to put any obstacle in the way of the British forces will often be the only way of demonstrating our non-co-operation with the Japanese. Neither may we assist the British in any active manner. If we can judge from their recent attitude, the British Government do not need any help from us beyond our non-interference. They desire our help only as slaves—a position we can never accept.

It is necessary for the Committee to make a clear declaration in regard to the scorched earth policy. If, in spite of our non-violent resistance, any part of the country falls into Japanese hands we may not destroy our crops, water supply, etc., if only because it will be our endeavour to regain them. The destruction of war material is another matter and may under certain circumstances be a military necessity. But it can never be the Congress policy to destroy what belongs to or is of use to the masses.

Whilst non-co-operation against the Japanese forces will necessarily be limited to a comparatively small number and must succeed if it is complete and genuine, the true building up of Swaraj consists in the millions of India wholeheartedly working the constructive programme. Without it the whole nation cannot rise from its age-long torpor. Whether the British remain or not it is our duty always to wipe out unemployment, to bridge the gulf between rich and poor, to banish communal strife, to exorcise the demon of untouchability, to reform dacoits and save the people from them. If crores of people do not take a living interest in this nation-building work, freedom must remain a dream and unattainable by either non-violence or violence.

### *Foreign soldiers*

The A.-I. C. C. is of opinion that it is harmful to India's interests and dangerous to the cause of India's freedom to introduce foreign soldiers in India. It therefore appeals to the British Government to remove these foreign legions and henceforth stop further introduction. It is a crying shame to bring foreign troops in spite of India's inexhaustible manpower and is a proof of the immorality that British imperialism is.

### *Appendix B*

#### All-India Congress Committee Resolution, May 1, 1942

In view of the imminent peril of invasion that confronts India, and the attitude of the British Government, as shown again in the recent proposals sponsored by Sir Stafford Cripps, the All-India Congress Committee has to declare afresh India's policy and to advise the people in regard to the action to be undertaken in the emergencies that may arise in the immediate future.

The proposals of the British Government and their subsequent elucidation by Sir Stafford Cripps have led to greater bitterness and distrust of that Government and the spirit of non-co-operation with Britain has grown. They have demonstrated that even in this hour of danger, not only to India but to the cause of the United Nations, the British Government functions as an imperialist government and refuses to recognize the independence of India or to part with any real power.

India's participation in the war was a purely British act imposed upon the Indian people without the consent of their representatives. While India has no quarrel with the people of any country, she has repeatedly declared her antipathy to Nazism and Fascism as to imperialism. If India were free she would have determined her own policy and might have kept out of the war, though her sympathies would, in any event, have been with the victims of aggression. If, however, circumstances had led her to join the war, she would have done so as a free country fighting for freedom, and her defence would have been organized on a popular basis with a national army under national control and leadership, and with intimate contacts with the people. A free India would know how to defend herself in the event of any aggressor attacking her. The present Indian Army is in fact an offshoot of the British Army and has been maintained till now mainly to hold India in subjection. It has been completely segregated from the general population, who can in no sense regard it as their own.

The essential difference between the imperialist and the popular conceptions of defence is demonstrated by the fact that while foreign armies are invited to India for that defence, the vast manpower of India herself is not utilized for the purpose. India's past experience teaches her that it is harmful to her interest and dangerous to the cause of her freedom to introduce foreign armies in India. It is significant and extraordinary that India's inexhaustible manpower should remain untapped, while India develops into a battle-ground between foreign armies fighting on her soil

or on her frontiers, and her defence is not supposed to be a subject fit for popular control. India resents this treatment of her people as chattels to be disposed of by foreign authority.

The All-India Congress Committee is convinced that India will attain her freedom through her own strength and will retain it likewise. The present crisis, as well as the experience of the negotiations with Sir Stafford Cripps, makes it impossible for the Congress to consider any schemes or proposals which retain, even in a partial measure, British control and authority in India. Not only the interests of India but also Britain's safety, and world peace and freedom demand that Britain must abandon her hold on India. It is on the basis of independence alone that India can deal with Britain or other nations.

The Committee repudiates the idea that freedom can come to India through interference or invasion by any foreign nation, whatever the professions of that nation may be. In case an invasion takes place it must be resisted. Such resistance can only take the form of non-violent non-cooperation as the British Government has prevented the organization of national defence by the people in any other way. The Committee would therefore expect the people of India to offer complete non-violent non-cooperation to the invading forces and not to render any assistance to them. We may not bend the knee to the aggressor nor obey any of his orders. We may not look to him for favours nor fall to his bribes. If he wishes to take possession of our homes and our fields we will refuse to give them up even if we have to die in the effort to resist them. In places wherein the British and the invading forces are fighting our non-cooperation will be fruitless and unnecessary. Not to put any obstacle in the way of British forces will often be the only way of demonstrating our non-cooperation with the invader. Judging from their attitude the British Government do not need any help from us beyond our non-interference.

The success of such a policy of non-cooperation and non-violent resistance to the invader will largely depend on the intensive working out of the Congress constructive programme and more especially the programme of self-sufficiency and self-protection in all parts of the country.

## APPENDIX II

### *Mr. Rajagopalachari's letter of July 18th, 1942, to Mr. Gandhi*

"Madras, July 18, 1942.—Dear Mahatmaji, we have carefully read the resolution passed by the All-India Congress Working Committee at Wardha on July 14, which is to be placed before the meeting of the A. I. C. C. next month. In view of the far-reaching consequences of the adoption of this resolution, we feel it our duty, having worked with you since 1920, to place before you our considered views in this matter. While there can be no difference of view over India's demand for complete freedom from foreign domination, the idea of the withdrawal of Government being automatically replaced by another Government is altogether impossible. The State is not a mere superstructure, but is so intimately bound up with the functioning of every activity of the people that the withdrawal of the Government without a simultaneous replacement by another must involve a dissolution of the State and of society itself. It is unnatural for any Government to withdraw without transferring power to a successor by consent or without being forcibly replaced by another. The formation of a provisional government as well as the convening of the constituent assembly are possible only if the continuity of the State is assured.

"We feel, therefore, that, however difficult of achievement the Hindu-Muslim settlement may be, while the British Government is here and functioning, it is essential that, before a demand for withdrawal can be reasonably made, the major political organizations of this country, namely, the Indian National Congress and the Muslim League, should evolve a joint plan with regard to the provisional government which can take over power and preserve the continuity of the State. Even if we imagine

that the British could ever under moral compulsion be made to withdraw unconditionally, we are convinced that the chaos that would follow under existing conditions would not permit within any reasonable time the formation of a provisional government such as you contemplate.

"We consider it wrong to formulate a demand which, if complied with, must necessarily lead to anarchy or to frame a programme of widespread self-inflicted suffering based on the refusal of such a demand.

"Your proposal that while the civil power may be withdrawn, the British and Allied forces may continue in India in anticipation of a treaty with a problematic provisional Indian Government will only lead to the exercise of all governmental functions by the military forces. This will happen if only for their own safety and effective functioning. They are further likely to be urged towards this step by local chieftains and suffering people. This would be the reinstallation of the British Government in a worse form.

"In spite of these objections we might have submitted to your proposal if only because of the fact that the British are not going to withdraw, and in actual operation the movement would amount to a nationwide protest against the existing Government and may be productive of a satisfactory settlement in due course. But the critical international situation in which India is directly involved makes it certain that the party to gain immediately by the movement will be Japan. If the movement could possibly displace the British Government, installing a national government capable of resisting Japanese aggression, it might be worth while taking all risks attached to it. But, as this result is not even remotely probable, it will only produce more intense and large-scale repression and suffering which will facilitate Japanese invasion and occupation.

"It is hardly likely that the authorities will allow the movement to proceed under central direction in an orderly and direct fashion. Even if we do not mind sporadic violence that may result from lack of proper control, there is another serious danger. When responsible leaders are removed and their guidance is no longer available, the movement can easily be taken advantage of by the enemy and be converted into a fifth column activity on his behalf.

"Any movement started by you would have commanded our loyal participation, in spite of differences of opinion, if the movement did not involve such grave consequences as pointed out above. Our conviction is strong enough to make it our duty publicly to oppose the proposal on these grounds. But it may be thought at this stage that your move will operate as a protest with an international appeal and bring about a fresh approach towards a political settlement for India without actually plunging the country in direct action. In order that any step on our part may not lessen this chance we refrain from giving public expression to our opposition but send this letter to entreat you to desist from taking the steps you have adumbrated." (Sd.) C. Rajagopalachari, K. Santhanam, S. Ramanathan, Dr. T. S. S. Rajan.

### *Mr. Gandhi's Reply*

Sevagram, Wardha, July 20, 1942.—"My dear C. R., I was about to write to you when your letter came. Of course, I understand and appreciate the exquisite consideration running through your letter. I invite you all four to come here and pour out your love and argument to wean me from what appears to be an error. Anyway your monthly visit is due. You can come any day you like. What I wanted to write to you about was this. Why don't you form a league with Muslim friends to propagate your idea of settlement? Have you Q. A.'s reply to my note? Do you accept his definition of Pakistan? What is the common idea about independence? Surely you should have a common understanding over fundamentals before you come to an agreement. Let not your fear of the Japs betray you into a worse state of things. But more of all this when you come. Love to you all. Bapu."

## APPENDIX III (1)

*Text of the resolution adopted by the Congress Working Committee at Wardha on 14th July 1942*

The events happening from day to day and the experience that the people of India are passing through confirm the opinion of Congressmen that British rule in India must end immediately, not merely because foreign domination even at its best is an evil in itself and a continuing injury to the subject people, but because India in bondage can play no effective part in defending herself and in affecting the fortunes of the war that is desolating humanity. The freedom of India is thus necessary not only in the interest of India, but also for the safety of the world and for the ending of Nazism, Fascism, militarism and other forms of imperialism, and the aggression of one nation over another. Ever since the outbreak of the world war, the Congress has studiously pursued a policy of non-embarrassment. Even at the risk of making its satyagraha ineffective, it deliberately gave it a symbolic character in the hope that this policy of non-embarrassment carried to its logical extreme would be duly appreciated and that real power would be transferred to popular representatives so as to enable the nation to make its fullest contribution towards the realisation of human freedom throughout the world, which is in danger of being crushed. It had also hoped that negatively nothing would be done which was calculated to tighten Britain's hold on India.

These hopes have, however, been dashed to pieces. The abortive Cripps' proposals showed in the clearest possible manner that there was no change in the British Government's attitude towards India and that the British hold on India was in no way to be relaxed. In the negotiations with Sir Stafford Cripps, Congress Representatives tried their utmost to achieve a minimum, consistent with the national demand, but to no avail. This frustration has resulted in a rapid and widespread increase of ill-will against Britain and a growing satisfaction at the success of Japanese arms.

The Working Committee view this development with grave apprehension as this, unless checked, will inevitably lead to a passive acceptance of aggression. The Committee hold that all aggression must be resisted, for any submission to it must mean the degradation of the Indian people and the continuation of their subjection. The Congress is anxious to avoid the experience of Malaya, Singapore, and Burma and desires to build up resistance to any aggression on or invasion of India by the Japanese or any foreign Power. The Congress would change the present ill-will against Britain into goodwill and make India a willing partner in a joint enterprise of securing freedom for the nations and peoples of the world and in the trials and tribulations which accompany it. This is only possible if India feels the glow of freedom.

The Congress representatives have tried their utmost to bring about a solution of the communal tangle. But this has been made impossible by the presence of the foreign power and only after the ending of foreign domination and intervention, can the present unreality give place to reality and the people of India, belonging to all groups and parties, face India's problems and solve them on a mutually agreed basis.

The present political parties formed chiefly with a view to attract the attention of and influence the British power, will then probably cease to function. For the first time in India's history, the realisation will come home that the princes, 'jagirdars', 'zamindars' and propertied and monied classes derive their wealth and property from the workers in the fields and factories and elsewhere, to whom essentially power and authority must belong. On the withdrawal of British rule in India, responsible men and women of the country will come together to form a provisional government, representative of all important sections of the people of India which will later evolve a scheme by which a constituent Assembly can be convened in order

to prepare a constitution for the Government of India acceptable to all sections of the people. Representatives of free India and representatives of Great Britain will confer together for the adjustment of future relations and for the co-operation of the two countries as allies in the common task of meeting aggression.

It is the earnest desire of the Congress to enable India to resist aggression effectively with the peoples' united will and strength behind it. In making the proposal for the withdrawal of the British rule from India, the Congress has no desire whatsoever to embarrass Great Britain or the Allied Powers in their prosecution of the war, or in any way to encourage aggression on India or increase pressure on China by the Japanese or any other Power associated with the Axis group. Nor does the Congress intend to jeopardise the defensive capacity of the Allied powers.

The Congress is, therefore, agreeable to the stationing of the armed forces of the Allies in India, should they so desire, in order to ward off and resist Japanese or other aggression and to protect and help China. The proposal of withdrawal of the British power from India was never intended to mean the physical withdrawal of all Britishers from India, and certainly not of those who would make India their home and live there as citizens and as equals with the others. If such a withdrawal takes place with goodwill it would result in the establishing of a stable provisional government in India and co-operation between this government and the united nations in resisting aggression and helping China. The Congress realises that there may be risks involved in such a course. Such risks, however, have to be faced by any country in order to achieve freedom, and more especially at the present critical juncture in order to save the country and the larger cause of freedom the world over from far greater risks and perils. While, therefore, the Congress is impatient to achieve the national purpose it wishes to take no hasty steps and would like to avoid, in so far as is possible, any course of action that might embarrass the United Nations. The Congress would be pleased with the British power if it accepts the very reasonable and just proposal herein made not only in the interest of India but also that of Britain and of the cause of freedom to which the United Nations proclaim their adherence. Should, however, this appeal fail the Congress cannot view without the gravest apprehension the continuation of the present state of affairs involving a progressive deterioration in the situation and the weakening of India's will and power to resist aggression. The Congress will then be reluctantly compelled to utilise all the non-violent strength it might have gathered since 1920 when, it adopted non-violence as part of its policy for the vindication of the political rights and liberty. Such a widespread struggle would inevitably be under the leadership of Mahatma Gandhi. As issues raised are of the most vital and far-reaching importance to the people of India as well as to the peoples of the United Nations the Working Committee refer them to the All-India Congress Committee for final decision. For this purpose the A. I. C. C. will meet in Bombay on the 7th of August, 1942.

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### APPENDIX III (2)

*Text of the resolution adopted by the All-India Congress Committee on 8th August 1942*

"The All-India Congress Committee has given the most careful consideration to the reference made to it by the Working Committee in their resolution dated July 14, 1942, and to subsequent events, including the development of the war situation, the utterances of responsible spokesmen of the British Government, and the comments and criticisms made in India and abroad. The Committee approves of and endorses that resolution, and is of opinion that events subsequent to it have given it further justification, and have made it clear that the immediate ending of British rule in



India is an urgent necessity, both for the sake of India and for the success of the cause of the United Nations. The continuation of that rule is degrading and enfeebling India and making her progressively less capable of defending herself and of contributing to the cause of world freedom.

"The Committee has viewed with dismay the deterioration of the situation on the Russian and Chinese peoples its high appreciation of their heroism in defence of their freedom. This increasing peril makes it incumbent on all those who strive for freedom and who sympathise with the victims of aggression, to examine the foundations of the policy so far pursued by the Allied Nations, which have led to repeated and disastrous failure. It is not by adhering to such aims and policies and methods that failure can be converted into success, for past experience has shown that failure is inherent in them. These policies have been based not on freedom so much as on the domination of subject and Colonial countries, and the continuation of the Imperialist tradition and method. The possession of Empire, instead of adding to the strength of the ruling power, has become a burden and a curse. India, the classic land of modern Imperialism, has become the crux of the question, for by the freedom of India will Britain and the United Nations be judged, and the peoples of Asia and Africa be filled with hope and enthusiasm.

"The ending of British rule in this country is thus a vital and immediate issue on which depend the future of the war and the success of freedom and democracy. A free India will assure this success by throwing all her great resources in the struggle for freedom and against the aggression of Nazism, Fascism and Imperialism. This will not only affect materially the fortunes of the war, but will bring all subject and oppressed humanity on the side of the United Nations, and give these nations, whose ally India would be the moral and spiritual leadership of the world. India in bondage will continue to be the symbol of British Imperialism and the taint of that imperialism will affect the fortunes of all the United Nations.

"The peril of today, therefore, necessitates the independence of India and the ending of British domination. No future promises or guarantees can affect the present situation or meet that peril. They cannot produce the needed psychological effect on the mind of the masses. Only the glow of freedom now can release that energy and enthusiasm of millions of people which will immediately transform the nature of the war.

"The A. I. C. C., therefore, repeats with all emphasis the demand for the withdrawal of the British power from India. On the declaration of India's independence, a provisional Government will be formed and free India will become an ally of the United Nations, sharing with them in the trials and tribulations of the joint enterprise of the struggle for freedom. The provisional Government can only be formed by the co-operation of the principal parties and groups in the country. It will thus be a composite Government, representative of all important sections of the people of India. Its primary functions must be to defend India and resist aggression with all the armed as well as the non-violent forces at its command, together with its Allied Powers, and to promote the wellbeing and progress of the workers in the fields and factories and elsewhere to whom essentially all power and authority must belong. The provisional Government will evolve a scheme for a constituent assembly which will prepare a constitution for the Government of India acceptable to all sections of the people. This constitution, according to the Congress view, should be a federal one. With the largest measure of autonomy for the federating units, and with the residuary powers vesting in these units. The future relations between India and the Allied Nations will be adjusted by representatives of all these free countries conferring together for their mutual advantage and for their co-operation in the common task of resisting aggression. Freedom will enable India to resist aggression effectively with the people's united will and strength behind it.

"The freedom of India must be the symbol of and prelude to this freedom of all other Asiatic nations under foreign domination. Burma, Malaya, Indo-China, the Dutch Indies, Iran and Iraq must also attain their complete freedom.



It must be clearly understood that such of these countries as are under Japanese control now must not subsequently be placed under the rule or control of any other Colonial Power.

"While the A. I. C. C. must primarily be concerned with the independence and defence of India in this hour of danger, the Committee is of opinion that the future peace, security and ordered progress of the world demand a world federation of free nations, and on no other basis can the problems of the modern world be solved. Such a world federation would ensure the freedom of its constituent nations, the prevention of aggression and exploitation by one nation over another the protection of national minorities, the advancement of all backward areas and peoples, and the pooling of the world's resources for the common good of all. On the establishment of such a world federation, disarmament would be practicable in all countries, national armies, navies and air forces would no longer be necessary, and a world federal defence force would keep the world peace and prevent aggression.

"An independent India would gladly join such a world federation and co-operate on an equal basis with other countries in the solution of international problems.

"Such a federation should be open to all nations who agree with its fundamental principles. In view of the war, however, the federation must inevitably, to begin with, be confined to the United Nations, such a step taken now will have a most powerful effect on the war, on the peoples of the Axis countries, and on the peace to come.

"The Committee regretfully realizes, however, that despite the tragic and overwhelming lessons of the war and the perils that overhang the world, the Governments of few countries are yet prepared to take this inevitable step towards world federation. The reactions of the British Government and the misguided criticism of the foreign Press also make it clear that even the obvious demand for India's independence is resisted, though this has been made essentially to meet the present peril and to enable India to defend herself and help China and Russia in their hour of need. The Committee is anxious not to embarrass in any way the defence of China or Russia, whose freedom is precious and must be preserved, or to jeopardise the defensive capacity of the United Nations. But the peril grows both to India and these nations, and in action and submission to a foreign administration at this stage is not only degrading India and reducing her capacity to defend herself and resist aggression but is no answer to that growing peril and is no service to the peoples of the United Nations. The earnest appeal of the Working Committee to Great Britain and the United Nations has so far met with no response and the criticisms made in many foreign quarters have shown an ignorance of India's and the world's need, and sometimes even hostility to India's freedom, which is significant of a mentality of domination and racial superiority which cannot be tolerated by a proud people conscious of their strength and of the justice of their cause.

"The A. I. C. C. would yet again, at this last moment, in the interest of world freedom, renew this appeal to Britain and the United Nations. But the Committee feels that it is no longer justified in holding the nation back from endeavouring to assert its will against an imperialist and authoritarian Government which dominates over it and prevents it from functioning in its own interest and in the interest of humanity. The Committee resolves, therefore to sanction, for the vindication of India's inalienable right to freedom and independence, the starting of a mass struggle on non-violent lines on the widest possible scale, so that the country might utilize all the non-violent strength it has gathered during the last 22 years of peaceful struggle. Such a struggle must inevitably be under the leadership of Gandhiji and the Committee requests him to take the lead and guide the nation in the steps to be taken.

"The Committee appeals to the people of India to face the dangers and hardships that will fall to their lot with courage and endurance, and to hold together under the leadership of Gandhiji and carry out his instructions as disciplined

soldiers of Indian freedom. They must remember that non-violence is the basis of this movement. A time may come when it may not be possible to issue instructions or for instructions to reach our people, and when no Congress Committees can function. When this happens every man and woman who is participating in this movement must function for himself or herself within the four corners of the general instructions issued. Every Indian who desires freedom and strives for it must be his own guide urging him on along the hard road where there is no resting place and which leads ultimately to the independence and deliverance of India.

“Lastly, whilst the A. I. C. C. has stated its own view of the future governance under free India, the A. I. C. C. wishes to make it quite clear to all concerned that by embarking on a mass struggle, it has no intention of gaining power for the Congress. The power, when it comes, will belong to the whole people of India”.

#### APPENDIX IV

*Confidential. Andhra Provincial Congress Committee*

Bezwada, 29th July 1942.

The following instructions are issued to all D. C. Cs. The Presidents and the Secretaries are requested to undertake organisation work immediately on the lines suggested hereunder. But it is open to the D. C. Cs. to supplement the items or alter the lines of organisation subject to the conditions in para. 1 below. The D. C. Cs. are requested to send their first report by 8th August 1942 and a report every week thereafter without fail.

The success of the movement when it starts will very much depend on the tempo we can give it at a swift pace from the time it begins. For this the organisation should not only be effective but also should be entrusted to capable hands and arranged in succession wherever possible.

The President and the Secretary of the P. C. C. will tour the districts and will be in active touch with the developments as long as they happen to be free.

The D. C. Cs. are also requested to pool together immediately all the amounts due from primary members. The quota due to the P. C. C. must be sent by about the 4th August, 1942.

If donations are collected anywhere for Congress work 25 per cent should be sent at once to the P. C. C. Even when the P. C. C. partakes in the collections work the same proportion will be claimed.

(1) The whole movement is based on non-violence. No act which contravenes this instructions should ever be undertaken.

All acts of disobedience committed should be overt and never covert (open but not under cover).

(2) *Organisation.*—The District may be divided into convenient groups based on Revenue divisions or Taluks and should be placed under an organiser. The organiser should be given the assistance of select Congress workers who will actively arrange the details—place, date and the persons. Consolidated lists of these organisations with available details should be sent to the P. C. C. office immediately.

The following suggestions can be followed immediately—

I. Collect information as regards items of programme—porambokes with toddy yielding trees and natural salt depots, liquor shops, railway stations, Telegraph and Telephone lines, troop locations, recruiting centres, etc.

II. Names of persons put in charge of various items of organisation work should be listed.

III. Organise public meetings and intensive propaganda in villages at c

IV. Congress resolutions and replies to counter-propaganda must be widely circulated. Printing work may not be possible. Duplicators may be used. Material can be gathered but will also be supplemented from time to time from the P. C. C.

(3) The form of disobedience may be individual, generalised individual, or mass.

(4) Items of the programme :—

*Group I.—First Stage—*

- (a) Breaking of prohibitory orders.
- (b) Picking salt.
- (c) Continuing openly to be members of unlawful associations.

*Group II.—Second Stage—*

- (a) Items of non-cooperation—  
Lawyers to leave practice.  
Students to leave colleges.  
Jurors and Assessors not to respond summons.
- (b) Government officers including village officers to resign their jobs.

*Group III.—Third Stage—*

- Arranging labour strikes.

*Group IV.—Fourth Stage—*

- (a) Picketting of foreign cloth shops.
- (b) Liquor shops.
- (c) Foreign concerns in trade and industry.

*Group V.—Fifth Stage—*

The following items are not prohibited but not encouraged and to be considered at this stage only :—

- (1) Stopping trains by pulling chains only.
- (2) Travel without tickets.
- (3) Cutting toddy yielding trees.
- (4) Cutting telegraph and telephone wires.

*N.B.*—Rails should not be removed or permanent way obstructed. No danger to life, should be a great caution. (sic).

*Group VI.—Practically the last stage—*

- (a) Non-payment of taxes excluding Municipal taxes. Especially Zamindari rent should not be paid if the Zamindar will not join the movement.
- (b) Picketting of troops.

*Convictions.*—When people are sent to jail, they need not keep quiet as usual. But they should continue disobedience here also through work and lock out strikes (sic.) Hunger strikes also should be undertaken, but voluntarily, on personal risk of the individual as it may lead to the glory of self immolation.

*Warning.*—99 out of 100 chances are for the inauguration of this movement by Mahatmaji at an early date, possibly a few hours after the next All-India Congress Committee meeting at Bombay. The D. C. Cs. should be alert and begin to act immediately. But please also take note that no movement should be launched or any overt act done till Mahatmaji decides. After all he may decide otherwise and you will be responsible for a great unwarranted mistake. Be ready, organise at once, be alert but by no means act.

## APPENDIX V

*A comparison of the "A. I. C. C. twelve-point programme" with Mr. Gandhi's pre-arrest writings and statements**"12-Point" Programme.**Extracts from Mr. Gandhi's writings or statements.*

*Instruction (1).*—There shall be a hartal throughout the country, in all the cities and villages of India. The hartal will be peaceful. The hartal will be country's protest against the arrest of Gandhiji, the Congress President and members of the Working Committee. It will also be symbol of our determination to carry on the struggle, which started with the arrest of Gandhiji, to its successful conclusion. If participation in a hartal carries with it any penalties, they should be cheerfully borne.

There will be a meeting in the evening in villages and cities where we shall deliver the Congress message "Quit-India". If there are bans on the meetings, they should be resisted.

*Instruction (2).*—Salt is a prime necessity of our life. Our countrymen should consider themselves free to manufacture it wherever they can do so whether in coastal or inland areas. Laws prohibiting the manufacture should be resisted and all consequences taken.

*Instruction (3).*—Our struggle is "non-violent non-cooperation" on the widest possible scale. The teeming millions that inhabit the 700,000 villages form the backbone of our struggle. They have the biggest and most vital part to play. Let them withhold all co-operation from the alien administration that reduced them to servitude and abject poverty. Let them when the time comes withhold payment of all revenue to the Government. Where there is zamindari system, the zamindar may be given his share of the revenue provided he throws in his lot with the people and refuses all co-operation with the Government.

*Instruction (4).*—The students are the vanguard of our struggle. It is their solemn and sacred task to rouse and awaken and vitalise the dumb millions from one end of the country to the other. It is unthinkable that they can be passive spectators of the grand fight for freedom that is going on about them. Let students above 16 leave their colleges and universities and conduct the non-violent struggle to its victorious conclusion. They are the intelligentsia of the country and know full well how our leader wants them to act. Our leaders have been arrested. The few that remain will soon be clapped, if worse does not befall them. Students alone can fittingly supply the gap. There is no doubt they will prove worthy of the great call that has come to them.

"As to salt famine, the law is not quite on the people's side, but the right is wholly on their side. . . . I would advise them to manufacture salt even at the risk of prosecution. Necessity knows no law."—*Harijan* (28-6-42).

"The programme covers every activity of a strictly non-violent character included in a mass movement. Therefore undoubtedly the things you have mentioned (*viz.*, breach of salt laws, calling out Government servants and labour) are included."—*Harijan* (26-7-42).

"Non-violent non-cooperation is the most effective substitute for every kind of violent warfare. If the whole nation takes to non-violent action, it can be wholly successful."—*Harijan* (26-4-42).

"What I am hoping and striving for is an irresistible mass urge on the part of the people and an intelligent response on the part of all privileged classes to the popular demand."—*Harijan* (14-6-42).

"If the (British) withdrawal is to take place, it won't be due merely to the non-violent pressure. . . . Thus we can disown the authority of the British rulers by refusing taxes and in a variety of ways."—*Harijan* (5-7-42).

"As regards students, I have not formulated my plans as yet and I do not want them to join this struggle for the moment, but I wish that the students and professors should imbibe the spirit of freedom. They should stand by the Congress and should have the courage to say they are for the Congress. When they get the call, they should cheerfully abandon their studies and their careers and support the movement whole-heartedly."—A. I. C. C. meeting, Bombay (8-8-42).

"12-Point" Programme.

Extracts from Mr. Gandhi's writings or statements.

*Instruction (5).*—The members of the Government services are faced with a choice. In this titanic clash between the people and the alien Government, what is their place? Must they earn their livelihood by betraying their country at a time when it is engaged in a mortal and deadly struggle? Is it part of their duty to suppress, to betray the people? Do they like to have the blessings of the present and future generations or their curses? The days of the administration which is giving them their bread and butter are now numbered. Why lean on a broken reed?

If those who do not have the strength to resign their jobs have at least the courage to say 'no' to all orders that are designed to suppress and crush our people. If the saying of 'no' involves dismissal, let it be cheerfully courted. Every such dismissal will be a nail in the coffin of the Empire that is throttling us.

*Instruction (6).*—As Gandhiji said let every soldier in the army consider himself a Congressman. If his officer issues an order which hurts his conscience as Congressman let him disobey them and take the consequences cheerfully. It can be no part of their duty to lathi charge, tear gas or shoot non-violent crowds, peaceful processions or meetings. India hopefully looks to them to play worthy part in the great struggle. The fellow soldiers in other lands fraternised with the people when they rose in revolt against misrule and oppression whether indigenous or foreign. Let the Indian soldiers follow their glorious example.

*Instruction (7).*—The Indian States are a part and parcel of India. The struggle today is as much theirs as of the so called British India. Gandhiji at the A. I. C. C. issued an appeal to the Princes to make common cause with the Indian people and throw off the common yoke. Whatever the response of the Princes to Gandhiji's appeal let our brothers in Indian States make the struggle their own. Their fight today is not with the Princes but with the alien master who is keeping them and the people in subjection. If the Princes side with the alien masters it will be the painful duty of the people to wage a struggle against a combination of the Princes and the alien master.

"The programme covers every activity of a strictly non-violent character included in a mass movement. Therefore undoubtedly the things you have mentioned (*viz.*, breach of salt laws, calling out Government servants and Labour) are included."—*Harijan* (26-7-42).

"There is no need for the Government servants to resign, but they should write to Government to say that they are with the Congress."—A. I. C. C. meeting, Bombay (8-8-42).

"The sepoys should also declare that they belonged to the Congress, but that they were working for their livelihood, and, if they were asked to shoot Indians, they should refuse to do so saying that they are prepared to fight the Japanese."—A. I. C. C. meeting, Bombay (8-8-42).

"Will the Princes march with the times or must they remain tied to the Imperial chariot-wheel? If they take their courage with both their hands and make common cause with the nation, they can run the risk of dispossession. . . . . Will the Princes and princely landholders and merchants take the lead? It is for them to take the lead, not for the 'have-nots'. . . . . If the 'haves', who are in fact the pillars on which the mighty British Power rests, can realise their obvious duty, the British Power must yield. It was because I had despaired of response from the pillars, that I have thought of moving the masses on whom the pillars rest."—*Harijan* (2-8-42).

"Princes are the creation of the British Power. Their number may be 600 or more. They are created by the ruling power, as you know, to create differences between Indian India and British India. . . . . The Congress claims to represent them as well. . . . . Whatever the Princes may say their people will acclaim that we have been asking for the very thing that they want. If we carry on this struggle in the way I want it, the Princes will get more through it than they can ever expect. I have met some Princes and they have stated their helplessness by saying that we are more free than they are because they can be removed by the Paramount Power."—A. I. C. C. meeting, Bombay (7-8-42).

**"12-Point" Programme.**

*Extracts from Mr. Gandhi's writings or statements.*

"Let the Princes know that I am their well-wisher from the bottom of my heart..... The Princes should rise to the occasion. They must part with responsibility of administration to their subjects. Let them read the sign of the times. If they fail to do this, they will have no quarter in a Free India..... Let the Princes shear themselves of their autocracy.... Their only chance of survival depends on the goodwill of their people. I would venture to ask the Princes whether they are not equally anxious to see India free. If the answer is in the affirmative, let them come forward. If the answer is in the negative, then I do not hesitate to say that even the Paramount Power will not be able to come to their rescue because the Power itself will not be there. Responsible Government should immediately be conferred on their subjects."—A. I. C. C. meeting, Bombay (8-8-42).

*Instruction (8).*—Gandhiji has time and again stressed the vital and decisive part that our womenfolk can play in the non-violent struggle. It is for them to justify Gandhiji's faith in them. If they bring to the struggle the non-violent sacrifice and suffering of which they are capable our struggle will inevitably be short and swift. Let it fall to them to infuse and energise the people of India at the fateful period in her history.

*Instruction (9).*—Let every man and woman in the country carry on his person a badge bearing the motto "Do or Die". This will proclaim our determination to be free or perish in the attempt to be free.

"If they (the Allies) don't (do the initial act of justice and put their case on unassailable basis), they must face the opposition of those who cannot tolerate their rule and are prepared to die in order to get rid of it."—*Harijan* (2-8-42).

"If I could turn India, Great Britain, America and the rest of the world including the Axis Powers in the direction of non-violence I should do so. But that feat mere human effort cannot accomplish. That is in God's hands. For me 'I can but do or die'."—*Harijan* (9-8-42).

"You have to forsake wife, friends, forsake everything in the world.... Even if all the United Nations opposed me, even if the whole of India tried to persuade me that I am wrong, I will go ahead, not for India's sake alone, but for the sake of the world..... I have pledged the Congress and the Congress will *do or die*". —A. I. C. C. meeting, Bombay (8-8-42).

*Instruction (10).*—This is a struggle in which all Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs, Parsis and Christians have to participate. Freedom's struggle knows no communal or racial distinctions. If there must be competition between Communities let it be one in sacrifice and suffering for the great cause.

"I wish all conflicting elements and interests will make a combined effort to rid India of foreign domination."—*Harijan* (24-5-42).

"The fight has been conceived in the interest of the whole of India..... They will fight not to seize power, but to end the foreign domination, cost what it may..... The movement has only one aim—that is displacing British power..... Why should not Muslims, who believe in Pakistan but also believe in Independent India, join such a struggle?" —*Harijan* (12-7-42).

**"12-Point" Programme.**

*Preamble and instruction (11).*—With the arrest of Mahatma Gandhi every man and woman in India is his successor. Victory or death should be the motto of every son and daughter of India. If we live we live as free men, if we die, we die as free men. There can be no rest for us so long as Gandhiji is in jail.

This is our final struggle. If all do their duty, the struggle should finish in two months time. All classes of men are called upon to join the fight. Millions have to move and break the chains that bind India. The struggle will include all activities that a non-violent mass struggle can include. Let our struggle gather momentum from day to day till it becomes an irresistible force and we regain our previous heritage. Let us be true to the message which Gandhiji has left us: "Do or Die."

Ending of foreign rule is our objective. Whatever helps in the attainment of that objective, subject to inexorable condition of non-violence, is permissible and legitimate. People in the Provinces have to devise and adopt all non-violent ways of paralysing the administration. Every man is his own guide and leader. All Provinces have full Provincial autonomy in the matter of carrying on the struggle. Let them remain true to non-violence and all will be well with the struggle. There is no place for fear in the struggle: it should be banished from our minds and hearts. Each one of us should feel and assert that he is a free man. Suffering that comes our way as a consequence of this assertion and our action on it shall be cheerfully borne. Our leaders have done their part, it is for those who are left out to do theirs. The burden of carrying on the struggle falls on them. Let them carry their burden worthily.

*Extracts from Mr. Gandhi's writings or statements.*

"I ask for a bloodless end of an unnatural domination and for a new era."—*Harijan* (17-5-42).

"British rule in India in any shape or form must end. Hitherto the rulers have said, 'We would gladly retire if we know to whom we should hand over the reins'. My answer is, 'Leave India to God. If that is too much, leave her to anarchy'."—*Harijan* (24-5-42).

"Nor is waiting possible till hatred abates. Withdrawal of the hated power is the only way to rid the land of the debasing hatred. The cause gone, hatred must cease..... In this struggle every risk has to be run in order to cure ourselves of the biggest disease—a disease which has sapped our manhood and almost made us feel as if we must for ever be slaves. It is an insufferable thing. The cost of the cure, I know, is heavy. No price is too heavy to pay for the deliverance."—*Harijan* (31-5-42).

"We want the (British) rule to end altogether, for that is the poison that corrupts all it touches, that is the obstacle that stops all progress. And what is needed for this are two things—the knowledge that the domination is a greater evil than any other evil that we can think of, and that we have to get rid of it no matter what it may cost..... Next is the will to throw off the chains..... That (the resultant anarchy) is the consideration that has weighed with me all these 22 years. I waited and waited until the country should develop the non-violent strength necessary to throw off the foreign yoke. But my attitude has now undergone a change. I feel that I cannot afford to wait. If I continue to wait, I will have to wait till doomsday. For the preparation I have prayed for and worked for may never come, and in the meantime I may be enveloped and overwhelmed by the flames that threaten all of us. That is why I have decided that even at certain risks which are obviously involved I must ask the people to resist the slavery..... The people have not my Ahimsa, but mine should help them. There is ordered anarchy around and about us. I am sure that the anarchy that may result because of the British withdrawal or their refusal to listen to us and our decision to defy their authority will in no way be worse than the present anarchy. After all, those who are unarmed cannot produce a frightful amount of violence or anarchy..... But to be passive witness of the terrible violence that is going on in the name of resisting a possible foreign aggression is a thing, I cannot stand..... I am also sure that those who cannot, or will not, understand me will do so in the light of experience, i.e., if they survive the present catastrophe."—M. D.'s report of Gandhi's address to the Rashtriya Yuva Sangh.—*Harijan* (7-6-42).

"Our arrests would work up the movement, they would stir everyone in India to do his little bit..... My invitation to the British to withdraw is not an idle one. It has to be made good by the sacrifice of the inviters...."

"Strikes can be and have been non-violent. If railways are worked only to strengthen the British hold on India, they need not be assisted. . . . . What I am hoping and striving for is an irresistible mass urge on the part of the people and an intelligent response on the part of the privileged classes to the popular demand. But because I know that this picture is for the time being imaginary, I am quite prepared for the worst. Hence my statement that I would end the present state of things even at the risk of anarchy reigning supreme in the land."—*Harijan* (14-6-42).

"I have been working for it (the end of the British rule in India) for years. But now it has taken definite shape and I say that the British power in India should go today for the world peace. . . . . (The next move) will be a move which will be felt by the whole world. It may not interfere with the movement of the British troops, but it is sure to engage British attention. . . . . I do not know (if what is wanted is a relaxation of civil grip) I want unadulterated independence. If the military activity serves but to strengthen the strangle-hold, I must resist that too. . . . . I have waited long and I can wait no longer."—*Harijan* (21-6-42).

"If the withdrawal is to take place, it won't be due merely to the non-violent pressure. . . . Thus we can disown the authority of the British rulers by refusing taxes and in a variety of ways."—*Harijan* (5-7-42).

"I am not going to make a call on the Khadi workers. But if there is a general conflagration, Khadi workers cannot escape it. . . . . You must also understand that I am not thinking of civil disobedience or non-cooperation of old. . . . . No hard and fast rules can be laid down this time."—*Harijan* (5-7-42).

"My proposal presupposes shedding of all fear and distrust. . . . . All this may not come to pass. I do not mind. It is worth fighting for, it is worth staking all that the nation has."—*Harijan* (5-7-42).

"Why should you shove all the blame on to me for all that may happen by reason of my taking action for the discharge of an overdue debt and that too just when the discharge has become the necessary condition of my life?"—*Harijan* (12-7-42).

"It will be a mass movement of a strictly non-violent character. . . . . It will include all that a mass movement can include. . . . . I am not going to court imprisonment. . . . . It is too soft a thing. We had no doubt made it a business to court imprisonment up to now, but there will be no such thing this time. My intention is to make the thing as short and swift as possible."—*Harijan* (19-7-42).



"The programme covers every activity of a strictly non-violent character included in a mass movement. I shall handle the movement gently, but I would not hesitate to go to the extremist limit, if I find that no impression is produced over the British Government or the Allied Powers. . . . . (It will be) my biggest movement. . . . . (With the arrests of leaders) it should gain strength, if it has any vitality."—*Harijan* (26-7-42).

"For a swift ending a general strike is necessary. It is not outside my contemplation, but seeing that I shall take every step in terms of my oft-repeated declaration that a mass struggle is not conceived in any INIMICAL spirit, I shall move with utmost caution. And if a general strike becomes a dire necessity, I shall not flinch."—Press interview, Bombay (6-8-42).

"This is the last struggle of my life. Delay is injurious and waiting any further would be humiliation for all of us. Our struggle is about to start. But before launching the movement I will address a letter to the Viceroy and wait for his reply. It will take a week, a fortnight or three weeks. In the meantime we will have, apart from carrying out the thirteen points of the Congress Constructive Programme, to observe the following code :—

Let every Indian consider himself to be a free man. He must be ready for the actual attainment of freedom or perish in the attempt. His attitude towards life should be that he is a free man. . . . . There is no compromise on the demand for freedom. Freedom first and then only the rest. Do not be cowards, because cowards have no right to live. Freedom should be your 'mantra' and you should chant it."—A. I. C. C. meeting, Bombay (8-8-42).

*Instruction (12).*—Last but not the least let us not forget spinning so dear to Gandhiji. If millions spin it will administer a powerful stimulus to the struggle.

"DO or DIE".

## APPENDIX VI

### *The "A. I. C. C." instructions for a no-tax, no-rent, no-grain campaign*

During the last three months the Indian people have risen to new heights of resistance of the usurper authority. While the towns were the first to flare up into flames, it was inevitable that they should be overpowered with superior military force. But the most heartening feature of our revolution is the spontaneous extension of our field of action from the towns into the countryside. It is not easy to paralyse the civil administration in the towns for any considerable length of time, mainly because civil administration can stand on the support of bayonets and machine guns. Besides industrial general strike is the core of urban resistance. If it is not possible to maintain such a general strike urban resistance is bound to collapse. The spirit of revolt can, however, be kept alive by a continuous programme of specific defiance

2. In the rural areas civil administration is not backed by the same overpowering superiority of military and police force. Therefore in the first month or two rural India brought the apparatus of civil administration to a standstill. The war on communications (railroads, telegraph and motor roads) prevented the enemy from concentrating his military might and distances because the strongest weapon of the revolution. This phase of the struggle lasted for over two months and even to-day resistance is spreading to newer areas where civil administration has been rendered ineffective. This situation is, however, not as extensive as it should be. Bihar and Eastern U. P. were the first to lead the way. It is only now that gradually the spirit and technique of this revolt are spreading all over India. But it has brought the full fury of police and military violence on those areas which had completely overthrown the usurper authority. A period of military reconquest ushered in the worst excesses to history. Looting and burning of villages, rape and rapine on a mass scale, machine-gunning and even aerial attacks with such weapons the gangster requires tried to strike terror and to break the spirit of revolt. There is no doubt that these indiscriminate and ruthless atrocities are a sign of weakness. It is the last resort of a collapsing authority.

Unfortunately the primary impulse of revolt could not be extended continuously from one district to another, or from one province to the next. The rural areas were thrown on the defensive. Repression could not break the iron will of our leading cadres. But the spontaneous up-surge of entire village was suppressed for the time being.

On the other hand the inhuman barbarity of British authority has widened the gulf between the people and the agents of this regime. Today there is a conscious hatred of the foreign rulers where before there was a vague groping for a way out of existing hardships. But all the same over wide areas it is not immediately practicable to launch another offensive against this regime, based on a spontaneous mass action of the people as a whole. The core of resistance is still unbroken but a reorganisation of our forces has become necessary; such a reorganisation is the essential preliminary to a renewed assault which would bring civil administration to an end and render the tax collecting agency ineffective reffete. This task devolves upon:— (a) Those active congress workers who have spread the fire of revolt in the countryside and have still remained free, (b) those students who have left their colleges and schools and who have taken up the leadership of rural revolt, (c) those newer elements from among the rural and urban workers who have been fired into activity by the events of the last three months, (d) and those adventurous elements who have found a new worth-whileness in this struggle; all these forces must combine to tackle the tasks of reorganisation for a fresh offensive.

Our ranks have been depleted; our resources, in the form of local assistance in rural areas, and active-enthusiastic support from village young men have been reduced by repression. With such resources as we have we can yet set ourselves the task of rekindling this fire on a more extensive scale. The time for tax collection is approaching and the business of administration will be extended on a scale which cannot be supported by threats of military and police action at all points.

March and round about months of 1943 will almost decide the fate of the Indian Revolution. It is during this period that the usurper Government will collect its land tax throughout the country. If this can be made an occasion for mass-defiance, by a general programme of non-payment we will have solved the problem of co-ordination and simultaneous action in all the Provinces and districts of the country.

Land-tax is important to the usurpers not only for the income that it yields but much more so for its administrative value. On land-tax alone hinges the rural administration of the British in India with its revenue officers and law courts and police stations. In resisting the land-tax we must therefore be clear about its revolutionary value. We must plan to go beyond our former no-tax campaigns. In former campaigns, the peasantry merely refused to pay the tax willingly, but permitted the revenue officers and the police to attach lands and other property. This

must not happen. It must be a total resistance. The peasantry must obstruct the revenue and police officers to collect the tax, in fact to enter the village unless in the form of a military invasion. Even this can be temporarily rendered ineffective by flight into the jungles until the invaders are forced to retire. They can be harassed in the meantime by cutting their communications and supplies. This can be done and instructions will tell you how.

(1) We must start with a campaign for the non-sale of food-crops and cattle. It is in the interest of the people themselves that they should ensure an year's stocks of food, when communications are so undependable and when the food-prices are so unsteady due to the worthlessness of the paper currency.

(2) Convert all cash into goods. Paper money is a fraud ; it will starve the peasant as well as other classes. Put no faith in the illusion of well-being created by the currency notes.

(3) In Ryatwari areas there is a straight tie between the Government and the peasantry. In the Zamindari areas however the question of the landlord does crop up.

The landlord should be paid by mutual agreement a small part of the rent which will enable him to maintain his family. An informal understanding with his tenants will be able to secure for the landlord his reasonable requirements.

It must however be made clear that the Zamindar must give a preliminary undertaking not to pay tax to the government before the tenants can agree to accept the responsibility of maintaining his family. Any attempt on the part of the landlord to bend before the British power will be sufficient cause for the tenants to withhold all payment by way of rent.

The A. I. C. C. has declared a moratorium on agricultural debts and interests. Arrangements should however be made between creditors and debtors for such payments as will enable the creditor and his family to meet their reasonable requirements of food, etc.

Communications should be continuously cut, young men of the village should cut wires from now on as a preliminary training. All the time tax-collecting is actually attempted communications should be so thoroughly put out of action that movements of police and military are rendered very slow and difficult.

Who would form the Swaraj Panchayats, who would cut the communications, who would bring about and maintain the unity among villagers ? The most satisfactory answer would be, the villagers themselves without outside assistance. Just give them the idea. But even to do this, we need a fairly large number of active propagandists and organizers. These should in the first instance be recruited from :—

- (a) Such Congress and other political workers as are still out and active.
- (b) Students and teachers.
- (c) Strikers and dismissed workers from factories.
- (d) Workers of social welfare institutions.
- (e) The better type Sadhus and Fakirs.

The directorate of each Congress province should immediately appoint a man in charge of the campaigns to resist land-tax and for the non-sale of food-crops. His task should be to meet at once, through a deputy if necessary, the active elements of the five groups mentioned in each district and to enthuse them with the basic idea of these instructions and to coach them upon the general line of propagandist and organisational activity.

*Propaganda.*—The main lines of propaganda in the villages should be :—

- (a) *Political.*—Since the 9th of August and the arrest of Gandhiji and other leaders, the British are declared usurpers. To pay land-tax to them is sin. Mother India, Gandhiji, the Congress religion and all that one prizes forbid the peasantry to pay land-tax.

(b) *Currency—Collapse.*—Sale of crops or cattle for paper notes is a big gamble. Already paper notes are unable to buy even one-third of what they formerly used to and they may soon become almost valueless. The British Government is to-day existing on the printing of paper-notes without gold or silver or other valuables. Therefore convert your savings into goods instead of cash.

(c) *Danger of Food and Cloth Famines.*—The British Military in and out of India is using up our crops and cattle and railways and cloth. War and aerial bombing of cities has come on our eastern frontier. All this will lead to food and cloth famine. Therefore, to sell crops or cattle to-day is to prepare for suicide to-morrow.

(d) *Organisation.*—Form Swaraj Panchayat, arrange for barter inside the village and between one village and another. Develop handicrafts, particularly spinning and weaving. Have no dealings with anti-national revenue or police officers. Create unity in the village itself and among groups of villages.

(e) *Break-up of communications.*—If roads and telegraphs and railways are put out of action or destroyed throughout the country, the British military will be defeated and India will be free and the peasantry will prosper.

Emphasise these five points in your propaganda. Tell the peasantry that to sell crops or cattle or to pay land-tax is sin, gamble and suicide.

NOTE.—Attempt should be made to reach the appended appeals of the A. I. C. C. to (1) The Peasants of India (2) The Landlords (3) The Money Lenders (4) Revenue and Police Officers in the villages. These appeals should be spread as they are for the sake of uniformity of propaganda and because of the weight that the name of the A. I. C. C. would carry. Further appeals must be drafted on the general lines indicated by the Provinces and the Districts themselves.

## APPENDIX VII

### “THE FREEDOM STRUGGLE FRONT”

1. *The Struggle of Revolt.*—India is stirring as she has never stirred before. Robbed of organisation and leadership, denied of guidance and planning, the people of our country have started their revolutionary march to freedom. There is a tenseness in the air—every section every man and woman is deeply moved and feels impelled to action. Established authority is reeling under its impact, and is striving to beat down the upheaval with desperate repression. There are faint hearts which are appalled, muddled heads that screech their condemnation, servile bodies that bend to crush this upsurge of spirit. But the fact of this outburst is here. It is the profoundest fact of recent history.

2. *The Nature of the upheaval.*—Undirected, uncontrolled and leaderless, the masses are surging, heaving, swaying in their struggle for release. Every individual every group is acting on its own, impelled by diverse motives, diverse ideals. In this lies at once the strength and the weakness of the movement. This strength Gandhiji invoked where he called out to each Indian to feel free. That feeling stirring in his breast makes him rise. The appeal is to the individual direct; the response is of the individual direct. The medium of a party or organisational machine becomes redundant. The active units in this battle are individual, not mass formation dependent for every move on extraneous command. This feature invests the movement with a spontaneity, flexibility and deathlessness, an elemental and all-embracing quality which is thrillingly unique in its national and international possibilities. Gandhiji has given us a new technique in revolution. It is ethically superior to all other methods in that it eschews collective massacre and entails the minimum of bloodshed. It is a weapon of self-defence, self-expression and liberation of a people, not of territorial aggression or exploitation of another. It is economical in resources in that the enemy is fought, not with a colossal array of costly armour, but by paralysis of its organisation by individual resistance. It is a p

of mass education on the most extensive scale, offering an inherent guarantee of the permanence of its achievement, in that it strengthens each individual participant by bringing to him a consciousness of his latent power and a realisation of his unity of interest with his fellow fighters. Unity is not to be looked for in a static formula of percentage, but is realisable only through this dynamic struggle, while pursuing an obvious political objective, it simultaneously solves the problems of fear, ignorance and disunity. In laying stress on the common man and awakening him to power, it makes sure that he will be the centre round which the structure of the new state will be raised.

3. *The need for plan.*—There can be no doubt about the essential soundness of this technique. Whatever the opinion about its universal applicability for all militant action, there can be no gainsaying that it is the only feasible method in the present circumstances of this country. But the stress it lays on the individual, which is the secret of its unique efficacy, is also the source of weakness one must most carefully guard. The individual is thrown on his own resources of thought and action. How small these resources are in a suppressed people we know. There are some who would eternally postpone the struggle on that account, forgetting that it is only through struggle that they may enlarge these resources. But this limiting factor dictates the form which the struggle must take. The objective must be immediately appealing to the common man, because immediately satisfying vital lack, (sic) clearly defined, so as to be easily grasped by the meanest intelligence. The ultimate issue, the final goal is perceived and maintained aloft only by a sustained process of reasoning and must be allowed to emerge before the fighting ranks only in careful stages, through a progressive series of secondary and immediate aims. The action demanded to cover each stage must be of the most direct and simplest kind. Else there will be perplexity and false manoeuvrings and despair. The final goal of the struggle must be kept steadily in view of (by ?) some; the stages to its attainment must be carefully set by some. That is the task of planning.

4. *The scope of planning.*—This movement is decentralised, individualistic, anarchical. Yet because it is a movement and not an involuntary explosion of pent-up energy, it has a direction, and its anarchy is deliberate and purposeful. The object of planning is to set the direction, inform and animate the participants with the purpose. But the scope of central direction and control in a movement of this atomistic character is strictly limited. The function of planning in this movement is threefold: It must furnish the ideological perspective at each stage; it must indicate the broad principles which will guide action; and it must provide a general co-ordination of the efforts of groups and individuals, by arranging contacts, dissemination of intelligence, suggesting avoidance of overlapping or mutually cancelling actions. Central direction cannot attempt much more without destroying the elasticity and decentralised initiative which constitute the essential quality of this movement. The detailed application of the general principles in concrete acts and manoeuvres must be left to the primary fighting units. The movement will not conform to a uniform pattern in all areas for this reason. Its outward manifestation will exhibit as great a variety as local problems and circumstances will vary. This infinite diversity of expression should be welcome. It is bewildering to the enemy and should be encouraged by working up and bringing to a head the particular local grievance which is most acute in any area. It may be a shortage of foodgrains in one place, the exaction of rent-collector in another, the refusal of permission to irrigate the fields in some other, the realisation of collective fines is still another. Each such problem is the focal point for the initiation of the movement in that area. The general plan will direct the search for such force; point out why our festering economic sores will be the most suitable starting points for local agitation; being the most deeply felt and the quickest, most natural and the most unifying inciting agents for the local people; explain how these issues can never be solved within the framework of the existing system; and as this understanding spreads and the agitation has reached a sufficient pitch, suggest the precipitation of the next wider issues, taking the people forward to the next higher phase of the struggle.

5. *The machinery for planning.*—The machinery set up to undertake this planning must be suited to its special and limited purpose. That purpose is, as indicated already, to outline the general policy and direction and to provide a loose and flexible co-ordination of the work of already established parties, groups and individuals to whom the widest discretion is to be left in carrying out the day to day programme of the struggle. These are old organisations claiming the membership of disciplined bodies of men and women, who have been already working for the subversion of the present order of things for a long time. They may have varying methods and varying creeds but as long as they do not plan counter to the general direction of this movement, they will be welcome and will find a place. The invitation must be open even to individuals in their own right as children of this country. This struggle is a total struggle in its present phase, the upsurge of a whole people. It is not sectional, partisan, exclusive, but total and inclusive at this stage. The class war may have to come, but that is not yet, not till after the riddance of foreign exploitation. It is arguable that in the course of this struggle the shift of forces will get power to the proletariat even in the process of overthrowing the foreign yoke (? hold), the two vital phases being simultaneous, not successive. Be that as it may, this must be clear now that the organisation required for central guidance of the movement in its present stage is not the rigid organisation of an exclusive party professing a dogmatic creed and enforcing an iron discipline. We do not want to set up a new party which must immediately come into conflict with existing parties and can only prevail by fighting and destroying them. What we need to set up is a meeting place for parties and groups, a forum for discussion, a clearing house of ideas where the greatest common measure of agreement on policy can be worked out. What we need is a coming together of parties not their supersession by a new body. What we need is a combination, a joint enterprise, a common stand. What we need is the Freedom Struggle Front, where every group, every party, every class and section and every individual can find a place to fill without (? losing) their separate identities. There are many revolutionary parties in the field. They differ in their methods, their traditions, their special experience of particular lines of work ; but there is little difference in the ultimate goal of their endeavours. Their organisation, discipline, resources, special talents and aptitudes for special tasks must be all utilized. They can be all roped in on the common platform of the Freedom Struggle Front, and this can be done in the present phase of the struggle without calling upon them to renounce their immediate loyalties. To a much more, limited extent, yet in some measure, the same is true of social groupings also. There is no class or section, no social or functional unit, which is not disaffected against the present State. Let that discontent and frustration in each layer of society be exploited and nursed into a disruptive force. If the rich mill owner or banker is willing to finance the revolution, let his help be eagerly seized. He may be acting from calculated self-interest, desiring a freer field for his capital investments ; or as happens more often than the text book communist will think, he may be moved in spite of himself by the patriotic change in the air. In any case, the course of development of the struggle which can only succeed through the people awakening to power, he must either identify his interest with that of the masses, or be submerged in the rising tide of their power. Let not a virginly horror of outraging the class issues stand in the way of seeking and taking his help. Let him be roped in too.

6. *The Programme of Action.*—There are as many battle fronts in this war as there are classes and sections and individuals waging it, and action on all fronts is simultaneous. But the most extensive and significant field of work lies in the country-side, where our peasantry offers the biggest reserve of man-power and where village economy is threatened with imminent break down. Let peasant representative in the villages be approached by our central agents. The agents themselves must be selected from tried workers of existing organisations and parties, some now disbanded by law, such as the Spinners' Association, some still countenanced openly, such as the Krishak-Projas, who have already established connections in the interior. Let them select the initial targets for assault in each village or group of

villages. Let the rising and simmering discontent against these immediate grievances be churned up into an angry ferment; first, through informal discussions; then through open meetings, all the while attempting to relate the immediate problems to wider and bigger issues in simple, understandable terms. Open conflict with authority should be avoided at this stage by representing the agitation as a lawful demand for economic concessions. As soon as the discontent has crystallized to some extent, orderly but confident processions should be organised, for its collective representation before the local authorities. On their failure to redress, which is inevitable, the more extreme and militant spokesmen of the peasants should be helped to take the lead and prepare the man for direct action; by organised and orderly seizure of stocks of essential goods; by refraining payment of rents and debts; by refusing to part with crops; by ignoring court processes for distraint and refusing to attend or bid at sales; by taking possession of the machinery of local administration, such as Union Boards, Chowkies, Thanas, and running it themselves; by setting up new machinery where necessary. If the developments can be fairly synchronised in a number of areas from the centre,—and to a great extent this will be helped by the natural infectiousness of the process,—the forces of the State will be helpless to check this progress, the disturbances will be too widespread and scattered. The police and military may advance on one village and reduce it to ashes. But their flanks and rear and front will be constantly harassed, their communications will be constantly cut off, their food supplies will be precarious. The tactical plan of defence for the villagers will be to isolate their area, organize scouts to give warning of the enemy's approach, retire and disperse before its advance and return like the tide when the enemy must presently withdraw, having nothing to do and little to subsist on. The suffering of the villagers will be great. But the stakes are also high. If they have been made to realise these at the outset, if they know that the alternative is inaction and suffering no less, if they have been trained what to expect and do, then this suffering will not break them, then each time they will return to their razed villages with a grimmer determination of spirit, an increased bitterness of heart. And the news of happenings in other villages, other districts must filter through to fortify their resolve.

7. *Other Fronts.*—We have a better organisation and greater experience of work among industrial labour. Here also unrest must be brought to a head on immediate economic issues. The situation will be directly helped by the campaign in the villages which will dry up the sources of food supply and raw materials to the urban and industrial areas. Dearthness allowances can never keep pace with prices, which will soar higher and higher with a progressive inflation of the currency. Price control will show up as the senseless deception it is. Strikes should be easy to organise in this contest. Propaganda should be meanwhile pressed home on the capitalist front, appealing to this class on emotional patriotic grounds to view the strike programme with favour. The bourgeoisie must be exhorted to keep up political discontent at high pressure, 'declassé' members of the petit bourgeois sections must be recruited to lead militant demonstration of students and labourers. The Indian officialdom should be approached for secret contributions in money and information and sabotage of vital processes of the administration. The precise points and methods of attack must be left to their own decision in this as in other cases, but countless illustrations can be cited and innumerable opportunities discovered once the general lines of our movement are clearly grasped. That general analysis of the struggle should be made known in every suitable case.

8. *Administrative Tasks.*—The training of workers; the issue of leaflets, news sheets, slogans; the organisation of contacts; the raising of funds; frequent reviews of progress; issue of directions to the fighting line. These are the urgent administrative problems of the Freedom Struggle Front. Help is pouring in from all sides. The tasks will be done. But in administration, as in programme, the greatest decentralisation should be provided for. In that, rather than in secrecy for which the scope is strictly limited in a movement of this character, lies the biggest safeguard against its suppression.



## APPENDIX VIII

## AN APPEAL TO THE PEOPLE

*Independence Day, 26th January 1943*

To-day is the 26th January. Twelve years ago on this day we took the vow of freedom, and since then every year we have renewed that solemn pledge. These twelve years have been years of travail and suffering, and every Independence Day has brought us nearer our goal. This day, however, on which we are privileged to live—January 26th, 1943—is different from all such dates that have gone before. The battle of freedom which began twelve years ago has now reached its climax and shall soon reach its end. Beginning with Satyagrah and disobedience of specific laws we are now in the midst of total revolution. It is not this or that law of the foreign power that we defy but that power as a whole. It is not this or that Constitution that we demand, but total withdrawal of the Imperialist aggressor.

Therefore, the pledge that we take to-day must be different from that pledges we have taken before. Our only pledge to-day can be to make 1943 the last year of our national slavery. On August 8, last year we declared ourselves as free people but the enemy is still in our midst and is trying by fascist terror to crush our will to freedom. We must, therefore, vow to-day that before January 26 come round again we shall be a free people, and on the Government House in Delhi all Government Houses and all our houses in the country shall fly not the arrogant British flag but the proud flag of the republic of India. Every section of the people must therefore pledge to-day to discharge its duty to the Nation and pay its appropriate part in the National Revolution.

Therefore, in the name of the Indian National Congress and the Republic of India, which is being born to-day, we appeal:—

*To the Peasants.*

To pay no Taxes or revenues to the British usurpers.

To pay no rents to the landlords who pay revenues to the British Government.

To establish Swaraj Panchayats in their villages.

To boycott Law Courts and to settle their disputes in panchayats.

To sell no crop or cattle.

To keep no paper money and to deal through barter.

To form Guerilla Bands.

*To the Workers.*—In factories, Railways, in mines and elsewhere

To strike work.

To slacken production.

To sabotage.

To organise and fight for wages and cheap Food.

Cloth and the right to strike.

To form Guerilla Bands.

*To Students.*

To leave schools and colleges.

To enrol as soldiers of revolution.

To form Guerilla Bands.

To form vacation brigades.

*To Businessmen.*

To cease business with englishmen.

To withdraw deposits from Imperial and other British banks.

To subscribe to "Swaraj Karaz".



*To the armed Forces.*

To take prescribed oath of allegiance to the republic.

To refuse to be used against their own countrymen.

To vow to rise against the British usurpers on the command of the congress.

*To the Police and other Government servants to refuse to be used against the national revolution.*

*To everybody.*

To help in every big and small way to destroy the usurper authority and to Establish the Republic of India.

To Raise the slogans of "Inqilab zindabad".

"Karange Ya Mareng" and "Angrezon ko nikalo".

At 8 A.M. and 9 P.M. everyday.

Central Directorate  
All India Congress Committee.

## APPENDIX IX

### " TO ALL FIGHTERS FOR FREEDOM "

#### *Revolutionary greetings*

Comrades,

Let me first of all offer you and those comrades who have been made prisoners of war my heartiest congratulation on the magnificent battle already given to the enemy. Nothing like it ever happened or was expected to happen in this our long suffering and suppressed country. It truly was the "Open Rebellion" envisaged by our incomparable leader Mahatma Gandhi.

The Rebellion, no doubt, seems to have been suppressed for the moment. But I hope you will agree with me that it has been suppressed only for the moment. This should cause us no surprise. As a matter of fact, had the very first assault been successful and had it completely crushed imperialism, that in reality would have been a matter for surprise. The very fact that the enemy himself has admitted that the Rebellion came pretty near destroying his power, shows how successful was the first phase of our National Revolution.

And how was the first phase suppressed? Was it the Military power of the enemy, his unmitigated reign of goondaism, looting, arson and murder that did the job? No. It is wrong to consider the "Revolt" as having been "suppressed". The history of all Revolutions shows that a Revolution is not an event. It is a phase, a social process. And during the Evolution of a Revolution, tides and ebbs are normal. Our Revolution is at present going through the period of low water, so soon rather than rise to higher heights and go from Victory to Victory, not because the superior physical force of the Imperialist aggressors intervened, but because of two important reasons.

Firstly *there was no efficient organisation* (of) the national Revolutionary forces that could function (and) give effective lead to the mighty forces that were released. The Congress, though a great organisation, was not tuned to the pitch to which the Revolution was to rise. The lack of organisation was so considerable that even important Congressmen were not aware of the progress of the Revolt, and till late in course of the rising it remained a matter of debate in many Congress quarters whether what the people were doing was really in accordance with the Congress programme. In the same connection should be mentioned the regrettable fact that quite a considerable number of influential Congressmen failed to attain their mental attitude to spirit of this "last fight for Freedom". The earnestness, the urgency,

the determination that marked the attitude of leaders like Mahatma Gandhi, Dr. Rajendra Prasad or Sardar Patel failed to reflect in the minds and hearts of all congress leaders.

Secondly, *after the first phase* of the Rising was over *there was no further programme* placed before the people. After they had completely destroyed the British Raj in their areas, the people considered their task fulfilled, and went back to their homes not knowing what more to do. Nor was it their fault. The failure was ours : we should have supplied them with a programme for the next phase. When this was not done, the Revolt came to a standstill and the phase of the ebb began. This situation was created many days before the British soldiers arrived in sufficient numbers to push back yet further the receding works of the revolt. What programme should have been placed before the people in the second phase ? The answer is suggested by the nature of Revolutions. A Revolution is not only a destructive process, it is at the same time a great constructive force. No Revolution could succeed if it only destroyed. If it should survive, it must create an authority to replace the one it has destroyed. Our Revolution too having accomplished over large territories of the country the negative task of destruction, called for a positive programme. The people who destroyed the objects and means of administration of the foreign power and drove away its agents should have set up in their areas their own units of Revolutionary Government and created their own police and militia. Had this been done, it would have released such an unprecedented volume of energy and opened up such a vast field for constructive work that the waves of the Revolution would have mounted higher and higher till—if the rising was countrywide—the imperialist power had been broken and the people had seized supreme authority throughout the land.

The lack of efficient organisation and of a complete programme of National Revolution : these were two causes of the downward course of the first phase of the present Revolution.

The question now is what are our present tasks ? First, to banish all depression from our minds and those of the people, and create an atmosphere of joy instead at the success achieved and of hope for success in the future.

Second, we must keep steadfastly before our minds and of the people the nature of this Revolution. It is our last fight for freedom. Our objective can, therefore, be nothing but victory. There can be no half way houses. The efforts that men like Rajagopalachari are making for the establishment of National government are not only fruitless but positively harmful in as much as they distract public attention from the real issues. There is no compromise, between the slogans of " Quit India " and of a " national government ". Those who are running after the slogan of Congress-League unity are merely serving the ends of imperialist propaganda. It is not the lack of unity that is obstructing the formation of a national government, but the natural unwillingness of imperialism to liquidate itself. Mr. Churchill left no manner of doubt about it, when he declared recently that he had not assumed the office of the King's first minister to preside over the liquidation of the Empire. He would be a foolish student of society indeed who expected empires to wither away of their own accord. Those erstwhile " revolutionaries " who are attempting today to wish away the Indian Empire by the cataclysmic force of humble memorials are making of themselves the most pitiable fools of history.

It is not the unity of all the important elements in Indian life, to quote the imperialist jargon, that is the need of the hour but the unity of all the national revolutionary forces. And these are already united under the flag of the Congress. Unity between the League and the Congress does not foreshadow the growth of these forces, but their absolute relation, for the League cannot conceivably tread the path of revolution and freedom.

The complete overthrow of imperialism, then, is our objective and we must keep this steadfastly in view. There can be no compromise on this issue. Either we win or we lose. And lose we shall not. Not only because we are determined ceaselessly

to work for victory, but also because powerful world forces are drawing the doom of imperialism and fascism ever nearer and nearer. Do not believe that the formal results of this war settled laboriously at the Peace Conference would settle the fate of the post-war world. War is a strange alchemist, and in its hidden chambers are such forces and powers brewed and distilled that they tear down the plans of the victorious and vanquished alike. No peace conference at the end of the last war decided that four mighty empires of Europe and Asia should fall into dust—the Russian, the German, the Austrian and Ottoman. Nor, was the Russian, the German, the Turkish Revolution decreed by Lloyd George, Clemenceau or Wilson.

Throughout the world where men are fighting, dying and suffering today, the alchemist is at work, just as he is in India, where he has already let loose a mighty social upheaval. Neither Churchill nor Roosevelt, neither Hitler nor Tojo will determine the fate of the world at the end of this war. It is force such as we represent that will fulfil that historic task. Can we doubt that revolutionary forces are stirring everywhere? Can we believe that millions of people are undergoing unutterable suffering without a thought for the future? Can we believe that millions are satisfied with the lies that their rulers daily feed them with. No, it cannot be so.

Having therefore definitely fixed our vision on the goal of total victory, we have to march ahead. What concretely must we do? What does a general do when he loses or wins a battle? He consolidates and prepares for the next battle? Rommel stopped at El Alamein after his great victory to consolidate and prepare. Alexander too prepared and he turned his serious defeat into a resounding victory. Ours was not even a defeat. We really won the first round of the fight in as much as our large territories of the country the civil rule of the British aggressor was completely uprooted. The masses have now learnt from experience that the imposing edifice of the police and magistracy and law courts and prisons which goes by the name of British Raj is but a house of cards when they hurl against either collective power. This lesson is not likely to be forgotten and it constitutes the starting point for the next offensive.

Our third and most important task then at the present moment is to prepare for the next major offensive. Perhaps organisation, discipline ourselves—these are our present watch-words.

The next offensive? When do we expect to launch the next offensive? Some people think that the masses will not rise again for the next five or six years. This estimate might be true of peace time but it does not hold good for a stormy war-torn world of fast moving events. The savage tyrannies of the British fascists—the Linlithgows, the Hallets, the Stewarts and the myriads of others and theirs base Indian Lackeys—may have compelled the people to lie low for the present, but they have nowhere converted them into friends of the oppressors. The whole country side, where this British type of Nazi Hell was let loose, is seething with the most intense discontent, anger and thirst for revenge. The people have merely to understand that *powerful preparations are afoot* to take courage again and to enter the plans and schemes of the next offensive, with active, co-ordinated and disciplined work; it would be wholly favourable for the next assault. International events may come to our aid. Then there is Gandhiji's ever impending fast unto death, a constant reminder to us and to the people not to slacken, not to waver, not to rest on the oars.

The question of the next offensive is linked up with the question of the positive task of the Revolution—i.e., the establishment of the units of the Revolutionary governments. With the latter question is bound up the question of violence and maintain(ed) armed forces. I wish, therefore, to place before you my view on this question, as to my mind it affects vitally the future of our Revolution.

First of all, I feel I must say a few words about the noise the British authorities have made about the violence committed in the course of this revolution. There was some violence indeed under extreme provocation, but it was remarkably little as compared with the magnitude of the Rising and the staggering manifestation of

individual and collective non-violence. It is not realised, perhaps, that thousands of British and Indian employees of the foreign power were for some days literally at the mercy of the masses, who took compassion on their foes and spared them their lives and property. And what of the cool, sublime courage of those thousands of young and old who received the enemy's bullets on their chests with the flag revolution in their hands and "Inqlab Zindabad" on their lips? Have the British a word of praise for this godly courage?

In any case is it not remarkable that the British power which is soaked in violence, which is based on violence, which daily commits the most pitiless forms of violence, which grinds down millions of people and sucks their life-blood should make so much noise about the violence that others commit? How are the British concerned with what weapons we choose to fight them with? Have they pledged non-violence if the rebels adhere to it? Have they not already shot down thousands of our non-violent soldiers? Whatever weapons we use the British have only bullets for us and looting and rape and arson. So let them keep quiet as to how we fight them, it is our business entirely to decide that.

Coming to the question as it affects us, I would first remind you of the difference between Gandhiji's views on non-violence and those of the Working Committee and the A. I. C. C. Gandhiji is in no event prepared to depart from non-violence. With him it is a question of faith and life-principle. Not so with the Congress. Then Congress has stated repeatedly during this war that if India became free, or even if a national government were set up, it would be prepared to resist aggression with arms. But, if we are prepared to fight Japan and Germany with arms, why must we refuse to fight Britain in the same manner? The only possible answer can be that the Congress in power could have an army, whereas the Congress in wilderness has none. But *supposing a revolutionary army were created or if the present Indian army or a part of it rebel*, would it not be inconsistent for us first to ask the army to rebel and then ask the rebels to lay down arms and face British bullets with bared chest?

My own interpretation of the Congress position—not Gandhiji's—is clear and definite. Congress is prepared to fight aggression violently if the country became independent. Well, we have declared ourselves independent, and also named Britain as an aggressive power; we are, therefore, justified within the terms of the Bombay resolution itself to fight Britain with arms. If this does not accord with Gandhiji's principles, that is not my fault. The Working Committee and the A. I. C. C. themselves have chosen to differ from Gandhiji and to reject his conception of non-violence as applied to the war. Nor was Gandhiji allowed by the British power to lead and shape this resolution; so, in following interpretation we should in no manner be false to him. We should only be discharging our duties in the light of our own reason. As far as I am concerned, I feel that I should be completely justified as an honest Congressman, without in any manner intruding my socialism upon the question, in repelling the British aggression with arms.

I should add that I have no hesitation in admitting that non-violence of the brave, if practised on a sufficiently large scale, would make violence unnecessary, but where such non-violence is absent, I should not allow cowardice, clothed in Shastri subtleties, to block the development of this revolution and lead to its failure.

With the implication of the last phase of the revolution clear in our minds, *we have to prepare, organise, train and discipline our forces*. In everything we do, we have constantly to bear in mind that ours is not to be merely a conspiratorial action. It is total revolt of the masses that is the our objective. So, along with our immense technical work, we must do intensive work among the masses—peasants in the villages and the workers in the factories, mines, railways and elsewhere. We must do ceaseless propaganda among them and help them in their present difficulties, organise them to fight for their present demands, recruit from them selected soldiers for our various activities and train them technically and politically. With training a few may succeed where thousands failed before. In every fiska and taluka and

thana, in every considerable factory and workshop or other industrial centres we must have a band of militants, mentally and materially equipped for the next rising.

Then there is our work in the Indian Army and the services. There is agitational and demonstrative work. There is work in the schools and colleges and in the market place. There is the work in the Native States and on the frontiers of India. It is not possible for me here to describe our preparations more concretely. Let it suffice to say that there is tremendous work to be done and work for every one. Much is being done at present, but vastly more remains to be done.

Who but youth can accomplish all this? Is it too much to hope that our students who have set such a brilliant record already will follow up their achievements and vindicate the promise they have given? It is for the students themselves to answer.

I should make it clear that preparation does not mean that fighting entirely ceases for the moment. No "Skirmishes", "frontier activities", "minor clashes", "sniping", "patrolling"—all this must go on. These are in themselves a preparation for the offensive.

With full confidence in the people and devotion to the cause, let us, then, march ahead. Let our steps be firm, our hearts resolute and our vision undimmed. The sun of the Indian freedom has already risen above the horizon. Let not the clouds of our own doubts and disputes, inaction and faithlessness, obscure that sun and drown us in our self-created darkness.

In the end, comrades, I should like to say that it has made me inexpressibly happy and proud to be able once again to place my services at your disposal. In serving you, the last words of our leader, "do or die" shall be my guiding star, your co-operation my strength and your command my pleasure.

Somewhere in India.

B. JAI PRAKASH.

## APPENDIX X

### *Mr. Gandhi's last message*

Every man is free to go to the fullest length under *Ahimsa* by complete deadlock, strikes and all other non-violent means. *Satyagrahis* should go out to die and not to live. It is only when individuals go out to seek and face death that the Nation will survive. *Karenge Ya Marenge*. (We shall do or die).

## APPENDIX XI

### *I. Instructions from the ALL INDIA CONGRESS COMMITTEE to the Provincial Congress Committees and others*

Our chief task is to keep up the enthusiasm witnessed in urban India on the day of the arrest of Gandhiji and other leaders and to organise it along positive lines and, at the same time, to work up rural India to a similar pitch of activity with a view to make the culminating point of our struggle simultaneous in all the country. The essential consideration is time. Not only that we have to show what we are worth within two or four weeks, for else, Gandhiji might resort to a fast but that our rural and urban movements should be so coordinated and timed together that the Government may not already have crushed the one before the other is ready to meet with the same fate.

*Rural India*.—The village population should be encouraged to declare at public meetings and elsewhere that they are free and that the laws, taxation and police and other arrangements of a foreign government no longer bind them. The beginning of such meetings may be made in the smallest units, say a village, but the activity must soon develop into freedom and fraternity processions marching from one village

to another. All this is intended to lead to the bigger meeting of any ten and twenty villages, where the declaration of freedom and unity is reiterated. Nevertheless this propagandist and agitational activity must be given a positive programme and definite direction, or else it will fizzle out. Such a positive direction cannot be one of no-rent or no-tax campaign except as agitation, for the month for rent collection is yet far off. Nor can it be merely of educative agitation in respect of food-shortage, currency inflation, price control and the like. All this must be done, together with the declaration of freedom, in order to rouse the people. Once the people are roused, and even while they are roused, their energies must be given a definite task. In the present circumstances, this can be nothing else than the non-violent raids of thousands of people on the symbols and centres of British authority, the Thanas and the Tehsils. These must be put out of action. The police and other government servants should be invited, in the first instance, to accept the authority of the people or, in their refusal to do so, should be dispossessed both of their weapons and their governmental positions. It is essential to remember (1) that such raids should take place in the best awakened and organised two or three Tehsils or any one district and care should be taken not to select such areas in which there is friction of any kind, (2) that not only must these raids be timed together in the same district but throughout the province, or, at least in the majority of the districts where the Congress message has reached best. The culminating point of these raids will be reached when the spontaneously awakened but organised energies of the people in their thousands raid the district headquarters. The government machinery will then not only be paralysed but shattered. Either at this moment, or in the process while this is taking place, a parallel authority of the people will be formed. This will be the beginning of the Free Indian States. It is also necessary to remember that efforts should be made to time together, as far as possible, the paralysis of the existing government machinery in all provinces. The climax of this paralysis should be designed to reach in four weeks from now; or a little earlier or a little later. There can of course be no rigidity.

It is needless to say that between their declaration of freedom and their attempt to put the existing administrative machinery out of action, the people must have completed their disobedience of all political and general laws of the government, with which we are in disagreement. They must, for instance, start manufacturing salt at their will, disobeying evacuation and other orders, refusal to appear in law courts.

Certain problems of (1) cadres to organise this work, (2) dislocation of government communications arise. This will be treated separately. Moreover all attempts at violence must be seriously discountenanced and this problem will be treated more thoroughly in an examination of our relations with government servants.

The instructions in succession, therefore, are:—

(1) Get everyone of our seven lakhs villages to organise meetings of declaration of freedom.

(2) Organise freedom and fraternity marches from one village to another.

(3) Disobey government authority and laws specially D. I. R. and engage in positive activity such as formation of people's executive and manufacture of salt and cessation of recruitment and war-contributions.

(4) Put Thanas and Tehsils and, later, district headquarters out of action through non-violence.

(5) Arrange completion of this programme in four weeks or thereabout. We must, however, be alert and careful that we do not fall behind the tamper of the people.

*Urban India.*—From reports obtained of happenings in Bombay, Ahmedabad, Allahabad, Calcutta and elsewhere on the day of Gandhiji's arrest, and even later, it is obvious that the people are highly excited. The enormous crowd in Shivaji Park where Gandhiji was to have spoken stood over dozen repeated attempts to

tear-gas it. There have been hundreds of lathi charges and quite frequent firings. The people appear to stand all this well but extreme care should be taken (1) to maintain the spirit of resistance, (2) to further strengthen it so that, even in the event of firings, a determined band of men and women at any rate should not run away.

The instructions are as follows :—

(1) To canalise the spontaneous outbursts of the people, an organised form should be given to it. An authoritative call for a general strike till Gandhiji and other leaders are back among us throughout the country is hereby given and in the first twenty cities of India effect should be to make it complete.

(a) Colleges and Universities must close indefinitely till freedom is won and Gandhiji is back among us. The striking students will (1) lead the demonstrative action in the towns or (2) go into the villages to further our four-week's programme.

(b) All general offices, such as whole-sale trade, banks and other establishments must close and their clerical personnel brought out. Retail shops with the exception of foods and similar provisions must also be persuaded to close.

(c) Stoppage of work in manufacturing industries such as textile and engineering should be completed in the course of the indefinite general strike and the workers brought out.

(2) Efforts should be made to reach the workers and clerical staff in the transport industry such as railways and docks and in the government agencies such as posts and telephones and radio and in the electricity producing and distributing plants, while the general strike in other sphere is maturing. When the culminating point of the general strike is reached, say three or four weeks from now, the call to strike should be given to this other category of workers, and clerks.

(3) Care should be taken to see that the climax of the movement both in rural and urban India is reached in four weeks from now.

(4) Appropriate appeals should be made to every class of our population, workers in the manufacturing industries, workers in the transport and government concerns, clerical staff all round, students, retail dealers through leaflets issued daily, differing in tone and directions in consonance with our needs and the differing situation, and through meetings and processions. In spite of the serious repressions, there must be daily small meetings and processions in hundreds and thousands all over the town and bigger demonstrations wherever possible, reiterating the declaration of freedom.

There is pre-eminently the problem of cadres, determined bands of men and women, who will lead our revolution, through its various stages of success. Apparently this is an enormous problem and we may flinch at the great task we have set before us and the inadequacy of our organisation. But nowhere was it more true than today that a revolution provides its own leadership. Moreover, the cadres are already there, if only we make use of them. In addition to the thousands of trained Congress workers who cannot all be clapped up in a day, nor even in a fortnight if they choose to work rather than to court arrest, there will be the hundreds of thousands of striking students, workers and clerks, particularly students. Upon these we can draw for our rural and urban work according to their talents and taste.

There is also the problem of the technical work of our revolution. Two things must be borne in mind. (1) These activities should never be looked upon as independent. They must in every event be subordinate to a mass action. (2) None of our activities should be such as to endanger human life, whether Indian or British and warnings should always be issued.

Again, how shall we infuse in our people the determination to face firings and yet not to retaliate in kind. In the earlier stages, hundreds will have to be ready to die, but when that is done, the end will not be far off when considerable sections



of the military and the police refuse to shoot or when, after the necessary non-violent strength is acquired, the people start disarming the government forces without killing the personnel. The organisation of non-violence is pre-eminently the question of a thousand or so self-chosen martyrs in all the country.

In this connection appeals should be made to the military and the police through leaflets and personal approaches and brave encounters in the midst of an awkward situation. Indians among government forces should, in the first instance, be asked to regard themselves as free men and to refuse to admit to foreign authority and to come over to the Indian revolution. If they cannot do this, they should in the second instance be asked not to shoot their own defenceless people fighting for their freedom as much as their own. Appeals not to shoot may also be addressed to British and American soldiers, although the emphasis here will not be a national freedom but on human freedom and peace all over the world.

### DO OR DIE

We will die, 'Great Leader, but

We will also do,

We will free Gandhiji before he fasts.

LONG LIVE THE FREE STATE OF INDIA.

*Duplicate and Distribute.*

### II.—All India Congress Committee: To Students

At the A. I. C. C. meeting in Bombay Gandhiji in his parting message to the nation issued an appeal to the students to take their rightful share in the struggle. The appeal was heard by the students of Bombay and we have no doubt it has also somehow reached the ears of students in other parts of the country. The struggle has started. The response of the nation on the very first day has been splendid. All classes of people threw themselves into the fight, but none perhaps took a braver and more glorious part than our student community. Most of the Congress leaders everywhere having been picked up, the students stepped into the gaps and assumed the leadership of the campaign. Our students are the rightful successors to our leaders behind the prison bars. We need intelligence, skill, judgment, earnestness and capacity for suffering among those whose privilege it will be to conduct the struggle and all these qualities our students possess. It is the task of the students to keep the fires burning, to carry on and intensify the struggle, to reach the Congress message to all our countrymen whether in urban and rural areas. Here is a bare outline of what they can do.

(1) All students above sixteen should leave their schools, colleges and Universities. They cannot carry on the studies and the Great Revolution simultaneously. Colleges and Universities must close down by the students voluntarily withdrawing from them. Let them remember that the fight we are in is not a long drawn out agony. We are resolved to make it a short and swift revolution. We have therefore to bring to it utter desperation born of the unconquerable will to DO OR DIE. If the students are possessed of this spirit they will infect the whole nation with it. They cannot have this revolutionary spirit unless they burn their boats, leave the colleges and fling themselves wholeheartedly into the fight.

(2) Our fight will be waged on two fronts—Rural and Urban. The students have a decisive part to play on both the fronts. Complete paralysis of the administrative machinery in all its branches is the objective of the struggle. The forces of law and order which are being used to lathi charge and tear-gas people into submission to be paralysed by all non-violent means, the courts of law set up to administer laws made by the Imperialist Government to suppress our people to be rendered functionless, stoppage of work in manufacturing industries till our goal is reached. Communications, which to-day instead of being public utility services



are used to throttle us to be put out of use without causing hurt to life, to give a few instances of what we need to do if our struggle is to succeed in the contemplated period of time. It will be the task of students, as leaders of this struggle, to canalise the energy and enthusiasm of the people and divert it into fruitful channels. The revolutionary spirit must be kept up by all non-violent ways open to them.

Ours is a vast country. The message of the Congress has to reach each village and each hamlet. The rural India has to be roused into a spirit of open rebellion and who will do this if not the students. Such among them as are suited for this work should singly or in parties visit the rural areas and deliver the message. Only the message has to be delivered and explained and the people will do the rest. They have to be told that the British Raj is no more and they have to take steps to establish the Raj of the people. Let the people combine and take steps to establish the Raj of the people. Let the people combine and take the administration of the villages into their hands. This must inevitably involve disobedience of orders received from officials high or low. There shall be complete non-co-operation with the alien administration. There must be utmost harmony and unity among the people if our revolution is to succeed in the minimum time. The disappearance of the existing apparatus of administration should synchronise with the establishment of our own Raj in each village and Tehsil. The Raj will have behind it the united will and strength of the people.

(3) We must remember that non-violence is the basis of our struggle. Activities which tend in the direction of violence should be discouraged. Disciplined non-violence on a mass scale will generate in us ever growing strength and power. For purely practical considerations non-violence should be adhered to even under circumstances of the gravest provocation. At all events care should be taken to avoid all danger to life. Violence is self-destructive. Nothing will be more conducive to the success of the struggle than that our people remain non-violent while violence rages round them. Acts of non-violence, bravery, readiness to face death without retaliation disarm our opponents and win popular sympathy for our cause. The struggle is hardly two days old and yet we have reports of many soldiers and military officers resigning from the service. This is largely the outcome of the appeal that our voluntary suffering without retaliation makes to them. It is heartening to note that our people have remained predominantly non-violent even in the face of indecent and indiscriminate violence. They have endured the lathi charges and firings as non-violent soldiers are expected to do.

(4) The Government has suppressed all existing channels of publicity. It is for the students to explore fresh avenues. They have skill and resourcefulness enough to reach all relevant news about the movement to the people. Let them organise an information bureau. The instructions that reach them from the A. I. C. C. and other authoritative quarters should be broadcast to the people. They may print bulletins and leaflets of their own and distribute them in thousands among the people in the language or languages of the province as also in English. A group of students should be especially appointed for the publicity work.

(5) While the work of preparing bulletins and leaflets is to be entrusted to one group of students, another group, a much larger one, should be charged with the work of distributing them among all classes of people.

(6) We have to approach all classes of people, the labourers, mill-owners, the clerical personnel in the various services, the merchants, the petty traders, the police, the military and so on. Students have to maintain close and constant contacts with them. Their contacts with the police and the military can be especially useful. There is a large and growing element in the police and military services which is friendly and sympathetic to the Congress. We have to plead with them, wherever we find them to play the part worthy of them in the Great Fight. A soldier's duty is to protect the people and fight and if need be lay down his life for a good cause. It cannot be the duty of an Indian soldier to help in putting down his own people struggling for their birth-right of freedom. Our earnest pleadings

coupled with the events that are happening from day to day, cannot but have a salutary effect on the minds of our countrymen in the military and the police services. The American and other soldiers should also be approached. More about them separately.

(7) Processions and meetings should form a daily feature of our struggle. In big towns meetings may be held in different localities on different days. Besides speeches there should be a liberal distribution of printed literature among the audience. Initiative in organising meetings etc. should be taken by students.

(8) Paper or metallic badges bearing suitable mottos such as "DO OR DIE" should be distributed in thousands among the people.

(9) It is our firm hope and belief that the present struggle will bring us communal harmony. The three days of struggle have brought us abundant evidence of growing fraternisation among Hindus, Muslims, Christians, Sikhs and others. Nowhere is this fraternisation more in evidence than among students. We see this in strikes, processions, meetings and other activities. Common suffering, common devotion to the cause of Liberty have abolished all communal distinctions. Let it be the proud privilege of a student to be the agent of communal harmony. Students, Hindu, Muslim, Christian and others, should lay their heads together and find out ways and means of cementing the unity that is emerging out of the crucible of common suffering for a common cause. The message of unity should reach the man in the street through leaflets, slogans and appropriate cries.

(10) Our struggle is thickening with each passing day. There can be no slackening, no relaxation of our work. There is going to be no going back on the decision the Congress has taken. If we live we live as free men in a free country else we die in the attempt. Gandhiji need not fast, need not make the supreme sacrifice if we all stand by him, and in one united mass assert the will to be free. A miracle will happen. What appears to be a formidable structure will collapse like a pack of cards in an incredibly short space of time. Let our students be the agents of this miracle.

### DO OR DIE

WE WILL DIE, GREAT LEADER, BUT

WE WILL ALSO DO

WE WILL FREE GANDHIJI BEFORE HE FASTS

LONG LIVE THE FREE STATE OF INDIA.

### APPENDIX XII

#### *Survey of the first five months of "Our Revolution"*

EXTRACT FROM BOMBAY CONGRESS BULLETIN NO. 132, DATED 9TH JANUARY 1943

Looking Back : Our Revolution has now completed five months of its giant sweep, and is now in the sixth month. Five months of hard struggle, of toil, tears and blood, on a scale unparalleled in the history of our country. Five months of mass-up-risings, of acts of individual bravery and fearlessness, of heinous acts of inhuman brutalities and atrocities on the part of the alien Imperialist agents, and five months sustained and cheerfully braved sufferings on the part of the large masses of our people. To-day on the memorable 9th, let us, for a while, pause and ponder over these months of our freedom-march, and analyse our failures and our achievements.

Let us, at the very outset, admit that the Revolution has not been able to attain that pitch, that momentum, which we all expected it would. The march has been slower than expected. Thousands of our dear and valued comrades have laid down their lives, and many more thousands have suffered and are suffering imprisonments and untold hardships. The gigantic and sweeping mass up-risings and mass

demonstrations and mass-attacks that we witnessed in the beginning of our struggle have slowed down and subsided. The defiant temper that showed itself on the faces and in the activities of our people in the earlier stages of our struggle is today, after a strenuous march, rather seasoned down to solid bitterness. We confess that while numerous centres of usurper administration have been attacked, and in many cases, destroyed, and the war on communications has been carried on with more or less sustained tempo, we have not been, as yet, able to paralyse the administration completely. The factories are still working and producing war materials, and other factories which have been producing intellectual slaves are still active: The students have again lapsed into inactivity and drifted into the old rut.

That is our debit side. These can be put as our failures. But what about the credit side? What about our achievements?

The dynamics of our struggle do not allow us now to expect any swift results. Ours is going to be a sustained, even if long-drawn-out, struggle. Our achievements during these five months, however, give us a certain hope of ultimate success. If mass-demonstrations have ceased, we have gained immeasurably in individual bravery and resourcefulness. The movement has gone underground, and is slowly atomising into strong and virile pockets. The earlier tempo may not have been maintained. Yet the spirit of defiance and determination has spread and developed widely and intensely. In place of disorganised and scattered mass demonstrations, we have now strongly formed groups of brave and courageous and resourceful cadres, working day and night, planning and executing numerous and varied raids on the enemy.

Together with this, the social and economic discontent upon which revolutions like ours are based and are being fostered, is coming into its own. The untold poverty, hunger, and daily increasing food scarcity are rapidly rising to a pitch when all the revolting elements will join hand and crash with a bang upon the usurper authority and, through chaos and confusion and through violent upheavals, lead the Revolution to a success and create a new and better world to live in.

### APPENDIX XIII

#### *" Six Commanders of Gandhi Baba "*

[Bapu's (Mahatma Gandhi's) message to the nation at the time of going to jail.]

1. Look upon yourself as free.
2. We are free to do anything so long as we remain within the limits of non-violence.
3. Paralyse the administration of Government by means of complete hartals and other non-violent means.
4. A satyagrahi should join the struggle for dying and not in the hope of remaining alive.
5. Keep the nation alive even at the risk of death.
6. Do or die.

(How should you put into execution this message?)

1. Do not acknowledge any power other than the public.
2. Keep closed all factories, mills, colleges, schools and markets so long as full independence is not achieved.
3. Maintain complete non-cooperation with Government.
4. Destroy the administration of Government.
5. Do picketing in Government offices and dislocate Government administration by every means.

6. Destroy tram, railway and motor services.
  7. Destroy telegraph and telephone wires.
  8. Persuade policemen not to carry out Government's orders.
  9. Let the people take possession of college and school buildings and Government administration and keep them closed and in suspension if the British Government does not leave India.
  10. Violate all prohibitory orders of Government.
  11. Disseminate by every possible means and in every corner the news of this open rebellion against Government (for example give publicity to this by writing on walls, by leaflets, by writing on the ground, by word of mouth or by distributing leaflets etc.).
- For the sake of God and your country make and distribute ten copies of this.  
 "LONG LIVE FREE INDIA".

#### APPENDIX XIV

EXTRACT FROM THE "HARIJAN" DATED AUGUST 23, 1942.

##### *Question Box.*

##### *Permissible Items.*

Q.—What may be permitted for disorganising Government within the limit of non-violence?

A.—I can give my personal opinion only. In my opinion looting or burning of offices, banks, granaries etc. is not permissible. Dislocation of traffic communications is permissible in a non-violent manner without endangering life. The organisation of strikes is the best and if that can be accomplished it in itself will be effective and sufficient. It will be non-violence without blemish. Cutting wires, removing rails, destroying small bridges cannot be objected to in a struggle like this, provided ample precautions are taken to safeguard life. If the Japanese were invading us, there can be no doubt that even no principle of non-violent self-defence, these would have to be carried out. The non-violent revolutionaries have to regard the British power in the same way as they (*i.e.* revolutionaries) would the Axis powers and carry out the same measures.

#### APPENDIX XV

##### *Miscellaneous Congress pamphlets.*

Inquilab Bulletin No. 1.

Friends! We put before you the following few instructions:—

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(4) To make complete deadlock possible all factories, mills, colleges, markets, etc. must remain closed till freedom is achieved. *Instead of idling away their time, students should form their own groups in their localities to prevent their people from attending business offices.*

(5) Persuade Government officers and officials to disobey Government orders and give up their slavish jobs.

(6) Completely paralyse communications and transport, dislocate tram and bus service, uproot telegraphic and telephonic posts, dig up roads, cut railways, tear out motor and bus tyres and dislocate the Government machinery in every possible way.

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## Congress Bulletin No. 5

*Britishers' ordered Anarchy*

The real fighters for India's freedom and independence will never fight shy of the word "chaos"; rather they should invite it. That is going to overpower the present ordered anarchy carried on by the Britishers in the ugliest form for the last five days in all the cities and towns of India. Remember what Mahatmaji said on the 25th May last:—"I am convinced that we are living to-day in a state of ordered anarchy. This ordered disciplined anarchy should go and if, as a result, there is a complete lawlessness in India, I would risk it and people will evolve real popular order out of chaos".

Every freedom-loving man and woman must follow this instruction of Gandhiji to complete the task that he left unfinished.

*Anglo-American Third Front in India*

The most virulent form of violence is being used by the combined Anglo-American forces and this must be met by all available means including violence wherever necessary.

*Mass murder all over India*

The India Office in London says that our movement has not affected the masses. Since the first phase of demonstration against the British offensive in cities is now over, it is incumbent on the townsmen, villagers, factory and land-workers to organise wholesale strikes, stop payment of taxes and revenue, withdraw money from Postal Savings Banks, take possession of post offices, tahsil headquarters, thanas and chowkies, picket recruiting centres, persuade military and policemen not to use lathies, guns and bayonets against their Indian brothers and sisters and if and when such command comes from the top they should use the same weapons against their masters for unjust and inhuman order. Thus this task should be carried on relentlessly for some time and open the road for the Indian armies, who had gone out of India to fight for British but now allies of other powers, to come back to India and join your struggle.

Remember that as a protest against the British firing on Indians since 9th August the arrest of nationalist leaders and patriotic workers here, one Indian Army in Egypt and another in North Africa have refused to fight for the British and their officers and ranks have been mercilessly shot as rebels. Another Regiment of Indian Army in North Africa has revolted and as a result, 20 per cent. have been shot dead and the rest made prisoners.

*International Affairs*

Look to the battle of Solomon Island. Japan has had the upper hand there as elsewhere; yet false news is given that Japan is being defeated. On the other hand, the whole of the Pacific is controlled by the superior Jap Naval Force. America is provoking Great Britain to launch offensive everywhere, so that it gets crushed as Britain provoked all the countries only to be crushed.

Marshal Timoshenko has now given up the hopes of saving the Caucasus; he is concentrating all energies and forces towards the Stalingrad front which is in a very precarious position. It is only a matter of a few weeks for the German drive towards the borders of Iran.

The British Premier Mr. Churchill is away from London—but where and why?

The treacherous role played by Mr. Harris, British Vice-Consul at Ishpahan has been avenged by the Persian Patriots. They believe in slogan of "Asia for Asiatics" and therefore they greet each other with the abbreviated expression "Afa". Similarly, those Indians who think and act in terms of "India for Indians" propose their greeting terms as "Ifi".

The United National profess to fight for freedom and democracy but yet none of them has yet condemned the British atrocity and brutal massacre of Indians in the last few days, while all the countries forming the Axis Power and other neutral countries have been sending every day their sympathies with us and condemning gangsterism of Britishers.

Japan has consistently and persistently pronounced that she has no interest nor lust for conquest of India except that the Britishers are driven out and India becomes free at once.

The Indian soldiers including those of the Mysore, Baroda, Kapurthala, Nizam States who are now free in Japan and German occupied countries or even in Free States of Burma, Malaya, Singapore, Batavia, etc. are sending their greetings to their Indian brothers with assurances that they would come back soon to liberate India. Once the struggle has begun it must be carried on vigorously simultaneously all over India till Gandhiji's Birthday—2nd October next.

Bombay Congress Bulletin dated 17th August 1942

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**TO SOLDIERS.** Let us appeal to the soldiers and the police in our country to refuse to act as the repressive arm of the law. For this organisation and continued effort is necessary. The will of the people is with us. Let us get down to our workers and tell them that they must refuse to supply with their labours the requirements of an unjust government. Actual organisation of their relief is another heavy task. Determination to strike work cannot succeed without adequate food for those who come out. Let us collect food and aid for the workers so that a general strike of a long enough duration may succeed.

It is the legitimate duty of a people to end tyranny and thwart its opponents by the organised strength of its will. Let us exercise our will and—

1. Refuse all co-operation to the Government.
2. Deny the use of communication to troop movements or troop supplies.
3. Refuse to obey their unjust laws.
4. Refuse to work in war factories.
5. Refuse to help the government in repressing our own people.

Remember that our five hundred people have been shot dead and five times as many wounded all over India during the week after Gandhiji's arrest. Nearly thirty thousand men and women have been thrown into prisons during the first week of the struggle for freedom but the spirit of the people is undaunted. Government is congratulating itself already but he laughs best who laughs last. The fire within and underneath will express itself in some days. Each one of you help in this expression. Non-cooperate with the industrial economic and legal machine of the Government. Stay away from your jobs.

The finger of our brave martyr is pointed at you. Shall it be one of accusation or praise ?

*Leaflet entitled " Workers of India " issued in the name of the A. I. C. C. Office*

Gandhiji has called upon every Indian to declare himself or herself as a citizen of free India. This declaration implies that we refuse to obey British laws or accept British authority. The process of smashing British authority has already begun with the beginning of Indian Revolution.

\* \* \* \* \*

Workers have always been in the forefront of Revolutions and you must lead the Indian Revolution. You have already shown your determination by walking out of your factories which were today mostly doing jobs for the British Government you have begun to overthrow. Keep out of these factories till British power is smashed and becomes a thing of the past. Bring out your comrades who are still inside the few factories. You will not have to keep out long and the factories you go back to will not be the monuments of exploitation that they are for with British rule must end.

The resolution of the Working Committee dated 14th July which was subsequently reiterated by the Bombay A. I. C. C. states "Only after the end of British authority will the realisation come home that princes, jagirdars, zamindars and propertied and monied classes drive their wealth and property from workers in the fields and factories and elsewhere to whom essentially power and authority must belong". It is in your hands to make this possible by sweeping away British authority and exploitation of one stroke.

You have all over the country faced lathies and bullets and you are facing them today as brave men and women. Nothing worth while is achieved without the necessary sacrifice.

In addition to the stoppage of work you have to see that communications in any shape or form must stop, the foreign army must be immobilised so that it can have no power to strike you and your countrymen.

Every article which this army and the British authority needs must also be cut off. We did not invite them here. Let them feed and clothe themselves as best they can.

Start organising yourselves in your street and moholla committee so that you protect yourselves against the attempt by the police and the military to re-establish British authority.

You know that Gandhiji asked you to rebel because Japanese are knocking at your doors and perhaps Germans might be doing so in the near future. The British Government has proved itself incapable in Malaya, and Burma to protect those people. They are no more capable of protecting you. The people want the power to organise themselves for defence for the British and other foreign armies if defeated will run with their tails between their legs. You will have to live in this country and you do not want to exchange masters but be masters in your own country. The right and ability to defend our country can only be effective after we have the power to do so, a power the British have withheld from us because in spite of their tall talk of democracy they want to hold India in bondage.

#### Bulletin No. 6—War of Independence

##### *Devilish Slaughter*

The devilish slaughtering by the British Army and Police is going on still more ruthlessly. In addition to the places mentioned in our previous bulletin, the firing was resorted to on the unarmed people at Madura, Sangli, Benares, Gorakhpur and several other places. Further brutal attacks with tear gas, batons, lathies, guns, bayonets and bombs etc., are made freely while the defensive weapons of our soldiers are only stones and soda water bottles. The casualties so far being 700 killed and about 7,000 wounded; about 4,500 people have already been made prisoners of war by the British while the number of such prisoners in Bombay alone is in the neighbourhood of 1,000.

##### *No Negotiation—Fight on*

Those who talk of negotiation and compromise even at this stage, are doing greater harm than good to the cause of the country. The Government has first started the offensive and ours is only defensive. This fight we must carry on to victorious conclusion. "Victory or Death" is our determination.

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### *War Programme*

This programme has already been given to the country and we dealt with items in our previous bulletins. While reiterating the same we now ask you to include the following items as well and they should be worked out according to the suitability of different places and capacity of the soldiers of freedom—

1. Boycott of all English goods.
2. Boycott all British firms and shops.
3. Social boycott of persons who help the British in any shape or manner.
4. Formation of Guerilla Bands to give surprise attacks on the Tommies.
5. Prevention of personal harm or physical injury of the public.
6. Symbols of slavery like the British monuments, statues are to be demolished and destroyed.
7. Slow and inefficient work by clerks and ministerial staff in the offices of Government and British and American Firms.
8. Wholesale strike in mills and factories concerning textile and engineering.
9. Britishers' cooks are to be organised to cook bad food for their masters.
10. Formation of barricades in streets to prevent police and military attacks.
11. Defiance of all laws.
12. Prevention of all courts functioning.
13. Non-payment of all kinds of taxes whenever possible.
14. Stopping of all trains carrying troops and war materials.

#### Bulletin No. 7—War of Independence.

....., the soldiers of our National Militia have been so far successful in dislocating all the railway traffic, telephone and telegraphic communications almost all over India. The notable success in this direction is in Bengal which even the Government had admitted.

#### *Workers Task*

This movement has opened up the greatest opportunity for the industrial workers to fight for their salvation. So long as they were fighting only on economic grounds and had their piecemeal settlement. But now let them secure the political Freedom and take rein in their hands. For this they must strive every nerve to sabotage the supply of war materials to the British. This they can and should do by stopping work in all mills and factories specially of textile and engineering. They should leave their work immediately, leave the cities and go to their native places and take up the whole programme to work out in the interior. Those who remain in and around the cities should picket vigorously all the places including transport services, create all kinds of harassment to the civil, police and military of the Britishers.

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The self-respecting citizens, youths and students would retaliate the insulting and most humiliating expressions of the Britishers when they call our soldiers of the National Militia as "mobs", "hooligans", "rowdy elements" etc.

Regular hands of youths and students should be organised to approach the mothers, sisters, and wives of those Indians who are now working in the Police and Military and make them persuade their relatives to revolt against their masters and win freedom for their own motherland. As a matter of fact, within these ten days



our own Indian brethren have shot our brilliant brothers and molested our sisters. If they do not stop this behaviour, they will be suitably dealt with for which the mothers and sisters of such police and military men should be warned before hand.

### *Bonfire of English Goods*

There should be organised raids on shops dealing with English goods and asked to stop selling such goods. If they refuse to do so, there should be bon-fires of such goods in front of those shops.

### *Picketing of English and American Banks*

The Bank clerks of such banks should ask all depositors to withdraw their money ; destroy such records as are useful to the English Directors and the Bank itself. Students and workers should raid such banks as well, but before it is done the depositors should be asked to withdraw their money from all English and American banks.

“ Victory or Death ”—Must be our Answer

Do or Die—Mabatma's Command.

INQUILAB ZINDABAD. AZAD HIND ZINDABAD.

Leaflet entitled “ Free State of India Gazette ”, dated 18th August 1942.

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In order to shorten the struggle against the foreign authority it is very necessary among other things to starve it of vital supplies. Your Association is concerned with one such vital supply and it gladdened our hearts to see that there was practically a complete stoppage of work in Textile Mills. It helped us in two ways, stopping supplies to the British and releasing large man-power to assist in the task of smashing British authority.

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